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INTRODUCTION

Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides a
current deduction for the ordinary and necessary expenses of carrying on a trade or business. 1 However, the deduction of start-up
and analogous costs, incurred prior to commencement of revenuegenerating operations in a new business, as an ordinary business
expense is traditionally denied on the relatively mechanical ground
that the taxpayer is not yet carrying on a trade or business; the
, denial is based on the "preparatory" doctrine. 2 Once capitalized,
' I.R.C. § 162(a).
• Section 195(c)(1) (1984) (like its predecessor § 195(b) (1980)) of the Code encompasses
both investigatory and pre-opening costs within the generic term "start-up expenditures."
See infra note 315. Some commentators agree with the approach adopted by the Code. See,
e.g., Buell, Business Start Up Costs: Analyzing and Planning for Current Deductibility, 43 J.
Tax'n 278 (1975); Erbacher, Start-Up Costs: Are They Deductible by a Corporation for Federal Income Tax Purposes?, 48 Taxes 488, 496 (1970); Roth, Trade or Business Requirement
of Sec. 162 and the Deductibility of Preoccupancy Expenses Incurred in Rental Real Estate
Projects, 57 Taxes 33 (1979); see also infra note 175. However, other commentators distinguish between (a) investigatory costs and (b) pre-opening expenses, which are often called
start-up costs. See, e.g., Lee, Pre-Operating Expenses and Section 174: Will Snow Fall?, 27
Tax Law. 381, 384 (1974); Seago, The Tax Treatment of Start-Up Costs, 9 Tax Adviser 410
(1978). Proper tax treatment (current deduction versus capitalization) of the two classes of
expenditure may differ in some instances under a deep structure analysis. See infra note
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such start-up costs are also inequitably held to be nonamortizable
after the business commences. 8 In contrast to this traditional "definition approach," a "functional approach" to the treatment of
such costs would deny a deduction, based upon a lack of business
status, only to non-profit-motivated and investment expenditures.
The functional approach opens the way for consideration of the
structural question" of the distinction between currently deducti443.
Under the preparatory doctrine, a current deduction of both classes of expenditures is
denied because the activity is not yet functioning as a going concern. See infra notes 175-187
and accompanying text. The preparatory doctrine still finds adherents. See, e.g., Aboussie v.
United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1985). Increasingly, however, decisions base denial
of a current deduction of start-up costs on the rationale that they constitute capital expenditures. See, e.g., Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleveland
Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 CJ. Ct. 220, 228 (1985). Start-up cost issues are
frequently raised on audit. Hearings on H.R. 6883, H.R. 5616, H.R. 5729 [60-month amortization of start-up costs], H.R. 6039, H.R. 6140, H.R. 6247, H.R. 6824, and H.R. 7009 Before
the Subcomm..on Select Revenue Measures of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 45, 101-02 (1980) [hereinafter 1980 Hearings] (statements of Charles M.
Walker, Chairman, Section of Taxation, A.B.A., and Samuel M. Chase, Jr., Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors,
respectively).
• Capitalized start-up costs are usually added to one of three items. First, they are added
to the nonamortizable basis of the business created in part by them. E.g., Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 52
(1973); cf. Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986) (start-up costs "are
part of the cost of establishing the enterprise"). Second, they are added to a nonamortizable
permit required to operate as a business. E.g., Richmond Television Corp. v. United States,
345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), rev'd and remanded, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 CJ. Ct. 220 (1985). Third, they are added to amortizable business
assets used in the created business. E.g., Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir.
1976); Shainberg v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 241 (1959); see also cases cited infra note 112.
• A structural question involves a basic concept of the Code. See Kingson, The Deep
Structure of Taxation: Dividend Distributions, 85 Yale L.J. 861, 861 (1976) (arguing that
"difficulty in understanding tax law most frequently arises from failure by those who use
basic concepts to grasp their meaning, rather than from any excessive attempt at statutory
precision").
The deep structure analysis in the start-up and business expansion cost area must start
with "Congress' fundamental policy decision to tax net income calculated annually, with
minimal distortion. To arrive at a figure for annual net income for a given tax year, it is
necessary to reduce gross revenues for the year by the costs of producing those revenues."
NCNB Corp. v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 947 (4th Cir. 1981) ("NCNB /"), vacated and
remanded en bane, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); see also Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983); Note, Commissioner u. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association: "Separate and Distinct Asset" As a Condition Sufficient for Capitalization, 2 Va. Tax Rev. 315 (1982). A net annual income is
supported by the legislative history. 50 Cong. Rec. 3,849 (1913) (statement of Senator
Williams).
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ble or "ordinary" expenses and capital expenditures. The emerging
functional answer turns on whether current deductibility will substantially distort the taxpayer's income. 11 If so, the expenditure
should be capitalized and concomitantly its cost amortized or deducted ratably over the expenditure's useful life. The conflict between the definitional approach and the functional approach continues as to start-up-type costs incurred after commencement of
revenue-generating operations. Under the "separate, saleable asset" definitional tack, start-up-type expenditures incurred in expanding an existing business are currently deductible if they do
not enhance or create property convertible into cash,6 whereas a
functional approach continues to ask whether a current deduction
will produce a substantial distortion of income as contrasted with
capitalization and gradual amortization.
The case-law development of the tax treatment of start-up business expansion and analogous costs epitomizes the hazards of a
bright-line definitional approach, particulary in the multi-jurisdictional tax world. 7 It may produce the correct result on the narrow
facts to which first applied, but upon further talismanic extension
generates functional inequities. These inequities, like a blocked
river seeking new channels, often force other resolutons. Thus,
some tribunals seeking to maintain the definitional precedents
while obviating such inequities multiplied nonfunctional distinctions, distorted other tax concepts, or adopted further definitional
tests. Other tribunals more forthrightly, but in direct conflict with
the definitional tests, applied a functional approach. All of this ne-

• See 1 B. Bittker, Federal Taxation of Income, Estates and Gifts 11 20.4.1, at 20-66 to -67
(1981). Professor Bittker concludes that:
As with the danger of over-inclusion, the best remedy against an under-inclusive application of the capital expenditure concept is to focus on whether income will be
better reflected by deducting or capitalizing the amount in question. This is obviously
not an easy standard to apply, but it has the virtue of emphasizing the basic objective
of the relevant statutory provisions rather than secondary guideposts.
Id. at 20-67 (footnotes omitted); see Gunn, The Requirement that a Capital Expenditure
Create or Enhance an Asset, 15 B.C. Indus. & Com. L. Rev. 443, 452 (1974); Lee & Murphy,
Capital Expenditures: A Result in Search of a Rationale, 15 U. Rich. L. Rev. 473, 474-75,
544-45 (1981); Note, Deductibility of Start-Up Expenditures Under Section 162-The
"Clear-Reflection-of-Income" Test, 61 Cornell L. Rev. 618, 630-31, 638-39 (1976).
• See, e.g., Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973); accord
Colorado Springs Nat'! Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1974).
7
Tax controversies may be tried in the Tax Court, federal district courts, or the Claims
Court. See generally 4 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 115.1.
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gates the prime, if not sole virtue of a definitional approach: predictable results. 8
The frequent controversies between taxpayers and the Internal
Revenue Service under these definitional approaches, as well as
the disparate tax treatment of identical expenditures by new and
existing businesses, led Congress 9 in 1980, as part of the then nascent tax reform and simplification efforts, 10 to enact section 195, 11
which provides for elective sixty-month amortization of start-up
costs incurred by a taxpayer in a new active business. 12 Unfortunately, the new Code provision utterly missed a basic goal of such
·simplification: attainment of a reasonably certain conclusion with~
out expenditure of excessive research time. 13 Instead of remedying
this failure, the 1984 amendments to section 195 1 " sadly compounded it. Additionally, the section continues the perverse tax
disparity of favoring existing businesses over new businesses, 111 al-

• Cf. Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538, 550 (1983) (Cohen, J., dissenting), aff'd
mem., 745 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1984). Judge Cohen stated that:
To say that the contract is the income-producing asset and the expenses relating to
that are deductible is to create chaos among those attempting to decide cases on
principle [the preparatory doctrine) rather than on the level of imagination utilized
by the taxpayer. In my opinion, the approach of the majority will create new 'incongruities in this area of the law,' which can only constitute a renewed inducement to
controversy and an impediment to settlement of litigation.
ld. (footnote omitted).
• See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1036, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 13, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 7293, 7303.
10
See, e.g., Committee on Tax Policy, Tax Section, N.Y. State Bar Ass'n, A Report on
Complexity and the Income Tax, 27 Tax L. Rev. 325 (1972) [hereinafter N.Y. Bar Report);
Krane, Depreciation, Investment Tax Credit, Capitalized Versus Deductible Expenditures,
and Prepaid Expenses, in Federal Income Tax Simplification 295 (C. Gustafson ed. 1979);
McDaniel, Simplification Symposium-Federal Income Tax Simplification: The Political
Process, 34 Tax L. Rev. 27 (1978) and commentary cited at 27 n.l. This superficial treatment of start-up costa was probably considered by the drafters of § 195. Compare Krane, at
310-11 with S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 7300-04.
11
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 102(a), 94 Stat. 3521, 3522
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 195).
11
I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1984); I.R.C. § 195(a) (1980).
18
Simplification to practitioners means that a reasonably certain conclusion can be determined by diligent and expert research without excess expenditure of time and dollars. See
N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 10, at 327. (This is not generally the case with start-up costs
and analogous expenditures before or after § 195, as this article abundantly evidences.)
14
Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 614-15 (codified at
I.R.C. § 195).
10
Section 195 requires new businesses to amortize or deduct ratably over at least a 60-
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though new businesses are already at a disadvantage in both the
capital and credit markets.
Two mistakes made by its drafters make section 195 a deeply
flawed provision and a substantial step backwards from simplicity.
First, embodying a drafting technique widely advocated in calls for
tax reform and simplification, 18 section 195 constitutes a barebones generalized statute leaving to the regulations, yet to be
promulgated, the fleshing out of the necessary details. Congress,
however, apparently unwilling to remove its thumb from the scales,
provided detailed guidance in the 1980 Committee Reports. 17 Unfortunately, this "legislative history" incorporated by reference
"present law" in an astounding number of controversial, uncertain
areas, fatally eroding the certainty sought by the statute. Second,
the drafters failed to consider an even more fundamental need in

month period expenditures that an existing business can currently deduct in "operation"
(previously, could currently deduct in "expansion"). I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1984); cf. I.R.C.
§ 195(a) (1980). As a witness pointed out at the 1980 Hearings on § 195 and other "minor"
tax bills, as to the pre-section 195 tax disparity between a new business and an existing
business:
An interesting point is that the same costs which are not deductible in starting up a
new business become deductible once the business has reached going concern status.
Then those same types of costs, not deductible or depreciable to the preoperating
venture, become deductible under our tax laws. Thus, our tax policy currently warns
an entrepreneur who is interested in investing and starting a new business or a new
economic entity: You will have to finance all of these costs with after-tax dollars, but
just as soon as you can demonstrate you have become a going concern, then we will
let you finance the identical types of costs with pretax dollars. In our judgment, this
is an excellent illustration of a cart-before-horse policy.
1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 107 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate National
Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.).
Sixty-month amortization is still less beneficial than an immediate deduction, notwithstanding the rationalization that a new business may be in a loss situation and, hence, find
deferral simpler since it corresponds "more closely to the earnings growth of a new business." 126 Cong. Rec. 24,813 (1980) (statement of Rep. Conable, introducer of H.R. 5729);
see NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285, 295-96 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane) ("NCNB
//") (Murnaghan, J., dissenting), vacating and remanding, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981). The
60-month amortization undoubtedly was a compromise between the aU-or-nothing (immediate deduction or capitalization without amortization) definitional rules of pre-1980 case law.
See Krane, supra note 10, at 310-11) (suggesting just such a § 248-like compromise to the
"intractable" start-up controversy). Section 248 was unmistakably the basis for the original
bill. Compare H.R. 5729, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at
181 with I.R.C. § 248.
'" See N.Y. Bar Report, supra note 10, at 348-49.
17
See, e.g., S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-14, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 7300-04.
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such reform-deep structure analysis 18 of ordinary and capital expenditures. Consequently, the efficacy of original section 195 fatefully hinged upon the fallacious premise that all targeted start-up
costs would be currently deductible if they had been incurred after
commencement of the business, with no apparent awareness of the
capitalization role of the clear reflection of income doctrine. The
1984 amendments still displayed the drafters' confusion of ordinary and capital expenditures.
The demarcation, predominantly judicially fashioned, between
ordinary and capital expenditures probably is the most difficult to
·draw in the tax field. 19 Accordingly, in order to lay an analytical
framework on which to examine start-up costs, Part II of this article analyzes the minimum distortion of income rationale for capitalization and the acquisition cost rationale, which when misapplied itself produces distortion of income. This section also
proposes a model reconciling these two approaches with respect to
start-up costs by treating the expenditure itself as a free-standing,
amortizable asset. Part III evaluates the case-law development of
start-up and business expansion costs in light of this model, focusing on (a) the judicial development of, and responses to, the conflicting definitional and functional tests, (b) the rejection of an approach substantially similar to the model, and (c) the substantial
impact of the enactment of section 195. Part IV critically examines
section 195, both as enacted and as amended, against the backdrop
of this case-law development and the model, paying particular attention to the statute's attributes of legislation by committee report, codification of case-law conflicts, and lack of deep structure
analysis.
II.

CAPITALIZATION AND CAPITAL RECOVERY: A DEEP STRUCTURE
ANALYSIS

A.

The Model

An ordinary business or investment expense is currently deducti•• See Kingson, supra note 4, at 861.
See, e.g., Seligman v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 191, 201 (1985), affd, 796 F.2d 116 (5th
Cir. 1986); accord Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 872, 878 (1977),
affd, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979); Boagni v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 708, 712 (1973). See
generally Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 473.
11
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ble in the tax year incurred or paid. 20 A capital expenditure, in
contrast, may be deducted from ordinary income only21 through (a)
amortization or depreciation, usually ratably, over the useful life of

•• Section 162(a) provides a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid
or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." I.R.C. § 162(a).
Section 212 provides individual taxpayers a deduction for "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year-(1) for the production or collection of
income; (2) for the management, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income." I.R.C. § 212. The courts have assigned several major functions to the
term "ordinary and necessary." See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, II 20.3.2. The two most important of these functions have been (1) to limit deductions to normal or habitual expenditures (shading into "public policy") and (2) to distinguish between currently deductible and
capital expenditures. See Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120
(6th Cir. 1984). Bertolini Trucking, however, pointed out that the Supreme Court announced that the " 'principal function of the term 'ordinary' ... is to clarify the distinction,
often difficult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in
the nature of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the
useful life of the asset.'" 736 F.2d at 1123 (quoting Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687,
689-90 (1966)).
The confusion as to the meaning of "ordinary" stems from the fact that both approaches
are "to a certain extent correct, and are not mutually exclusive.'' 736 F.2d at 1124. An unusual expense is often capital "because it is a purchase of an asset requiring an unusually
large cash outlay," and "an expenditure may be so abnormal as not to logically be connected
to the taxpayer's particular business at all," in which case it is not necessary. Id. at 1124-25.
These questions-"normal" or "habitual"-are but tools for getting at the prime question:
whether the expenditure should be deducted currently or capitalized. Id. at 1125. See generally Wolfman, Professors and the "Ordinary and Necessary" Business Expense, 112 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 1089, 1096 (1964). The term "expense" in both §§ 162 and 212 may also serve the
same function as "ordinary.'' See Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345,
354 (1971). See generally 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, II 20.4.1, at 20-65; Roth, supra note 2, at
34. These provisions are backstopped by § 263, which denies any (current) deduction for,
among other items, "[a]ny amount paid out for new buildings or for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate." I.R.C.
§ 263(a)(1) (which overrides §§ 162(a) and 212). See Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418
U.S. 1, 16-17 (1974). These provisions also appear to be the inspiration for the test adopted
in Lincoln Savings & Loan. See infra note 233 and accompanying text.
While § 263 has been broadly interpreted to deny any deduction for capital expenditures,
"[i]t serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction properly attributable,
through amortization, to later tax years when the capital asset becomes income producing."
Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 16. In fact, "capitalization is a basic principle of income taxation
rather than a technical requirement imposed by specific statutory language.'' Gunn, supra
note 5, at 450; see also 1 B. Bittker supra note 5, II 20.4.1, at 20-66. Section 446(b), with its
requirement that the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflect income, also applies to
this area. See Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(a)(4)(ii) (expenditures made during the year must be
properly classified between capital and expense); 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, II 20.4.1, at 2065.
•• The Code and, on occasion, the regulations have provided a mechanical current deduction for capital expenditures below an administrative benchmark. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 179;
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-11(d)(2)(iii).
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the asset acquired, created, or improved by the expenditure, 22 or
(b) upon destruction or abandonment prior to the end of such life
as a loss under section 165. 28 This timing aspect of capitalization is

•• Amortization of the "cost" of property used in a trade or business, or held for the
production of income, traditionally has consisted of first determining the useful life of the
intangible asset acquired, created, or enhanced by the expenditure, under Treas. Reg.
§ 1.167(a)-3, and then allowing ratable, animal "depreciation" or amortization deductions,
under § 167 of the Code, equal to the amount of that expenditure over such life. Such
ratable charge generally is not directly tied, tax year-by-tax year, to the income produced .
.See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.1, at 23-5; Note, supra note 4, at 331.
In the case of depreciation of tangible assets, useful life rules are similar to- (albeit more
lenient, under Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-l(a)), but more rapid (in early years of use) than, ratable methods of recovery (i.e., accelerated depreciation), although recently class-life treatment has been increasingly available. See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.3.4. Under the
Accelerated Cost Recovery System ("ACRS") provided by § 168, which also is limited to
depreciable tangible property, the recovery method is front-loaded and the recovery period
a small fraction of actual useful life. See, e.g., 2 Department of the Treasury, Tax Reform
for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to the
President 154-55 (1984) [hereinafter Treasury Report]. In addition, for most taxpayers all
assets fall into one of three classes: real estate, cars and truc-ks, and other equipment. See
I.R.C. § 168(b)(2).
.
Terminology in this area is "confused," with the Code using "depreciation" to refer to the
cost of tangible and intangible property covered by § 167, while "amortization" refers to
statutory provisions allowing ratable deductions of cost faster than permitted under § 167
(see, e.g., I.R.C. § 169), or of costs not deductible under § 167 (see, e.g., I.R.C. § 195). Commentators and cases, however, limit "depreciation" to cost recovery of tangible property and
"amortization" to cost recovery of intangibles. E.g., 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.1, at
23-4.
The function of classic depreciation and amortization is "to further the integrity of periodic income statements by making a meaningful allocation of the cost entailed in the use
(excluding maintenance expense) of the asset to the periods to which it contributes." Massey Motors, Inc. v. United States, 364 U.S. 92, 104 (1960). In short, depreciation and amortization are the "indispensable corollary" of capitalization to prevent distortion of income.
See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.2, at 23-7. Historically, they served to spread the
deductions of the capitalized expenditure over the tax years benefited, thereby "matching"
income and the cost of producing the income. For discussion of the controversy over
whether capitalization to prevent distortion of income is appropriate where neither depreciation nor amortization is available (e.g., due to inability to prove a "limited useful life"), see
infra notes 65-95 and accompanying text. For discussion of the different thrust of ACRS, see
infra notes 30-32 and accompanying text.
18
Section 165(a) provides a deduction for "any loss sustained during the taxable year and
not compensated for by insurance or otherwise." I.R.C. § 165(a). In the case of individuals,
however, such deductible losses are limited to losses incurred in a trade or business or in
any (non-trade or -business) transaction entered into for profit. These limitations do not
apply to losses arising from casualty or theft, however. See I.R.C. § 165(c). For losses (not
from casualty or theft) to be ordinary, either from a capital asset or an expenditure, they
must not arise from a sale or exchange. See I.R.C. § 165(0. As a practical matter, non-theft
or -casualty losses must arise from the asset becoming worthless or being abandoned. See 1
B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 25.8.2. For special problems where nonrecourse liabilities are
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dictated by a basic policy of the tax system to tax net income annually with minimum distortion of income. 2" Under an economic
model of determining net income, a capital expenditure is not
spent in the year it is made; rather, the expenditure is converted
into a different type of property. 211 The cost of this property then
reduces gross income in each tax period according to the change in
its value between the beginning and the end of the period in question.26 Under judicially adopted accounting concepts,27 capitalization-when coupled with depreciation or amortization-serves to
match (albeit usually roughly) an expenditure generating future income with such income. 28
Accelerated costs recovery methods, e.g., the Accelerated Cost
Recovery System ("ACRS") enacted as section 168 of the Code29
(unavailable for intangible assets), are a major departure from the
economic model . This departure at best economically matches resultant income and the expenditure only in very high inflation tax
years. 30 This distortion in accelerated cost recovery methods resulted in the open abandonment of the pretense of trying to measure income31 and instead was intended to eliminate the income
tax on capital, at least for personal property. 32 Such methods fuel

present, see Freeland v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 970 (1980); accord Middleton v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 310 (1981).
•• See supra note 4. See generally Gunn, supra note 5 (discussed infra note 37).
•• See Kahn, Accelerated Depreciation-Tax Expenditure or Proper Allowance for Measuring Net Income?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 13 (1979).
•• See id. at 3.
17
Matching costs with revenues produced in a particular period is a basic financial accounting concept under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"). See Dubroff,
Cahill & Norris, Tax Accounting: The Relationship of Clear Reflection of Income to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, 47 Alb. L. Rev. 354, 358-59 (1983) [hereinafter
Dubroff]. Judicial acceptance of this basic financial accounting concept should not involve
the adoption, as well, of the GAAP hierarchy of expense principles. See Commissioner v.
Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.
1 (1979). But see NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 948-49, vacated and remanded en bane, 684 F.2d 285
(4th Cir. 1982). See generally infra notes 258-63 and accompanying text.
•• Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 16.
•• Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 20l(a), 95 Stat. 172, 203-18
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 168).
•• See Treasury Report, supra note 22, at 155-56.
•• See Steines, Income Tax Allowances for Cost Recovery, 40 Tax L. Rev. 483, 501, 51819, 531-32, 536 (1985); Warren, Accelerated Capital Recovery, Debt, and Tax Arbitrage, 38
Tax Law. 549 (1985).
•• Steines, supra note 31, at 518, 531, 537; Warren, supra note 31, at 554 (1982-86 combination of investment tax credits, depreciable basis, and acceleration of depreciation for
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real estate tax shelters, particularly in low inflation tax years, and
virtually eliminate corporate-level income taxes in some capital intensive industries. 88 Classic depreciation of tangible property and
current amortization of intangible property, on the other hand,
conceptually consist of allocating a capitalized cost (usually ratably) to the tax years to which it contributes to production of income, i.e., its useful life. s• Capitalization coupled with amortization
is therefore necessary to prevent the distortion (here, understatement) of the taxpayer's net income that would result from deducting the entire cost currently of an expenditure "properly attributa·ble, through amortization, to later tax years when the capital asset
becomes income-producing." 811
In ascertaining the period in which to deduct a cost benefiting
several tax years, the fact that it benefits future years is not alone
determinative. As one commentator notes
if the IRS seriously endeavored to disallow every cost contributing
to the profits of future periods, it would be necessary to divide almost every salary and advertising expense between its immediate
impact on the customer and its contribution to the company's
long-lived goodwill. Recognizing this fact of business life, the Supreme Court has said that "the presence of an ensuing benefit that
may have some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses
concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable
year." 88

three· and five-year ACRS property equivalent to expensing at ten percent discount rate);
see S. Rep. No. 494, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 123, 126, reprinted in 1982 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News 781, 888, 891.
•• The new separate basket limitation on the deductibility of passive activity losses, also
included in the new minimum tax, will serve as a surrogate to curb overuse of tax shelters.
Under new § 469 of the Code, after Dec. 31, 1986, individuals, estates, trusts, and close and
personal service corporations may not use net losses and credits from passive trade or business activities to offset other income (e.g., salary, portfolio income, and active business income), but may use them to offset income from passive activities. See Tax Reform Act of
1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 501(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 469). The new minimum tax
imposes this limitation on all taxpayers, corporate as well as noncorporate. See id. at
§ 701(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 58(b)) .
.. See, e.g., Massey Motors, 364 U.S. at 104.
•• Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 16.
ae 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 20.4.1, at 20-67 (quoting Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. &
Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345, 354 (1971)). Precisely the same point was made (indeed, using the
same example) subsequently in Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d
212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982) (dictum). See Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner, 475 F.2d 775,
785-86 (2d Cir. 1973); Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 617 (Ct. Cl.
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The critical question is whether current deduction of an expenditure will result in more than minimal distortion of income. 37 If not,
and the burden of capitalization and amortization will be heavy,
the expenditure should be currently deducted in its entirety in the
year made. 38 Such minimal distortion is produced by the current
deduction of an expenditure with future benefits where the expenditure (1) is not substantial in relationship to the taxpayer's overall income for the year or its useful life is short, (2) recurs regularly, or annually in roughly equivalent amounts, and the future
benefit is short or uncertain, or (3) cannot be clearly associated
with either current or future tax years. 39
However, another basis for capitalizaton, derived from a different line of authorities than those preventing a mismatch in the
timing of costs and attributable income, seeks to prevent a mismatch in the character of the deduction of an expenditure incurred in connection with the acquisition or disposition of a capital
asset. 40 To prevent the income distortion generated by the coup1978).
" The seminal commentary in the area of capital expenditures developed the thesis that
"a determination of whether capitalization of an expenditure is necessary to clearly reflect
income ... [should be] substituted for the usual process of determining whether the expenditure produces an asset,'~ and that expensing small items does not distort the taxpayer's
income. Gunn, supra note 5, at 452; accord Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 541-44; see infra
notes 53-60 and accompanying text. Gunn also raised the possibility that capitalization is
not appropriate in this context when amortization is not available. Gunn, supra note 5, at
492-95; cf. Note, supra note 5, at 621 n.21, 625 n.42 (proposing as an alternative factor to
future benefit the question whether the expense is recurring, in the context of distortion of
income; but principally arguing that reliance upon Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") for determining current deduction versus capitalization would avoid distortion of income). Essentially, this was the approach taken in NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961; see
infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text. One thesis of this article is that accounting concepts, e.g., treating a cost as an amortizable deferred charge, are useful in clearly reflecting
income, but "currency" or even "capitalization" does not incorporate GAAP per se. See
infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
88
See Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970); see also
Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979); Southland
Royalty, 582 F.2d at 618. Some tribunals overstress the "burden" of capitalization/amortization in attempting to distinguish between current and future use. E.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 234-35 (1985); cf. NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961
(vacated panel opinion). These courts focus on the "burden" rather than determining the
total period benefited (useful life). See infra notes 253-58 and accompanying text.
•• For discussion of each of these categories in turn, see infra notes 53-66, 67-79 & 80-108
and accompanying texts.
•• See Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970). See generally Lee & Murphy,
supra note 5, at 474-75, 484-99.
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ling of a current ordinary deduction for the cost of acquiring or
disposing of an asset and a pre-1987 capital gains deduction upon
disposition of the asset against the attributable capital gain unreduced by the expenditures, the "origin-of-the-claim," also known
as the acquisition cost, doctrine requires capitalization of such expenditures in order to match the character of the expenditure and
the income. 41 This doctrine is compatible with the timing-mini. mum distortion of income doctrine only so long as the expenditure
does not produce benefits for a shorter period than the asset to the
basis of which it is added. If, however, the expenditure's benefits
last for a shorter period than the useful life of the capital asset
acquired, capitalization of the expenditure and its addition to the
basis of the asset acquired itself produces distortion of income
through depreciation or amortization over a longer period than
that benefited by the expenditure, or at worst, by no amortization
at all.
In addition to the "origin-of-the-claim" doctrine, avoiding such
distortion of income also requires the use of a judicially approved
accounting concept. This concept, under the model, treats the expenditure as a separate asset, a "deferred charge" in accounting
terms,-n and its cost is then amortized over the period benefited. 43
If the period benefited is short or highly variable, so that amortization is difficult or impossible, and the expenditure is at least
"steady-state"" recurring, then the cost treated as a separate asset
should be expensed in its entirety in the year made. ' 11
Additionally, the role of the courts should be modified under the
model. Many courts improperly permit a current deduction of
(business expansion) costs, creating intangibles benefiting future
41
See Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550, 554 (Ct. Cl. 1976). For taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 1986, the present 60% capital gains deduction provided by § 1202(a) is
repealed. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 301. In addition, the alternate
corporate capital gains rate of 28% provided by § 120l(a) is conformed to the top rate for
corporations. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 311.
•• NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 949.
•• See Wolfsen Land & Cattle, 72 T.C. at 13. The vacated NCNB I panel opinion in
essence called for this approach with regard to start-up or expansion costs (which it properly believed should be treated identically), although the panel was confused regarding the
actual tax mechanisms for amortization. See infra notes 258-68 and accompanying text.
" See infra note 75 and accompanying text.
•• See Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d at 436; Southland Royalty, 582 F.2d at 618.
For discusion of the "origin-of-the-claim" or acquisition cost doctrine and deferred charge
approach, see infra notes 116-61 and accompanying text.
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years under the definitional "separate, saleable asset" doctrine, 46
in order to prevent distortion of income where they believe amortization will not be available if the expenditure were capitalized.
However, under the model the courts' flexibility in avoiding distortion of income as to start-up and business expansion costs instead
should lie in (a) approximating or estimating useful lives under
Cohan u. Commissioner,•' or (b) determining that a current deduction produces minimal distortion of income. 48
Summarizing the model entails a two-step analysis: (1) look at
whether current deduction of an expenditure will distort the taxpayer's income (because the expenditure provides future benefits
and is neither sufficiently insubstantial nor recurring to be nondistorting if currently deducted); if so, (2) estimate the period benefited by the expenditure, i.e., the useful life, and amortize the expenditure as a free-standing asset over that period.

B.

Currently Deductible Future Benefit Expenditures Not
Distorting I nco me

The allowance of a current deduction for an expense generating
future benefit depends on several factors, including the insubstantiality or short life of the expenditure49 and its regular steady-state
recurrence. 110 A further issue is raised when an expenditure cannot
be clearly associated with either current or future tax years. 111 In
light of these considerations, courts and commentators alike have
attempted to establish grounds for allowing a current deduction
for such expenditures. In contexts where income is distorted, however, amortization based on "estimation" of useful life is the appropriate remedy. 112

1. Insubstantiality or Short-Lived Expenditure
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway u. United
•• See infra notes 225-43 and accompanying text.
47
39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
•• See infra notes 116-61 and accompanying text.
•• See infra notes 54-66 and accompanying text.
•• See infra notes 67-79 and accompanying text.
61
See infra notes 80-108 and accompanying text.
•• See infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
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States 63 was the first decision to allow the current deduction of an
expenditure benefiting future years under a distortion of income
analysis. There the government argued that: (1) since the expenditures at issue admittedly had a useful life in excess of one year,
they had to be capitalized under the predecessor to section 263 64 as
a "betterment"; and, (2) the method of accounting provisions (the
predecessor to section 446) 66 were subordinate to the capital expenditure and depreciation provisions. 66 The Court of Claims (now
the Federal Circuit) disagreed, reasoning that capitalization, depreciation, and the requirement that the taxpayer's method of accounting clearly reflect income were all so "inextricably intertwined"67 that the ultimate question was whether the taxpayer's
(tax) accounting method clearly reflected its income, 68 and not
whether the benefits generated by the expenditures extended beyond the tax year, although that was a relevant inquiry. 69 The
Court of Claims relied most heavily on the insubstantiality of the
expenditures in relation to both the taxable income and the balance sheet of the taxpayer, concluding that the taxpayer's method
did clearly reflect its income. 6 ° Critical to the court's conclusion
was the fact that the burden of capitalizing and depreciating each
purchase with benefits extending beyond the tax year would be

•• 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970). See generally Gunn, supra note 5, at 454-57.
•• Section 263 generally denies a current deduction for expenditures for new buildings or
permanent improvements or betterments. I.R.C. § 263; see also supra note 20. Commentators believe that the capitalization requirement is broader than any particular section of the
Code. See, e.g., Gunn, supra note 5, at 450; accord 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 20.4.1, at 2066.
•• Section 446(a) and (b) provides that the taxpayer's income is to be computed under his
regular method of accounting unless he fails to employ a method or the method used does
not clearly reflect income. I.R.C. § 446(a)-(b). In either case, income will be computed under
such method as does clearly reflect income in the opinion of the Secretary of the Treasury.

Id .
.. 424 F.2d at 567-68. The useful life was assumed to be ten years. ld. at 571; Gunn, supra
note 5, at 456 n.55.
07
424 F.2d at 569.
•• See supra note 55.
•• 424 F.2d at 568. In this determination of clear reflection of income, "the one year rule
will be given adequate, though not conclusive, weight." Id. The taxpayer's method of accounting for these items was required by the Interstate Commerce Commission. Id. at 565.
Courts tend to give considerable weight to the requirements of applicable regulatory accounting in determining clear reflection of income. See id.; NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 292; see
also Dubroff, supra note 27, at 396-97.
80
See 424 F.2d at 571-72; Gunn, supra note 5, at 456-57.
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heavy; "at the same time, the clearer reflection of income would be
exceedingly slight if there were any at all. " 61
The Tax Court similarly pointed to the regulation permitting a
farmer to currently deduct the full cost of inexpensive or shortlived tools in the year of payment despite their capital nature, as
supporting the current deduction of the minor costs of a license by
an attorney admitted to one state bar to practice in another state
notwithstanding its future benefits. 62 Commentators also largely
rationalized the repair-maintenance rules (under which expenditures made to keep property in ordinarily efficient condition are
currently deductible but must also be capitalized) 63 under such a
distortion of income approach. The proper criterion for nondeductibility of a "repair" expenditure is whether it is sufficiently substantial in relation to the taxpayer's entire business so that deduction all at once will produce a distortion of income. 64 In short,
determining net income annually with minimum distoriton of income entails a balancing process under which taxable income is not
distorted by currently deducting a cost producing future benefit so
long as such cost is insubstantial or the future benefit is shortlived, particularly if capitalizing and then amortizing such cost will
be burdensome.
The difficulty in the "insubstantiality" test lies not in its theory,
which is recognized by certain statutory provisions, 66 but rather in
determinimg "insubstantiality" as to the particular taxpayer and
the tax year. While the cases explicitly relying on the doctrine have
involved a $20-$500 range, the Claims Court has viewed $15,000 as

•• 424 F.2d at 572. For the same balancing approach as to recurring expenditures, see
infra notes 75-78 and accompanying text.
•• Sharon v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 515, 527 (1976), affd, 591 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979); accord Diffley v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 547, 549
(1984); Galazin v. Commissioner, 38 T.C.M. (CCH) 851, 853 (1979); Treas. Reg. § 1.16212(a). Similarly, the regulations provide that "[a]mounts currently paid or accrued for
books, furniture, and professional instruments and equipment, the useful life of which is
short, may be deducted." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-6. Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific
Railway noted the "insubstantiality" underlying the current deductibility by mine operators
of the cost of items of plant and equipment necessary to maintain the mine's normal output.
424 F.2d at 569; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.612-2(a).
•• See Treas. Reg. § 1.162-4.
•• Gunn, supra note 5, at 457-60; Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 541-43; see NCNB I, 651
F.2d at 961 n.39.
•• See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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insubstantial (at least compared to $300,000). 66

2.

Recurring Steady-State Expenditures

Several decisions analyzed the current deduction of recurring expenses benefiting several tax years as not distorting the taxpayer's
income. In Southland Royalty Co. v. United States 67 the taxpayer,
an oil and gas company, currently deducted the cost of an oil and
gas reserve survey used in current operations, with an uncertain
and short useful life. The government disallowed the current deduction for the survey, but disavowed prior survey decisions that
capitalized such survey costs as part of some underlying property, 68
instead arguing that the cost must be capitalized because the survey itself had a useful life lasting beyond the taxable year. 69 The
Court of Claims allowed the deductions because they were "functionally part of, and indistinguishable from, expenditures for ordinary management planning,"70 noting that the reserve survey was
not used to determine whether oil drilling was feasible, prior to
acquiring the mineral interest. If the company had obtained the
mineral interest, the survey cost would have constituted part of the
cost of such interest (under the acquisition cost doctrine). 71 The
court looked to "matching expenditures to the income resulting
from a capital transaction" as a function of capitalization, but
found amortization inappropriate because the surveys were subject
to change at any time and were updated every few years, and
hence, capitalization without amortization would distort the taxpayer's income. 72
•• Compare Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563 (Ct. Cl. 1970) with
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985).
87
582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978). Surveys of the kind at issue, while providing some
future benefits (three to four years), were used in current operations to make income projections, develop short- and long-term budgets, arrange financing, and prepare reports to
shareholders and regulatory authorities.
88
ld. at 616. Misidentification of cost with nonamortizable assetS has been a longstanding
problem. Gunn, supra note 5, at 446.
•• 582 F.2d at 616-17.
70
ld. at 617.
71
For discussion of the treatment of recurring expenditures incurred in the acquisition of
capital assets, see infra note 284 and accompanying text.
71
The Southland Royalty court noted that:
The useful life of the survey is very uncertain; as the trial judge found, the estimates
in a reserve study are subject to change at any time and have to be updated every few
years to take account of subsequent developments. In those circumstances, it is not
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In essence, the current deduction of expenditures recurring in
normal operations, even if producing future benefits, does not produce a distortion of income so long as the expenditures are not an
acquisition cost of some underlying property with a useful life coterminous with such benefits. Analogously, the Seventh Circuit in
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner73 profferred (in
dictum)· a distortion of income analysis as supporting a series of
decisions 74 allowing authors to currently deduct their expenses
even though incurred in the creation of long-lived assets (the books
being written). 'fhe court stated:
We can think of a practical reason for allowing authors to deduct their expenses immediately, one applicable as well to publishers though not in the circumstances of the present case. If you
are in the business of producing a series of assets that will yield
income over a period of years-which is the situation of most authors and all publishers-identifying particular expenditures with
particular books, a necessary step for proper capitalization because
the useful lives of the books will not be the same, may be very
difficult, since the expenditures of an author or publisher (more
clearly the latter) tend to be joint among several books. Moreover,
allocating these expenditures among the different books is not always necessary to produce the temporal matching of income and
expenditures that the Code desiderates, because the taxable income of the author or publisher who is in a steady state (that is,
whose output is neither increasing or decreasing) will be at least
approximately the same whether his costs are expensed or capitalized. Not the same on any given book-on each book expenses
and receipts will be systematically mismatched-but the same on
average. Under these conditions the benefits of capitalization are
unlikely to exceed the accounting and other administrative costs
entailed in capitalization 76

compulsory to amortize such a recurring item over a fixed time-interval. Neither is it
appropriate to require capitalization without amortization; such a requirement would
clearly distort Southland's income.
582 F.2d at 618 (footnote omitted); see also Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner,
592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979).
•• 685 F.2d 212 (7th Cir. 1982).
•• Faura v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 849 (1980); accord Snyder v. United States, 674 F.2d
1359, 1365 (lOth Cir. 1982). See generally Note, Tax Treatment of Prepublication Expenses
of Authors and Publishers, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 537 (1983).
•• 685 F.2d at 215 (emphasis added). This balancing of the benefits of capitalization versus administrative costs where income will not be distorted by current deduction is also a
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However, the Seventh Circuit questioned whether there is a tension between the author expense cases and Commissioner v. Idaho
Power Co., 76 where the Supreme Court ruled that expenses, regardless of character, must be capitalized if incurred in creating a capital asset. Encyclopaedia Britannica balanced this reservation with
the observation that capitalizing an expenditure producing future
income or benefits, if taken "seriously," would force the capitalization of virtually every business expense, even the salary of the
salespeople whose selling activities create goodwill, yielding income
beyond the year in which the salary is paid or accrued. This is "a
result courts naturally shy away from. " 77 The Seventh Circuit
viewed the administrative costs of such "conceptual rigor" as too
great:
The distinction between recurring and nonrecurring business expenses provides a very crude but perhaps serviceable demarcation
between those capital expenditures that can feasibly be capitalized
and those that cannot be. Whether the distinction breaks down
where, as in the case of the conventional publisher, the firm's entire business is the producton of capital assets, so that it is literally
true that all of its business expenses are capital in nature [under
Idaho Power], is happily not a question we have to decide here, for
it is clear that Encyclopaedia Britannica's payments . . . were of a
nonnormal, nonrecurrent nature. 78

The tension between Idaho Power and the current deduction
under a clear reflection of income analysis of recurring expenditures made in connection with an acquisition of a capital asset,
noted in Encyclopaedia Britannica, largely disappears under further analysis. 79

3. No Clear Association with Current or Future Tax Years
The distortion of income, resulting from capitalization without
subsequent amortization or an expenditure benefiting both the
current and future tax years, calls for a determination of whether a
critical element in the insubstantial cost exception to the rule requiring capitalization of
costs that produce future benefits. See supra note 61.
78
418 u.s. 1, 16 (1974).
77
685 F.2d at 217; see supra note 36 and accompanying text.
78
685 F.2d at 217.
78
See infra notes 134·61 and accompanying text.
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current deduction of such an expenditure is mandated when amortization is impractical or unavailable. Courts and commentators
have espoused the following positions: (1) Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP") are determinative as to the timing
of deductions; (2) capitalization and amortization are subordinate
to clear reflection of income, so that a current deduction is preferable to capitalization without amortization; (3) capitalization and
amortization are separate questions; and, (4) where both current
deduction and capitalization without amortization produce distortion of income, the appropriate remedy is creative use of amortization through "estimation" of useful life-the alternative this article advocates. 80

a.

GAAP and Tax Accounting

The regulations regard the taxpayer's method of accounting, as
ordinarily "clearly reflecting income" for purposes of section
446(b) 81 if it "reflects the consistent application of generally accepted accounting principles ... , provided all items of gross income and expense are treated consistently from year to year." 82
GAAP consists of the conventions, rules, and procedures used in
financial accounting to define: (1) those economic resources and
obligations which should be recorded as assets and liabilities, (2)
which changes in them should be recorded, and (3) how and when
these changes should be measured. 83
GAAP calls for "recognition" of an expenditure as an expense in
the year paid if it cannot be associated with revenue in a later
year, preferably on the basis of either cause and effect or, if that is
not possible, on the basis of systematic and rational allocation. 8 " If
See infra notes 109-115 and accompanying text.
Under § 446(b), if the taxpayer's method of accounting does not clearly reflect income,
the Service may recompute the taxpayer's taxable income under a method which the Commissioner believes does clearly reflect income. See Dubroff, supra note 27; Note, Protecting
the Public Fisc: Fighting Accrual Abuse with Section 446 Discretion, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 378,
387-98 (1983).
•• Tress. Reg. § 1.446-1(a)(2) (based upon S. Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 300,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 4621, 4939).
•• Dubroff, supra note 27, at 366.
.. See, e.g., Basic Concepts and Accounting Principles Underlying Financial Statements
of Business Enterprises, Accounting Principles Board Statement No.4, 1111147, 157-60 (1970)
[hereinafter APB Statement No. 4]. This Statement, relied upon by the NCNB I panel in
describing the three principles mentioned in 11 161, provides in pertinent part that:
80

81
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an expenditure is not so immediately recognized as an expense, it
is carried forward on the balance sheet as an asset, acting as a deferred charge to be expensed in whole or in part in future peri-

11 147. . . . Expenses are determined by applying the expense recognition principles
on the basis of relationships between acquisition costs and either the independently
determined revenue or accounting periods . . .. From the perspective of income determination, costs are divided into (1) those that have "expired" and become expenses and (2) those that are related to later periods and are carried forward as assets
in the balance sheet.
11 157. . . . [Associating cause and effect.] Some costs are recognized as expenses on
the basis of a presumed direct association with specific revenue.
Although direct cause and effect relationships can seldom be conclusively demonstrated, many costs appear to be related to particular revenue and recognizing them
as expenses accompanies recognition of the revenue. Examples of expenses that are
recognized by associating cause and effect are sales commissions and costs of products sold or services provided.
11 158. Several assumptions regarding relationships must be made to accumulate the
costs of products sold or services provided . . . . "Attaching" costs ... often requires
several allocations and reallocations of costs . . . .
11159. . . . [Systematic and rational allocation.) In the absence of a direct means of
associating cause and effect, some costs are associated with specific accounting periods as expenses on the basis of an attempt to allocate costs in a systematic and rational manner among the periods in which benefits are provided. If an asset provides
benefits for several periods its cost is allocated to the periods in a systematic and
rational manner in the absence of a more direct basis for associating cause and effect.
The cost of an asset that provides benefits for only one period is recognized as an
expense of that period (also a systematic and rational allocation). This form of expense recognition always involves assumptions about the pattern of benefits and the
relationship between costs and benefits because neither of these two factors can be
conclusively demonstrated . . . . Examples of items that are recognized in a systematic and rational manner are depreciation of fixed assets, amortization of intangible
assets, and allocation of rent and insurance. Systematic and rational allocation of
costs may increase assets as product costs or as other asset costs rather than increase
expenses immediately, for example, depreciation charged to inventory and costs of
self-constructed assets. These costs are later recognized as expenses under the expense recognition principles.
11 160. . . . [Immediate recognition.] Some costs are associated with the current
accounting period as expenses because (I) costs incurred during the period provide no
discernible future benefits, (2) costs recorded as assets in prior periods no longer provide discernible benefits or (3) allocating costs either on the basis of association with
revenue or among several accounting periods is considered to serve no useful purpose.
Application of this principle of expense recognition results in charging many costs
to expense in the period in which they are paid or liabilities to pay them accrue.
Examples include officers' salaries, most selling costs, amounts paid to settle lawsuits,
and costs of resources used in unsuccessful efforts. The principle of immediate recognition also requires that items carried as assets in prior periods that are discovered to
have no discernible future benefit be charged to expense .
ld. (quoted in NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 952-53 & n.l8).
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ods. 86 The GAAP hierarchy of expense recognition rules reflect the
underlying accounting concept of matching expenses with revenues
in a particular period. 86
Although adherence to GAAP in most cases does clearly reflect
income for tax accounting purposes, GAAP is neither determinative nor even presumptively correct regarding tax issues. 87 As the
Supreme Court pointed out in Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissoner,88 no such presumption is supportable in light of the vastly
different goals of financial and tax accounting. 89 GAAP financial
accounting rules and tax accounting rules vary in a number of specific transactions regarding timing of income and of expenses or
deductions. 90
Moreover, while financial and tax accounting both seek to match
costs with attributable revenue in the appropriate period, the
mechanisms utilized differ. In tax accounting, unlike financial accounting, capitalization and depreciation/amortization do not operate to match expense and income on a cause and effect basis, nor
does depreciation take account of actual market declines in the

•• NCNB /, 651 F.2d at 949; Gunn, supra note 5, at 445-46.
88
Dubroff, supra note 27, at 359 n.19.
87
One commentator notes that "financial accounting principles tend to err on the side of
understating income, which may not be tolerable for income tax purposes." Warner, Deductibility of Business Expansion Expenses-NCNB Corp. v. U. S., Tax Mgmt. Mem. No. 81-22
(BNA) 2, 6 (1981); see Note, Taxation: Start-up Cost Treatment Under § 195: Tax Disparity
in Disguise, 36 Okla. L. Rev. 449, 463 (1983). See generally Dubroff, supra note 27, at 38388, 400-02.
.. 439 u.s. 522, 542-44 (1979).
•• The Court stated that:
The primary goal of financial accounting is to provide useful information to management, shareholders, creditors, and others properly interested; the major responsibility
of the accountant is to protect those parties from being misled. The primary goal of
the income tax system, in contrast, is the equitable collection of revenue; the major
responsibility of the Internal Revenue Service is to protect the public fisc.
439 U.S. at 542. See generally Dubroff, supra note 27, at 377-79.
•• Dubroff, supra note 27, lists a number of such areas in which financial and tax accounting vary, including the following more common examples: (I) prepaid income and expenses,
(2) "all events" limitation on accountability of contingent expenses, and (3) inclusion of
"contingent" income under the "claim of right" doctrine. Id. at 360-63, 385-86, 386; see also,
Jensen, Deduction of Future Liabilities by Accrual-Basis Taxpayers: Premature Accruals,
the All Events Test, and Economic Performance, 37 U. Fla. L. Rev. 444 (1985). Tax and
financial accounting, in fact, differ as to the treatment of start-up costs. See Intangible Assets, Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 17 (1970); Case Note, Deductibility of Cost
of Establishing Merchandising Outlets, 34 Ohio St. L.J. 906, 909-13 (1973).
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value of the depreciable asset. 91 Rather, under classic tax depreciation/amortization concepts the expenditure's "useful life" 92 is "estimated" in the year incurred and its costs allocated to the tax
years of that useful life under one of several allowable methods
(e.g., straightline or ratably declining balance). 93 Only over the entire useful life of the expenditures is the cost matched with the
income it generates, and the results of any particular year may not
actually reflect income so clearly. 94 In short, blind resort to GAAP
as supplying the answers to the capital/ordinary controversy works
as too facile a panacea, 9 & since GAAP rules do not always accord
with the tax policy (here, the minimum distortion of income). Nevertheless, rather broad accounting concepts, such as "matching"
income and expenses and a deferred charge as constituting an
amortizable asset, are useful in effectuating such tax policy.

b.

Current Deduction if Amortization Unavailable

The Federal Circuit correctly believes that capitalization, depreciation, and clear reflection of income are "inextricably intertwined," with the ultimate question being the success of the taxpayer's method of tax accounting in clearly reflecting income. 96
Not surprisingly, therefore, the Court of Claims (predecessor to the
Federal Circuit) held in Southland Royalty Co. v. United States
that capitalization without amortization was inappropriate where
the recurring expenditures produced highly variable and relatively
short-lived benefits, 97 because such capitalization would distort the
taypayer's income. The distortion of income arising from capitaliz-

•• See 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.1, at 23-5; see also Kansas Power & Light Co. v.
Burlington N.R.R., 740 F.2d 780 (lOth Cir. 1984).
•• Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2, -3.
•• See I.R.C. § 167(b); see also supra note 22 .
.. 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.1.1, at 23-6.
•• For discussion of variances between the book and tax accounting systems, see supra
note 90. The NCNB I panel opinion hoped that book accounting rules will resolve the startup expansion cost conflicts. 651 F.2d at 948 & n.ll. Commentators assumed the same. Note,
supra note 5, at 619, 633-38. The better approach is to look at book accounting concepts to
fashion tax accounting rules, such as the amortization of recurring costs as a free-standing
"asset." See infra notes 134-40 and accompanying text.
"" Cincinnati, N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. United States, 424 F.2d 563, 569 (Ct. Cl. 1970) (relying
on the decision in Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 275, 283-84 (1967)). See
generally Gunn, supra note 5, at 453-54.
"' Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. CL 1978).
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ing an investigatory or start-up expenditure-with future, but temporally limited, benefits-incurred while expanding an existing
business and then adding such cost to the basis of a nonamortizable asset also clearly motivated the courts considering the bank
credit card and branch progeny of Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner to adopt the "separate, saleable asset" rule. 98 This definitional rule calls for current. deduction of expansion costs, notwithstanding future benefits, if no separate, transferable asset is
created or enhanced by the expenditure. An unarticulated premise
is that a saleable or transferable asset usually will have a determinable life and, hence, be amortizable. 99
Current deduction under the separate, saleable asset test of recurring expenditures producing short- or variable-term benefits
does not distort the taxpayer's income. Hence, the test often results in "rough justice." 100 However, a taxpayer can make substantial payments creating a nontransferable asset that benefits an extended or indefinite period. Current deduction of such
expenditures, e.g., the substantial cost of a computer program
designed for the taxpayer with a five-year life or acquisition costs
of a license with an indefinite life/ 01 under talismanic 102 application of the transferability test will clearly distort the taxpayer's income. This illustrates a common shortcoming of "talismans": promoting rough justice in commonplace application, but yielding
inequities in borderline areas.

•• See infra notes 225-44 and accompanying text.
•• See Warner, supra note 87, at 8.
100
ld. See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1185 (lOth
Cir. 1974) (recurring computer charges for customer accounting entries, advertising, and
credit checks); accord First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 413 F. Supp. 1107, 1109 (D.S.C.
1976) (charges for recurring consulting fees, salaries, rent, office expenses, and advertising),
affd per curiam, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir. 1977).
101
See First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1979) (Duniway, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (recurring costs of advertising, etc., properly deductible, but cost of computer program used for five years and costing substantial amount
should be capitalized and amortized over that period rather than currently deducted under
the majority's separate, saleable asset test); see also NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285 (current deduction of cost of branch banking permit with indefinite life). Contra Central Tex. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
101
The NCNB I panel majority viewed a definitional rule, such as the separate, saleable
asset test and the start-up of new business/expansion of old business dichotomy, as a "talisman," a rule operating mechanically without considering the underlying policy. 651 F.2d at
955.
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Immediate deduction of such intangibles benefiting an extended
period might, however, be justified on a different policy basis.
Under pre-1987 ACRS, coupled with investment tax credits
("ITC")1°3 and the effects of leverage, the function of cost recovery
shifted from matching of income and expenses to immediate deduction, in practical effect protecting capital from taxation. 104
Thus, from 1981-86, the separate, saleability prerequisite effected
rough parity between amortization of intangible and tangible property.1011 Explicit reliance on such policy, however, might betray too
much judiciallegislation/ 06 particularly in light of the 1985-86 tax
reform process. Additionally, such a judicial grant of a tax benefit
(current expensing of intangibles) might ignore trade-offs and bargains struck in that process. 107
Nevertheless, a current deduction of temporally limited expenditures does produce less distortion of income than capitalization
without amortization. 108 However, under the model, the answer is
to supply amortizaton through liberal approximation of useful life,
rather than a current deduction that is more income distorting
than amortization over the approximate period benefited.

Capitalization and Amortization as Separate Questions

c.

Some commentators maintain, contrary to the separate, saleable
••• See I.R.C. §§ 38, 46.
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
106
Congress repealed the regular lTC for property placed in service after Dec. 31, 1985.
Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 211(a) (to be codified at I.R.C. 49(a)). With
this repeal, cost recovery of tangible personal property is no longer equivalent to immediate
expensing, although the "reasonable allowance for depreciation" itself for most tangible personal property remains much the same as under pre-1987 ACRS.
108
Statements abound that courts may not legislate in the tax area to cure omissions or
inequities. E.g., Bidart Bros. v. United States, 262 F.2d 607, 609 (9th Cir. 1959); Estate of
Yantes v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 830, 833 (1954), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Ohio Nat'l Bank
v. Commissioner, 220 F.2d 754 (6th Cir. 1955). Nevertheless, courts in fact have fashioned
many equitable doctrines. See, e.g., Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930);
Alice Phelan Sullivan Corp. v. United States, 381 F.2d 399 (Ct. Cl. 1967); see also infra
notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
107
The 1985-86 tax reform primarily constituted a balancing of individual tax reductions
over a specified period with corresponding increases in corporate taxes over the same period,
coupled with some restructuring of tax burden within classes of taxpayers (both individual
and corporate).
108
A commentator has suggested that a current deduction should be allowed "whenever
capitalization would distort income more than current expensing." Note, supra note 4, at
333. If this is the only choice, the author agrees.
104
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asset doctrine, that concern regarding the lack of amortization is
not a basis for allowing a current deduction that itself will produce
distortion of income. They maintain instead that the remedy is
congressional allowance of amortization. 109 Similarly, the government has argued that the presence of any future benefits mandates
capitalization, but any inability to· determine useful life is immaterial to capitalization. no Proper resolution of this view with the conflicting views as to the importance of the ability to amortize in the
capitilization determination should lie in the analysis of why amortization is inappropriate in a particular case. If amortization is unavailable because the expenditure produces highly variable and
largely shorter-term benefits (in which case the expenditure usually recurs frequently), then a current deduction is appropriate
under the model. m
If amortization is unavailable because an expenditure producing
a determinable temporal benefit is associated with the acquisition
of an asset with a longer or indeterminable life, then the expenditure itself should be treated as a free-standing asset that is then
amortizable or currently deductible under the model. Many of the
capitalized start-up costs denied amortization, because they are
added to the nonamortizable basis of the business created, 112
One commentator has argued that:
If prepaid interest creates a capital asset, and if the Code precludes amortization in
certain cases, and if the deduction is lost, the solution is not to disregard the capitalization concept, but rather to fill the gap left by Congress in the statutory scheme by
an amendment to the Code allowing amortization in this situation.
Asimov, Principle and Prepaid Interest, 16 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 36, 61 (1968); see also Note, An
Inquiry into the Nature of Goodwill, 53 Colum. L. Rev. 660, 719 (1953).
11
° Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185, 1192 (lOth Cir. 1974).
111
See APB Statement No. 4, supra note 84, 11 160; see also NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 962; cf.
Encyclopaedia Britannica v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982); 1 B. Bittker,
supra note 5, 11 20.4.1, at 20-67.
111
The bulk of the start-up and investigatory cost decisions in contrast simply denied the
claimed deduction as a pre-operating "capital" expense without indicating the asset, if any,
which the capitalized cost should reflect. See, e.g., Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157,
1162 (6th Cir. 1986) (cost of establishing the enterprise); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v.
United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985) (rationale of classic start-up cases is capital investment in business as a whole); Bennett Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 458, 469-70
(1982), afrd per curiam, 699 F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1983); Davis v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1070 (1983); Lardy v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 217 (1980). A few decisions
have expressly left open the question whether pre-operating expenses created (amortizable)
assets with determinable useful lives benefiting taxable years following the start of business
operations. E.g., Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424, 432 n.S (1980), arrd mem., 691 F.2d
490 (3d Cir. 1982); Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 564 n.15 (1979),
100
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should be either currently deductible or amortizable under this
separate, amortizable asset approach.
However, if amortization is unavailable because the expenditure
must be added to the basis of an asset with a long-but not definitely determinable-life (because their benefits are coterminous),
the expenditure should be capitalized if a current deduction would
distort the taxpayer's income. 113 Distortion of income from lack of
amortization in such circumstances should be addressed through
remedial legislation or more liberality in "estimating" useful life, 114
not through a current deduction that would also distort income. 1 u 1

C.
1.

Detailed Analysis: Acquisition Cost as Basis for
Capitalization

"Origin-of-the-Claim"

Under the "origin-of-the-claim" doctrine, a taxpayer must capitalize those expenses arising from a capital transaction, for example, the acquisition or disposition of a capital asset. 116 This rule
"rests on the belief that all expenses which stem from a capital
transaction should rationally be 'matched' or equated with all
gains from the same capital transaction and the expenses should
receive identical tax treatment as the gains." 117 The origin-of-theclaim doctrine is designed to prevent the distortion of income arising from a mismatch of the (pre-1987) character of the income and
affd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 52 (1973). A
few others have added pre·operating or investigatory costs to the basis of a capital asset
constructed at the same time. E.g., Odom v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1132 (1982);
see Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976) (semble); Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977) (semble). Where the costs were found to be preparatory
because a necessary business permit had not yet been obtained, the courts have readily and
wrongly added the start-up or investigatory cost to the basis of the nonamortizable permit.
Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), remanded on other
grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); accord Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731
F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 7 Cl. Ct. at 229.
118 See Gunn, supra note 5, at 494 n.230.
114
See infra notes 116-61 and accompanying text.
110
But see Note, supra note 4, at 333; Note, Costs of Expanding an Existing Business:
Current Deductions Versus Capital Expenditures-North Carolina Nat'l Bank Corp. v.
United States, 18 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1127 (1982).
118
Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 48499.
117
Sharples v. United States, 533 F.2d 550, 555 (Ct. Cl. 1976). See generally, Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 474, 484, 488-89.
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the deduction. Such prevention is accomplished by ensuring that
the taxpayer does not deduct against ordinary income expenses
that arise from a capital transaction, but instead adds such costs to
the basis of the capital asset acquired or subtracts such costs to
reduce the proceeds of the disposition of the capital asset.
The overlap of the origin-of-the-claim and the timing-distortion
of income doctrine produces conflicts. On the one hand, if the capitalized expenditure is added to a depreciable asset, amortization
produces an ordinary deduction of the acquisition cost so that superficially the character is not matched. 118 Conversely, if an expenditure which benefits a finite period is added under the origin-ofthe-claim principle to the basis of an asset with a substantially
longer useful life, the slower amortization of the capitalized expenditure results in distortion of the taxpayer's income. Distortion is
even greater where the capitalized limited life expenditure is added
to the basis of a nonamortizable asset. 119
Nevertheless, the origin-of-the-claim or acquisition cost doctrine
is used to capitalize, and add to the basis of the asset acquired, 120
the recurring short-lived costs incurred in connection with the acquisiton of an asset used in the taxpayer's business. Such usage
occurs although identical costs incurred after, and unrelated to, 121

118
Under pre-1987 rules, gain from the sale of depreciable property (subject to complex
netting rules under § 1231(a)(3)-(4) and loss recapture rules under § 1231(c)), constituted
capital gains. See I.R.C. § 1231(a)(1). Such gains were subject in turn to depreciation recapture in whole or in part under §§ 1245 and 1250. See generally, Lee, Capital Gains Exception to the House's General Utilites Repeal: Further Indigestions from Overly Processed
Corn Products, 30 Tax Notes 1375, 1378, 1384 n.51 (Mar. 31, 1986).
110
See Note, supra note 4, at 322-23, 332.
••• See Shainberg v. Commissioner, 33 T.C. 241 (1959); see also Lee & Murphy, supra
note 5, at 482. The Claims Court explained the decisions that relied on a capitalization basis
for denying current deductibility of start-up costs as follows:
Although the rationale of these decisions is not fully articulated, they appear to
accept or assume the underlying theory that where a business requires substantial
start-up expenditures before it can begin operations, which are not directly for the
purchase of tangible assets and which will not ordinarily be recovered out of revenues
for the same year, the capital investment is in the business as a whole rather than
merely in the tangibles, and it includes the start-up costs.
Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985). Such rationale
logically would deny, however, a current deduction for identical expenditures incurred once
the business commenced. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
111
Such a cost incurred after acquisition, but anticipated at that time, may be capitalized
as an acquisition cost. See Mt. Morris Drive-In Theatre Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 272
(1955), afrd, 238 F.2d 85 (5th Cir. 1956).
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the acquisition are currently deducted, usually as a maintenance
cost. Analyzing the farm preparatory cost doctrine, 122 Judge Raum
of the Tax Court observed:
[T]he cost of painting a building ... generally is considered a deductible business expense. Yet the cost of putting the final coat of
paint on a building in the course of construction is plainly a capital
expenditure. Both involve painting and may be identical in physical character; however, one is incurred in ordinary maintenance
while the other is one of the components of cost in acquiring a
complete capital asset. 118

Similarly, the Tax Court treated cleaning expenses (paid to the
contractor) incurred in preparing a shopping center for its grand
opening as capitalizable acquisition costs, 124 stating subsequently
that the same treatment resulted even if the taxpayer developed
the center through its own efforts. 1211 Additionally, the Tax Court
required capitalization of recurring classic "start-up" costs, not
under the theory that they constituted preparatory costs, but
rather under the "general rule . . . that an expenditure in connection with the acquisition of a capital asset is a capital investment
and hence not deductible as an ordinary and necessary expense of
carrying on business."128 The Claims Court in Cleveland Electric
Illuminating Co. v. United States read these and similar cases as
n• For descriptions of the farm preparatory cost doctrine, see Maple v. Commissioner,
440 F.2d 1055, 1056·57 (9th Cir. 1971); Department of the Treasury, 91st Cong., 1st Sess.,
Tax Reform Studies and Proposals 153 (Comm. Print 1969) (issued jointly by the House
Comm. on Ways & Means and Senate Comm. on Finance). See generally sources cited in
Lee, A Blend of Old Wines in a New Wineskin: Section 183 and Beyond, 29 Tax L. Rev. 347,
465 n.498 (1974).
111
Estate of Wilbur v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 322, 327 n.6 (1964), acq., 1965-2 C.B. 7.
••• Shainberg, 33 T.C. at 251.
••• See Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 382, 403-05 (1965), afrd, 373 F.2d 45 (lOth
Cir. 1967). In Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., the Supreme Court stated most strongly
the requirement of tax parity between costs of self-constructed and purchased assets. 418
U.S. 1, 14 (1974). The Sixth Circuit recently reasoned "that pre-opening expenses must be
treated as capital in order to maintain parity with a taxpayer whose cost of purchasing an
existing business is clearly capital." Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1161 (6th Cir.
1986).
11
° Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977). Similarly, investigatory costs
(feasibility study for office/showroom) have been capitalized under the rule that "an expenditure in acquisition of a capital asset is a capital expenditure." Cagle v. Commissioner, 539
F.2d 409, 416 (5th Cir. 1976). The court in Cagle found that costs also had a value beyond
the tax year in which incurred; "[t]his alone is a persuasive argument for labeling the payments as a capital expenditure." ld. at 416 n.8.
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apparently assuming
the underlying theory that where a business requires substantial
start-up expenditures before it can begin operations, which are not
directly for the purchase of tangible assets and which will not ordinarily be recovered out of revenues for the same year, the capital
investment is in the business as a whole rather than merely in the
tangibles, and it includes the start-up costs. 127

The error in this "business as a whole" approach lies not in the
capitalizaton theory itself, but rather in confusion as to the "asset"
to which the recurring cost should be added; 128 that "asset" was
usually the business as a whole, 129 which is nonamortizable. Such
capitalization of recurring, finite-term benefit costs without amortization produces the same distortion of income that generates the
talismanic separate, saleable asset current deduction approach. 180
Moreover, an acquisition cost theory under the "business as a
whole" concept seemingly would require capitalization, and addition to the basis of the business as a whole, of substantially similar
costs incurred in the expansion of an existing business. 131 The underlying rationale is that the start-up and expansion costs increase
the earning capacity and hence produce future benefits. 132 Yet the
Claims Court in Cleveland Electric Illuminating inconsistently re117
7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985); see also Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1162 (expenses incurred during
start-up or pre-opening period were capital in nature because part of establishing the
enterprise).
••• Gunn, supra note 5, at 446 (cost itself should be viewed aa amortizable asset).
••• See supra note 112.
130
See infra notes 230-35 and accompanying text.
131
Both sale and acquisition of a going business are "viewed aa a sale of each individual
asset rather than of a single capital asset." S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 251 (1986).
Contrary to this "separate basket" concept, some courts have treated start-up costs aa a cost
of the business as a whole and not of specific tangible assets. See cases cited supra note.112;
cf. Aboussie v. United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1985). This can be explained in
capitalization terms only on the basis of creating future earning capacity. See infra note 132
and accompanying text. If so, the increased earning capacity logically should be capitalized
where incurred in expanding, operating, or starting a new business. Even if start-up costs
were properly viewed as acquisition costs of the tangible assets of a new business, they
would constitute acquisition costs of similar assets acquired in expanding or operating an
existing business. See supra note 112. This baa always been the fatal weakness in the capitalization theory for denying a current deduction for start-up costs so long aa similar expansion
costs are currently deductible. Cf. Lee, supra note 2, at 390 n.53... See, e.g., Mid-State Products Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 696, 714 (1954); Miner v.
Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1173, 1177 (1962); see also Lee, supra note 2, at 390 n.53;
Lee, supra note 122, at 461-63, 466.

32

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 6:1

quired capitalization of substantial training costs for employees
who were to work at a nuclear power generating plant as part of
the acquisition cost of the taxpayer's interest in the plant, while
permitting a current deduction for significantly less substantial
training costs for employees who were to work at a new conventional fossil fuel generating plant similar to four plants already in
use. las

2. Free-Standing Amortizable Asset
The distortion of income which results from adding a recurring
cost to a longer-lived or nonamortizable asset, under the rationale
that it constitutes an acquisition cost of the business as a whole,
can be avoided by relying on the basic financial accounting concept
of treating the expense itself as an amortizable asset. 184 Assets, for
financial accounting or balance sheet purposes, include both the
economic resources of the enterprise and certain deferred charges
that are not resources. If an expenditure may not be expensed in
its entirety in the year paid, the cash assets of the enterprise are
reduced and the portion of the expenditl,lre that cannot be currently expensed is treated as a separate, noncash asset on the balance sheet. 186 Thus, the NCNB I court noted that:
In order more accurately to reflect income, both in the present period and in future accounting periods, the carried-forward "assets"
of an enterprise include, without regard to whether they are tangible or intangible, certain expenditures for benefits whose cost has
already been incurred but the outlay for which is nevertheless most
properly matched against some future period's revenues which the
benefits will help produce. 188

In short, in financial accouting the expenditure itself may be
treated as a separate asset to be expensed, or in tax terms "depreciated" or "amortized," in future tax periods. 187 In the start-up and
••• 7 Cl. Ct. at 235-36. The Claims Court obviously was attempting to preserVe § 195. See
infra notes 305-19 and accompanying text.
114
See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 229 (1985); cf.
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 566 (1979), affd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th
Cir. 1980).
110
NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 949 (vacated panel opinion) .
••• ld.
117
Gunn, supra note 5, at 445 (citing De Capriles, Modem Financial Accounting, pt. 1, 37
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1001, 1020-21 (1962)).
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business expansion areas, such amortization of recurring costs as a
free-standing asset, without regard to whether incurred in starting
up a new business or expanding an exisiting business, provides a,
"golden mean" avoiding the ali-or-nothing extremes of the talis1
manic separate, saleable asset (current deduction) or preparatory
,
(capitalization without amortization) approaches. 138
The Tax Court in Wolfsen Land & Cattle Co. v. Commissioner189 treated a recurring expenditure with a limited life as such
a separate, amortizable, intangible asset to avoid the distortion of
income that would have followed from associating the expenditure
with the nonamortizable asset it enhanced. Wolfsen Land & Cattle
considered the deductibility of substantial expenditures, which the
taxpayer incurred every ten years, for draglining an earthenwork
irrigation system with an indefinite life. These substantial expenses resulted from the taxpayer's allowing the system to deteriorate until it became almost dysfunctional, rather than annually repairing and maintaining it. The court noted:
Thus, we are faced with something of a conundrum, how do we
treat a maintenance-type expense substantial in amount, which
only restores its subject to its original operating condition, yet need
be repeated only on the average of every 10 years and is performed
on a subject of indefinite life.
To permit a current deduction of such a large expenditure with a
beneficial effect lasting on the average of 10 years would surely distort that years's [sic] income. Yet to deny even an amortization
deduction for an expenditure with a specific demonstrable beneficial life on the ground that its deductibility is contaminated by its
relationship to an asset of indefinite life, i.e., the land, would similarly require an uneven reporting of income.
Since a basic premise of the income tax laws is to relate expenses
to the income which they helped earn, a reasonable solution to our
conundrum is to hold that the expenses in issue should be written
off over their useful life. In short we would subscribe independent
status to those expenditures on the basis that they create a freestanding intangible asset with an amortizable 10-year life. 140

See NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285, 294, 295 (4th Cir. 1982) (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
,.. 72 T.C. 1 (1979).
140
Id. at 13 (footnote omitted). Gunn, supra note 5, at 446, perspicaciously suggested just
this approach. The NCNB I panel came close to this approach. See infra notes 250-52 and
accompanying text.
138

34

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 6:1

The treatment of certain recurring expenses as a separate asset,
even ·though such expenses are incurred in the acquisition of a
nonamortizable asset, is not inconsistent with Idaho Power.w The
Supreme Court in Idaho Power required (1) capitalization of the
"depreciation" allocable to equipment the taxpayer used to construct capital improvements and (2) addition of the capitalized
amounts to the basis of such improvements. The Court sought to
prevent the distortion of income that would result from currently
deducting "depreciation" costs properly allocable to assets that in
the future would produce income themselves. a 2 The Court also
sought to maintain tax parity between a taxpayer that did its own
construction work and a taxpayer that purchased the work from an
independent contractor, which in turn charged its construction
equipment depreciation to the taxpayer as an element of the total
cost of the services. as However, allocation of a temporally limited
expenditure to the basis of a substantially longer-lived asset, or an
asset with no determinable life, produces distortion of income. If a
recurring expenditure-such as employee training in a workforce
with high turnover-is added to the nonamortizable basis of a new
or expanded business, a distortion of income is produced; 144 this is
not the situation in Idaho Power. Distortion will also exist when an
expenditure with a shorter-term benefit is incurred in connection
with the acquisition of an asset with a longer term; Idaho Power is
also distinguishable from this scenario. In Idaho Power the expenditures in question benefited the depreciable assets, created
with the machinery, over their entire useful life, in effect creating a
construction cost of the assets.
The deferred charge or separate asset approach is consistent
with basic tax concepts such as the "separate basket" approach to
transfers of a going business and to "component" depreciation.
Under the firmly established "separate basket" rule/''~ the sale or
,., The Seventh Circuit intimated a conflict between distortion of income analysis and
Idaho Power. Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commissioner, 685 F.2d 212, 215, 217 (7th
Cir. 1982) (discussing Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1 (1974)); see also supra
note 76 and accompanying text.
141
418 U.S. at 14.
... ld.
,.. See Madison Gas & Elec., 633 F.2d at 517.
,.. Williams v. McGowan, 152 F.2d 570, 572 (2d Cir. 1945). Judge Learned Hand concluded that "upon the sale of a going business it is to be comminuted into its fragments, and
these are to be separately matched against the definition [of 'capital assets' in the predeces-
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acquisition of a business is not treated as the transfer of a single
asset; rather, the business is fragmented into its components, with
each asset given separate treatment on both the sale and pwchase
side. 146 Accordingly, even under an acquisition cost approach,
start-up as well as internal and external business expansion costs
should be separated into their components for "tax parity" purposes, with those items providing benefits for a shorter period than
the useful life of the business (which usually is indefinite) being
treated as separate assets to be expensed or amortized according to
clear reflection of income principles. For instance, if a taxpayer
purchases an ongoing business that possesses short-lived recurring
assets (usually already expensed by the seller), 147 e.g., tools, supplies, or recurring marketing surveys, then the purchaser-under
the "basket of assets" fragmentation approach, involving transfers
of a going business-will be allowed to deduct currently the external cost of such items in the year of purchase. Technically, perhaps, the deduction may be considered depreciation or amortization of the cost in its entirety in the acquisition year because its
determinable life is one year and as such can be amortized fully
within one year under section 167. 148 Accordingly, treatment of internal costs for short-lived recurring expansion or start-up expenditures as a separate asset, to be expensed or amortized under clear
reflection of income principles, does not conflict with Idaho Power.
The same treatment of a recurring cost as a separate, free-standing asset should apply where a depreciable asset, e.g., a shopping
center or apartment project, is acquired or constructed and the (recurring) cost benefits a shorter period than the purchased or constructed asset. Under "component" depreciation an asset composed of separately replaceable components may be fragmented in
computing depreciation, even though the components are interdependent parts of an integral whole. Thus, "[i]nstead of assigning a

sor to § 1221(1)]." ld.
"" See Faber, Allocation of Purchase Price on Acquisitions; Recapture; Going Concern
Value, 39 lnst. on Fed. Tax'n 6-1 (1981); Ganier, Treatment of Goodwill: Allocating a Lump
Sum Purchase Price Among Mixed Assets of a Going Business, 7 J. Corp. Tax'n 111 (1980);
Leighton, Tax and Accounting Problems on the Purchase of a Basket of Assets, 28 Inst. on
Fed. Tax'n 75 (1970); supra note 131.
1
"
Under the "tax benefit" doctrine, the seller would recognize income (probably) equal
to the prior deduction. See Hillsboro Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370 (1983).
"" See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
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single useful life to a building, for example, the taxpayer can allocate its cost among such components as the shell, roof, plumbing
and wiring, heating plant, air-conditioners, and elevators and depreciate each of these elements over its own usefullife." 149 Hence,
a market survey of a rapidly changing environment, providing a
shorter benefit than a depreciable (e.g., an office showroom) 1110 or
nondepreciable (e.g., a branch operating under an indefinite life
permit) 1111 asset with which the survey is associated can be treated
as a separate, amortizable, capitalized cost, as an asset, or as a currently expensed short- or variable-term benefit, if sufficiently recurring. If this is so, should not the "last coat of paint" be treated
as a separate asset, probably currently deductible? One clear congressional trend in cost recovery for tangibles, however, is elimination of the line drawing entailed in component depreciation; the
Code prohibits its use where ACRS applies. 1112
While some "straws in the wind" support this approach, and
hence, the model, 1113 the bulk of the start-up cost and related deci••• 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 1l 23.3.3, at 23-41.
, .. But see Cagle v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 409 (5th Cir. 1976) (added survey cost to
basis of showroom).
••• But see Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984)
(added survey cost to basis of permits).
••• See I.R.C. § 168(0(1) (disallowing component depreciation of buildings); see also H.R.
Conf. Rep. No. 215, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 208-9, reprinted in 1981 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 285, 299. For the definition of component depreciation, see supra text accompanying note 149.
••• E.g., Ellis Banking Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
463 U.S. 1207 (1983). The Eleventh Circuit reasoned that even if the taxpayer's investigation of a target corporation's books (primarily to determine the merger stock exchange ratio)
produced general market information of continuing usefulness, "that future benefit of the
study might require capitalization and amortization over the period during which the study
was expected to have utility." Id. at 1381-82 n.ll. The court apparently visualized an independent benefit from use of the survey, rather than a survey used solely for acquisition, but
with a benefit shorter than that of the asset acquired. In contrast, professional fees incurred
in an acquisition, the benefit of which does not diminish over the period the asset is held,
clearly should be added to the cost of the asset acquired. Cf. Gunn, supra note 5, at 494
n.230. The author is indebted to Bittker, Tax Shelters, Nonrecourse Debt, and the Crane
Case, 33 Tax L. Rev. 277 (1978), for the "straws in the wind" metaphor.
This analysis suggests that Estate of Wilbur (last coat of paint) and Shainberg (grand
opening cleaning expenses) were incorrectly decided. For discussion of these cases, see supra
notes 123-24 and accompanying text. Under the model, Schultz v. Commissioner was probably decided incorrectly as well. 50 T.C. 688, 694-95 (1968), affd per curiam, 420 F.2d 490
(3d Cir. 1970). In Schultz, the taxpayer purchased quantities of bulk raw whiskey as an
investment and prepaid four years' storage charges, insurance premiums, and estimated
state ad valorem taxes at the time of purchase. Such expenses are usually currently deducti-
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sions using an acquisition cost rationale find some asset, generally
nonamortizable, with which to "associate" even a recurring expenditure. 1114 Indeed, this error is made by the Supreme Court in Richmond Television Corp. v. Commissioner. 166 The Fourth Circuit
had held that the employee staff training costs, incurred prior to a
television station's obtaining its broadcasting license, were not currently deductible as pre-opening expenses incurred between the
decision to establish a business and its actually beginning to function as a going concern. 166 Alternatively, the court had held that
the staff training costs were not currently deductible because they
resulted in the acquisition of a capital asset, the value of which to
the taxpayer would continue for many years, even though from
time to time individual staff members would leave. 167
The taxpayer, in response to the capitalization question, argued
that the staff training costs should be added to the basis of the
broadcasting permit and amortized over its useful life. 168 The

hie. See I.R.C. § 212. In this case the prepaid expenses, if deductible, should have been
capitalized as a deferred charge and amortized over four years. The Tax Court found that
the expenditures did not contribute an added value to the whiskey or extend its useful life.
50 T.C. at 695-96, 698. (The court's approach is analogous to the Lincoln Savings & Loan
test. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text.) Nevertheless, the Schultz court found
that the costs were acquisition costs of four-year-old bourbon (which through the passage of
time and chemical changes is more valuable than raw whiskey), the product the taxpayer
sought to acquire. 50 T.C. at 696, 699. The Third Circuit affirmed Schultz on the grounds
that the Tax Court's determination that these normally deductible expenses "were incurred
as an integral part of a capital transaction" was not clearly erroneous. 420 F.2d at 491.
,.. See cases cited supra note 112.
... 382 u.s. 68, 68 (1965).
,.. Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.), vacated and
remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965). Judge Sobelof fashioned this
argument sua sponte, since the government relied only on a capitalization/distortion of income position. Brief for Appellant at 12-14, Richmond Television (4th Cir.) (No. 64-9531)
(copy on file); see Lee, supra note 122, at 458. Judge Sobelof may have felt compelled to
answer the taxpayer's "challenge":
Every business paying U. S. ~es has incurred start-up expenses, many of them
repeatedly, every time they try to develop a new product or expand. Did Ford capitalize the quarter of a billion spent on the Edsel? Did Dupont capitalize the development of nylon? We challenge the Government to produce a case or a ruling which
denies the deduction of start-up costs.
Reply Brief for Appellee at 13 (copy on file).
107
345 F.2d at 907-08; see supra note 156. The Fourth Circuit subsequently overruled this
leg of Richmond Television. See NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 289.
,
100
The government noted that:
Taxpayer, by an amendment to its complaint, alleged in the alternative that the
advantage secured by its capital outlay had a useful life co-extensive with the term of
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Fourth Circuit avoided this argument by pointing out that since
the taxpayer was not yet in business during the tax year, the taxpayer also was not entitled to any amortization deduction. 1119 The
Supreme Court remanded for a finding of the permit's useful
life. 160 The Fourth Circuit on remand held it was indefinite, in line
with established precedents. 161 No one thought of treating the employee training cost itself as the asset and then determining its
useful life based on turnover and frequency of retraining.
D.

Detailed Analysis: Cohan Approximation of Useful Life

The clear reflection of income through amortization of a separate or free-standing intangible asset or deferred charge frequently
will require either the taxpayer or courts to estimate the useful life
of the deferred charge. The pertinent Treasury Regulations require, as a precondition for depreciation or amortization of an intangible asset, that its useful life "be estimated with reasonable
accuracy," 162 and disallow any deduction claimed "merely because
in the unsupported opinion of the taxpayer, the intangible asset
has a limited usefullife." 163 No similar restrictions or admonitions
appear in the regulations dealing with depreciation of tangible
assets. 164
If a taxpayer can show. that the benefits produced by the expenditure are temporally limited, although he may not be able to estimate that life with reasonable accuracy, logically he proves entitlement to a deduction equal to some percentage of the cost of the
expenditure. Generally, useful life cannot be estimated with reasonable accuracy; therefore, the taxpayer cannot prove exactly
what percentage of the cost should be ratably deducted (e.g., ten
percent if the useful life were in fact ten years or three percent if
the FCC construction permit and first regular license and accordingly claimed the
right to depreciate these expenditures over a period of 58 months.
Brief for Appellant at 8; see Richmond Television, 345 F.2d at 908. The taxpayer should
have argued that the training cost itself was the amortizable asset.
100
345 F.2d at 909.
180
382 U.S. at 68.
101
Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410, 413 (4th Cir. 1965); see,
e.g., Commissioner v. Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 350 F.2d 580 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied,
382 U.S. 1027 (1966); Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d 934 (5th Cir. 1951).
101
Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.
18
" Id.
1
. . See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-2. See generally 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, ~ 23.2.6.
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the useful life were in fact thirty-three years). This situation calls
for approximation of the useful life of the deferred charge under
the doctrine of Cohan v. Commissioner. 1611 Under Cohan, if the
taxpayer proves to the court that deductible expenditures are incurred in some amount, the court must "make as close an approximation as it can, bearing heavily if it chooses upon the taxpayer
whose inexactitude is of his own making." 166 Thus, where the taxpayer proved that an intangible asset (an easement) was indeed a
wasting asset, the Eighth Circuit held that some amortization deduction is mandated under Cohan. 167 The court read a similar, but
harsher, requirement as to the limited life of an amortizable intangible, imposed by a prior regulation, 166 as not requiring
proof of the exact number of years the easements will continue. We
believe that all that is required is definite proof that the asset is
one definitely undergoing exhaustion. The evidence clearly establishes that the rights-of-way will be useful for taxpayer's purposes
for only a limited period . . . . The uncertainty relates to the
length of the period. 169

Although only rarely so acknowledged, the Cohan rule is an equitable one under which a court, unable to be precise in its findings, dispenses "practical justice" as best it can. 170 Similarly, useful
180

39 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1930).
ld. at 544.
187
Northern Natural Gas Co. v. O'Malley, 277 F.2d 128, 135, 138 (8th Cir. 1960).
188
The regulations promulgated under § 23(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939 provided that:
Intangibles, the use of which in the trade or business or in the production of income
is indefinitely limited in duration, may be the subject of a depreciation allowance.
Examples are patents and copyrights, licenses, and franchises. Intangibles, the use of
which in the business or trade or in the production of income is not so limited, will
not usually be a proper subject of such an allowance. If, however an intangible asset
acquired through capital outlay is known from experience to be of value in the business or in the production of income for only a limited period, the length of which can
be estimated from experience with reasonable certainty, such intangible asset may be
the subject of a depreciation allowance.
Treas. Reg. 111, § 29.23(1)-3 (predecessor of Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3).
180
277 F.2d at 135.
170
See Dowell v. United States, 522 F.2d 708, 711 (5th Cir. 1975) (dictum); John L. Ashe,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 214 F.2d 13, 16 (5th Cir. 1954); Robinson v. Commissioner, 10 T.C.M.
(CCH) 571 (1951). Several courts have required a reasonable basis for judicial estimation
under Cohan. See cases cited infra note 173. In general, however, courts have not permitted
an "equitable" allocation not based on credible evidence. E.g., Union Stock Farms v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 712, 723-24 (9th Cir. 1959); see Gross v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M.
188

40

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 6:1

life for depreciation under one view need not be established with
certainty. Only a "reasonable approximation" or even a "rough estimate" is required. 171 Application of distortion of income analysis
to the issue of current deduction versus capitalization and amortization supports the liberal use of Cohan. If an expenditure does
benefit a number of tax years and the taxpayer proves that the
value of the expenditure becomes exhausted or will only benefit a
limited number of tax periods, but cannot reasonably estimate the
useful life, three judicial options are presented. First, under the
"rough justice" of the separate, saleable asset test, 172 a current de·duction is allowed if the benefits of the expenditure are not saleable, which generally will be the case if amortization is not available. However, current deduction of an expenditure benefiting a
number of tax years distorts income. Second, capitalization is allowed, but amortization is denied due to inability reasonably to
estimate useful life. However, this equally distorts income if the
expenditure is capitalized as a cost of the business as a whole.
Third, the useful life of the expenditure itself is approximated,
along the lines of Cohan, even if a reasonable basis for the approximation is not available. Only this third option offers "practical justice," consistent with the distortion of income rationale.
The model for separating current and capital expenditures on
the basis of distortion of income requires the third option. Equitable Cohan approximations of the useful life of intangibles avoids
the ali-or-nothing conflict between current expensing and capitalizing without amortizing expenditures that produce benefits for a
(CCH) 77 (1984).
A major difficulty in determining the approach followed by a particular opinion-equity
or reasonable basis-is that judges are unlikely to admit that they are making Cohan approximations without any ascertainable basis. For instance, one dissenting opinion charged
the majority with making a Cohan approximation without any ascertainable basis, or even a
citation to Cohan, and hence clothing the court with the "power of an equity court" that it
did not possess. Ward v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332, 345-46 (1953) (Withey, J., dissenting).
171
Burnet v. Niagara Falls Brewing Co., 282 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1931); cf. United States v.
Ludey, 274 U.S. 295, 302 (1927) (considering depletion). Useful life has been determined by
Cohan approximations implicitly or explicitly. See, e.g., Houston Chronicle Publishing Co. v.
United States, 481 F.2d 1240, 1253-54 (5th Cir. 1973) (approximation of useful life without
citing Cohan); Richard S. Miller & Sons, Inc. v. United States, 537 F.2d 446, 455-56 (Ct. Cl.
1976) (same); Wisconsin Psychiatric Serv., Ltd. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 839, 852-53 (1981)
(Cohan approximation of useful life); Joyce v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 13, 15-16 (1955)
(Cohan approximation of reasonable allowance for depreciation).
171
See Warner, supra note 87, at 8.
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substantial period that cannot be determined with accuracy. A
"rough guess" as to useful life produces less distortion of income
than the "rough justice" of a current deduction. This approach is
readily applicable to wasting assets such as market distribution
and sources surveys and employee training. Nonwasting assets
such as indefinite-life permits require a different conceptual approach to depreciation: abandoning the economic concept that depreciation measures the decline in value of an asset over its useful
life. Courts, focusing instead on the necessity of allocating meaningfully the cost entailed in the use of an asset to tax years to
which it contributes to income in order to avoid distortion of income, should pick some arbitrary period as the reasonable useful
life of an indefinite-life asset, say twenty or even eighteen years,
and provide a "reasonable allowance" for depreciation.
This liberal view of Cohan and, hence, this part of the model, is
not without opposition in the case law. Several decisions have required the taxpayer to prove a reasonable basis for a Cohan approximation, particularly where the taxpayer's sole evidence as to
amount was his testimony. 173 Moreover, depreciation has been denied due to a failure in establishing an asset's useful life even
though the asset would physically deteriorate or someday be retired from service. 174 In short, a conflict exists between those authorities fashioning some deduction where allowing no deduction
will produce a distortion of income and those authorities requiring
a reasonable basis for estimation.

III.

START-UP AND BusiNEss ExPANSION CosTs CAsE LAw: CHAos
OVER SYNTHESIS

A.

Thesis: Definitional Preparatory Doctrine

The traditional preparatory doctrine, also known as the classic
start-up doctrine, denies a current section 162 deduction to recurring, otherwise deductible, expenditures when incurred before or
171
See, e.g., Plisco v. United States, 306 F.2d 784, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1962); A. Finkl & Sons v.
Commissioner, 38 T.C. 886, 904 n.15 (1962); Masters v. Commissioner, 25 T.C. 1093, 10991100 (1956).
174
See, e.g., Burlington Northern, Inc. v. United States, 676 F.2d 566, 582 (Ct. Cl. 1982)
(Kashiwa, J., dissenting) (describing the majority's finding that the assets involved were
durable but would nonetheless become obsolescent); c{. Coleman v. Commission£:r, 540 F.2d
427, 431-32 (9th Cir. 1976).
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after the business is decided upon but before the taxpayer's trade
or business begins to function as a going concern. The traditional
approach denies a deduction on the definitional grounds that the
taxpayer is not yet carrying on a trade or business/ 711 or under perWestervelt v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1248, 1254 (1947) (investigatory costs such as traveling expenses "were preparatory to entering the cattle business"); accord Liberty Nat'!
Bank & Trust v. United States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9147 (S.D. Ga. 1968); Dean v.
Commissioner, 56 T.C. 895, 902 (1971); Abegg v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 145, 153-54 (1968),
affd, 429 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied sub nom. Cresta Corp., S.A. v. Commis.sioner, 400 U.S. 1008 (1971); Polachek v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 858, 863 (1954); Ward v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 332, 343-44 (1953), affd on other grounds, 224 F.2d 547 (9th Cir.
1955); Evans v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1192 (1974); Ewart v. Commissioner, 25
T.C.M. (CCH) 96 (1966). The Tax Court, in extending the "pre-operational costs" doctrine
to start-up costs (e.g., pre-opening training costs in a nuclear energy electric power plant
that, due to high employee turnover and engineering and safety changes after business commenced, trained new employees and retrained existing employees with equivalent scope and
content as an ongoing function), capitalized these costs simply because they were pre-operational. Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 567 (1979) (amortization not
considered since not timely raised), affd per curiam, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980).
For the historical development of the investigatory cost doctrine, see Fleischer, Tax
Treatment of Expenses Incurred in Investigation for a Business or Capital Investment, 14
Tax L. Rev. 567 (1959); Wilberding, An Individual's Business Investigation Expenses: An
Argument Supporting Deductibility, 26 Tax Law. 219 (1973). For the development of the
start-up cost doctrine, see Lee, supra note 2, at 391-96; Lee, supra note 122, at 464-65; Roth,
supra note 2; Seago, supra note 2. The Tax Court, following the rigid conceptualism of its
preparatory doctrine, permitted a father to deduct his coaching services, rendered to further
his son's development as a professional baseball player, upon the son's entering the business. The court found the son to be contractually obligated to pay for such services only if
he attained professional status. Hundley v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 339, 347 (1967).
Most early investigatory cost decisions were based on the rationale that the taxpayer was
not yet engaged in a trade or business. See Lee, supra note 2, at 393. Additionally,§ 212 was
originally intended to allow th<' deduction of expenses incurred for production or collection
of income, not those incurred in a trade or business. See Lang, Scope of Deductions Under
Section 212, 7 Rev. Tax'n Individuals 291 (1983); see also Treasury Reg. § 1.212-1(b) (not
requiring the "production or collection of income" to be received in the same tax year as the
deduction). Moreover, on its surface § 212 would appear to have been an available avenue
for currently deducting start-up costs (prior to 1984 amendments to § 195). Such use was
recommended early on by Fleischer, at 580-84. Shortly after deciding the first modern investigatory expense decisions (under the predecessor to § 162), however, the Tax Court in a
landmark decision denied any deduction under the predecessors to both § 162 and § 212 for
investigatory expenses incurred prior to the taxpayer's entering into a trade or business.
Frank v. Commissioner, 20 T.C. 511 (1953). The court based its opinion on the rationale
that the predecessor § 212 presupposed an existing endeavor with which the taxpayer was
connected, stating that "[t]here is a basic distinction between allowing deductions for the
expense of producing or collecting income, in which one has an existent interest or right,
and expenses incurred in an attempt to obtain income by the creation of some new interest." I d. at 514.
More recently the Tax Court has applied § 212 to start-up costs (ground rent during year
one for a leasehold interest where construction and rental of building on such interest oc110
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haps the same test worded differently, the taxpayer is not yet
holding himself out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or
services. 176 Amortization of such capitalized expenditures is not
usually available because the expenditures generally are added to
the nonamortizable basis of the business entered into by the
taxpayer. 177
Application of the definitional preparatory approach, in its modern manifestation, to investigatory expenses took place in the
1940s, 178 in cases involving expenses that were incurred prior to a
commitment to enter the venture. This approach resulted in their
disallowance on the ground that they were preparatory to the taxpayer's entering the business in question. 179 In 1965 the leading
preparatory decision, Richmond Television Corp. v. United

curred during year two), finding the requisite year-one "existent interest" in the ground
lease. Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538, 541 (1983), affd mem., 745 F.2d 66 (9th
Cir. 1984). Contra Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1986); Aboussie v.
United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428-29 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985). This end-run around the start-up
cost doctrine was ably and justifiably criticized in Note, Hoopengarner v. Commissioner
Revisited: Does the Tax Reform Act of 1984 Solve the Pre-Opening Expense Problem?, 4
Va. Tax Rev. 141 (1984). For the rationale behind Congress' reversal of Hoopengarner in
the 1984 amendments to § 195, see infra notes 439-41 and accompanying text.
178
See, e.g., Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 905 (4th Cir.),
vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); Downs v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 533, 540 (1968) (also relied on preparatory doctrine); Kennedy v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 52 (1973).
177
See supra note 112.
170
E.g., Westervelt v. Commissioner, 8 T.C. 1248, 1254 (1947). The preparatory doctrine
arose as early as 1929. See Harrisburg Hosp., Inc. v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 1014, 1018
(1929); see also Lee, supra note 122, at 455. The Board of Tax Appeals (predecessor to the
Tax Court) first ignored the Second Circuit's opinion in 379 Madison Ave., Inc. v. Commissioner, 60 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1932), continuing to rely on its own precedents. See, e.g., New
Quincy Mining Co. v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 376, 383-84 (1937). In the alternative, the
Tax Court facilely distinguised 379 Madison Ave. as involving different facts. E.g., Todd v.
Commissioner, 77 T.C. 246, 250 n.4 (1981), affd per curiam, 682 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1982);
Ewart v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 96, 98 (1966). Ultimately, the Tax Court acknowledged more forthrightly that there were two "diametrically opposed" positions in the startup cost area, with Tax Court precedents falling on one side and 379 Madison Ave. and
Blitzer falling on the other. See Hoopengarner, 80 T.C. 543 & n.9; see also Haskins v. Commissioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 359, 362 (1982).
170
See cases cited supra note 175. These caaes adopted the position that investigating a
potential new business did not constitute carrying on a trade or business but disproportionately involved businesses that never got off the ground and mixed business/personal motives
that could have better been resolved on the patent lack of profit motive. See generally I B.
Bittker, supra note 5, 11 20.4.4, at 20-77 to -78 and cases cited at 20-78 n.47; Lee, supra note
122, at 447-51; Wilberding, supra note 175, at 228; Note, Investigation Costs: An Analysis
and a Proposal, 41 Temple L.Q. 81, 88, 98 (1967).
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States, 180 extended the doctrine to "pre-opening" or start-up expenses incurred between the decision to establish a business, concluding the investigatory stage, and the actual beginning of business operations as a going concern. 181 In Richmond Television, the
Fourth Circuit disallowed a current deduction for the cost of training and paying salaries to the taxpayer's broadcasting staff incurred during a two-year period prior to the taxpayer's obtaining
its broadcasting license, reasoning that a taxpayer was still not carrying on a trade or business under section 162 "until such time as
the business has begun to function as a going concern and perJormed those activities for which it was organized. " 182 In the late
1970s, the Tax Court began to apply repeatedly and mechani180
345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds, 382 U.S.
68 (1965).
181
ld. at 905. Commentators have widely criticized Richmond Television, with its alternate holdings of (1) no deduction because the taxpayer was not currently carrying on a trade
or business, or (2) the disputed costs were capital because they provided future benefits.
These commentators have usually focused on the Fourth Circuit's application of the preparatory doctrine to recurring expenditures after the business "commenced." E.g., Buell, supra
note 2, at 280-81 (stating that the trade or business requirement should not be used to deny
current deduction of costs connected with acquisition of a capital asset or prior to generation of income to which they gave rise, because the "Commissioner has other tools, including
Sections 263 and 446, to prevent the current deduction of capital expenditures and the material distortion of income"); Erbacher, supra note 2, at 497-99 (also reasoning that if initial
costs are capitalized they should be amortized over a fairly short period of time); Roth,
supra note 2, at 48; Solomon, Tax Treatment of Pre-Opening Expenses, 46 Taxes 521, 52528 (1968).
For a description of the arguments made by the parties and evidence that the Fourth
Circuit sua sponte fashioned the preparatory start-up costs doctrine, see Lee, supra note
122, at 457-59; supra note 156. The author long thought that Richmond Television's gravest
error lay in its adoption of the preparatory doctine. See Lee, supra note 122, at 460. The
author now realizes that an equal if not greater error was its application of the "future
benefits" rule to capitalize probably recurring, short-term benefits, such as costs consisting
of employee training, travel, etc., and then adding such costs to the nonamortizable federal
agency license. These costs should have been treated as costs of separate assets under Wolfsen Land & Cattle's separate free-standing asset approach and either currently deducted or
amortized whenever the business commenced. See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying
text. This determination of current deduction or amortization should depend upon the
amount of such costs in relationship to the annually recurring employee training (and possibly retraining) costs, as well as the rates of employee turnover. Even when presented with
sufficient data, however, the Tax Court has applied the preparatory doctrine mechanically
to recurring, but pre-operational, employee training costs incurred in a new business.
Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 566 (1979) (the capitalization and
amortization issue not timely raised by taxpayer), affd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980); see
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,423,005 (Feb. 8, 1984).
181
345 F.2d at 907.
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cally 183 the Richmond Television nondeductibility of pre-opening
expenses rule to such start-up costs as nuclear power generating
plant employee training expenses before the issuance of an Atomic
Energy Commission operating permit184 and mortgage broker fees
incurred before completion of construction or leasing of units to
tenants. 186 Initially, various circuit courts uniformly affirmed these
decisions on the basis of a mechanical application of the Tax
Court's reasoning. 186 More recently, the circuit courts espousing
the pre-opening doctrine have begun to offer more extensive reasoning. However, conflict continues over whether pre-opening expenses are nondeductible because they are capital or because the
taxpayer is not yet carrying on a trade or business. 187
These decisions by-and-large denied amortization either because
the taxpayer did not timely raise the issue of amortizing the expenditures188 or because the court added the start-up costs to the
basis of a nonamortizable asset 189 or the business as a whole. 190
The combination of denying both a current deduction and an
amortization deduction produced distortion of income as to recurring, short-term benefits. In order to avoid such distortion yet
maintain the mechanical pre-opening doctrine, courts began to
carve out a number of definitional exceptions, 191 the most impor183

Bradley, Deductibility of a Partnership's Investigation and Start-Up Expenses, 2 J.
Partnership Tax'n 233, 243 (1985).
184
Madison Gas & Elec., 72 T.C. at 566.
180
Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980), aff'd mem., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982).
188
See Goodwin, 691 F.2d at 490 (affirming without opinion); Madison Gas & Elec., 633
F.2d at 517 (holding that "expenses were nondeductible, pre-operational start-up costs,"
apparently viewing the issue as "whether the costs were necessary and ordinary current
expenses or capital investments in future economic benefits"); see also Todd v. Commissioner, 682 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1982) (per curiam).
187
Compare Aboussie v. United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428, 428-29 n.6 (8th Cir. 1985)
(finding that the taxpayer was not carrying on trade or business, but the pre-operating expense incurred also did not represent the cost of acquiring the taxpayer's sole operating
asset) with Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that preoperating expenses constituted a capital expenditure since they were part of the cost of
establishing the enterprise).
188
See Madison Gas & Elec., 72 T.C. at 564 n.15; Aboussie, 779 F.2d at 428 n.5.
180
E.g., Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410, 412 (4th Cir. 1965)
(on remand, start up costs added to the basis of an indefinite-lived permit).
100
Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1162.
101
See, e.g., Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538 (1983), aff'd mem., 745 F.2d 66
(9th Cir. 1984). Under Hoopengarner, the application of§ 212 to start-up costs constitutes a
further definitional exception, adopted to avoid the § 162 start-up quagmire. See also supra
note 175 and accompanying text; infra notes 222-24 and accompanying text.
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tant of which is the "separate, saleable asset" precondition to
capitalization. 192
Finally, late in the development of the start-up cost doctrine, in
Blitzer v. United States 193 the Court of Claims challenged the doctrine's definitional functioning as putting a "going concern" gloss
on section 162(a). 194 The court rejected, albeit in dictum, 1911 the
government's "thesis that the start of a trade or business in the
sense of carrying on revenue-producing operations is an inflexible
temporal prerequisite for the application of I.R.C. § 162(a)." 196 Instead, the Court of Claims would have turned current deductibility
on general capitalization theories, i.e., whether the expenditures
were intended to provide benefits extending beyond the tax year in
question or were in the nature of start-up costs. 197 Thus, Blitzer

••• See infra notes 225-43 and accompanying text.
684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982). See generally Jones & Fowler, Pre-Operating Expenses:
Sec. 195 Does Not Resolve Conflicting Judicial Views, 14 Tax Adviser 471, 473-74 (1983);
Warner, supra note 87, at 3-4.
,.. See 684 F.2d at 879-81.
••• The court's discussion of whether the partnership was carrying on a trade or business
in the tax year in question constituted dictum in that the expenditures at issue were actually capital expenditures (e.g., payments for services in connection with the acquisition and
construction of capital assets, services in connection with obtaining a 42-year loan, and a
front-end fee for services rendered throughout the life of the partnership). 684 F.2d at 89394. The Blitzer court stated that the taxpayer might well have been able to prove that some
portion of fees paid to the administrative general partner were "of a non-capital nature, for
performing overhead, recordkeeping and normal housekeeping duties" during the tax year
in question, but the taxpayer waived any right to a remand since the amount involved was
too small. 684 F.2d at 895.
,.., 684 F.2d at 880 (footnote omitted). In Blitzer the government relied upon Richmond
Television Corp. v. United States, 354 F.2d 410 (4th Cir. 1965) (on remand), and on the Tax
Court decisions in Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521 (1979), afrd, 633
F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980), Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977), and Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424 (1980). See Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 880. The court distinguished Richmond Television and Madison Gas & Electric from the case before it on the
basis that they involved costs treated as capital expenses under the application of tests
which were apart from the "carrying on a trade or business" requirement, i.e., staff costs
that provided future benefits. Id. Additionally, the Blitzer court dismissed Francis and
Goodwin as being "without critical analysis." ld.; see also, Bradley, supra note 183. For
further discussion of Richmond Television, see supra notes 180-82 and accompanying text;
of Madison Gas & Electric, Francis, and Goodwin, see supra note 112 and accompanying
text.
,.., The court in Blitzer stated:
Defendant [the government] has supplied no good reason why normal recurring expenses to maintain any business enterprise, and which are not in the nature of startup costs nor intended to provide benefits extending beyond the year in question,
should not be deductible as ordinary expenses of such business irrespective of
118
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left open the possibility of capitalizing start-up costs on some
ground other than the preparatory doctrine. 198 It would, nevertheless, allow new corporations and new partnerships a current deduction for recurring expenditures producing short-term benefits. 199
Such expenditures fall within the classic definition of pre-operating or pre-opening expenses; 200 however, investigatory costs would
not be included. The Court of Claims previously had held that investigatory costs as to the acquisition of an investment, even
though recurring, had to be capitalized and added to the basis of
the assets. 201
Blitzer, in a step long advocated by commentators, 202 functionally limited "trade or business" in section 162(a) to requiring only
regular, continuous conduct distinguishing the activity from nondeductible "personal" or "family" expenses. 203 Ample support exists in the "hobby loss" area for this interpretation of "trade or
business." 204 However, something more than continuity is needed
to distinguish investment activities fro~ business activities. "The
'regular, extensive and continuous' test is not in itself the correct
test for determining whether a taxpayer is engaged in the trade or

whether or not the business has yet completed construction or acquisition of its income-producing asset.
684 F.2d at 880.
118
The Claims Court subsequently approved an "amassing of assets'.' capitalization rationale as undergirding the start-up cost doctrine. See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v.
United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985). But see supra notes 120 & 131 and accompanying
texts (criticizing the Claims Court's approach).
"'" 684 F.2d at 880 (dictum). Such deductions could be allowed "for amortization of organization and loan costs, for payment of telephone and other utility bills, rent, stationery,
and salaries and wages of corporate officers, secretaries and even for those who sweep the
floor ... [although] the business enterprise is not yet in a position to earn income." Id.;
accord Brotherman v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 407 (1984).
••• See infra note 315. Other decisions have treated similar costs as nondeductible preparatory costs. E.g., Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424, 434 (1980), affd mem., 691 F.2d
490 (3d Cir. 1982); Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M .. (CCH) 704 (1977). The Court of
Claims viewed these decisions as mechanical. Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 880; accord Bradley, supra
note 183.
••• See Weinstein v. United States, 420 F.2d 700 (Ct. Cl. 1970). Recurring acquisition
costs of capital assets also must be capitalized. See Union Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 570 F.2d 382, 390-91 (1st Cir. 1978).
••• E.g., Buell, supra note 2, at 280; Roth, supra note 2, at 48; see Erbacher, supra note 2,
at 491, 493, 495.
••• 684 F.2d at 879-80; accord Brotherman v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 407 (1984).
104
1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 22.5.1 to .2, at 22-44 to -49; Lee, supra note 122, at 390-97.

48

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 6:1

business of managing his own investments. " 2011 At the same time,
there is no need to use the term "trade or business" to separate
currently deductible expenses from capital expenditures; this separation is the primary function of the "ordinary" requirement under
both sections 162 and 212. 206
Rejecting revenue-producing operations as an "inflexible temporal prerequisite" for the application of section 162(a),207 the court
in Blitzer held that a taxpayer had begun business, for purposes of
this provision, as soon as the taxpayer "had actually begun, . . . a
regular, continuous course of conduct," 206 in this instance "to engage in, and carry on, its 'trade or business' of developing, constructing, owning and operating an apartment project with a bona
fide expectation of profit. " 209 The taxpayer's activities reached
trade or business status under this definition on ·the date on which
it "had acquired the land, had arranged for the financing of the
project, had executed its building loan agreement and given a note
therefor, had received substantial funds, and had prepared plans
for actual construction of its apartments (which began shortly
thereafter [and was completed in the following tax year])." 210
While couched in traditional commencement of a trade or business
format and perhaps supported by regulations under section 248, 211
••• Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
•oe See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966); Raymond Bertolini Trucking
Co. v. Commissioner, 736 F.2d 1120, 1123 (6th Cir. 1984).
••• Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 880.
••• Id. For a discussion of the "continuity" doctrine, see Lee, supra note 122, at 449-51.
108
684 F.2d at 880-81; Warner, supra note 87, at 3. See generally Lee, supra note 2, at 387
(trade or business requirement conotes profit motive and continuity). For a discussion of the
"profit" prerequisite, see Lee, supra note 122, at 380-90.
110 684 F.2d at 880.
111
See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.248-1(a)(3), 1.1372-4(b)(5)(ii)(b). The regulations peg "deemed
commencement of a business" (or "active conduct" in the latter instance) to whether the
activities of the (corporate) taxpayer advance to the extent necessary to identify the nature
of its business operations, e.g., the acquisition of necessary "operating assets." The Tax
Court explicitly rejected this model in the context of preparatory expenses. See infra note
428.
With increasing sophistication, or at least experience, the drafters of the regulations
under § 709 added, in 1983, a definition of "operating assets" providing that such assets are
"assets that are in a state of readiness to be placed in service within a reasonable period
following their acquisition." Treas. Reg. § 1.709-2(c). This definition was implicitly based on
the model of § 248. See S. Rep. No. 938, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 1, 94, reprinted in 1976
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3439, 3530. It provides for 60-month amortization of partnership organization fees "beginning with the month in which the partnership begins business." See I.R.C. § 709(b)(l). Not surprisingly, a decision following the start-up cost doctrine
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this approach, also long called for by commentators, 212 pinpoints
commencement of business activities substantially prior to the first
carrying on of revenue-producing operations. The government and
the Tax Court preferred the later starting point as the commencement of a business for start-up costs purposes. 213
Blitzer and other cases attacking the "holding oneself out as
providing goods or services" definition of trade or business status214 undermine the noncapital aspects of the preparatory doctrine, thus opening the way for a functional analysis of the deductibility of start-up and business expansion costs, as well. The
practical effect of Blitzer probably lay, however, more in its determination of when a business commences, than in its effect on the
definitional underpinnings of the traditional start-up cost doctrine.
For instance, under Blitzer, at least as soon as the typical real estate tax shelter venture acquired land and executed a construction
loan agreement, it could currently deduct classic recurring start-up
costs prior to completion or even commencement of construction. 2111 Investigatory costs, therefore, would not be currently deductible under the Blitzer approach because (1) they would still
fail the "ordinary" expense requirement previously viewed by the
Court of Claims as a capitalizable acquisition cost, 218 and (2) gen-

approved these regulations. Aboussie v. United States, 779 F.2d 424, 430 (8th Cir. 1985).
111
See, e.g., Galvin, Investigation and Start-Up Costs: Consequences and Considerations
for New Business, 56 Taxes 413, 418 (1978); Roth, supra note 2, at 39-40.
.,. See infra notes 415 & 420. Notwithstanding its usual hard-line tack as to when a business commences, the Tax Court on occasion has pinpointed commencement not on the first
purchase or sale (in a commodities trading business) but on when "planning for the business
was completed." Louismet v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1496 (1982). For examples of
typical Tax Court opinions, see cases cited infra note 415.
••• The author elsewhere has criticized the use of the "holding one's self out as providing
goods or services" definition of "trade or business" as support for the classic start-up cost
doctrine. See Lee, supra note 122, at 452-54; Lee, supra note 2, at 398-400. The issue of
whether meeting the "goods or services" standard is a prerequisite for "trade or business"
status is presently before the Supreme Court. See Commissioner v. Groetzinger, 721 F.2d
269 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1456 (1986). See generally, Boyle, What is a
Trade or Business?, 39 Tax Law. 737 (1986); Note, Trade or BusineSs Issue: Can a Gambling
Loss Properly Be Considered a Business Loss?, 19 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 907 (1985); Comment,
Defining "Trade or Business" Under the Internal Revenue Code: A Survey of Relevant
Cases, 11 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 949 (1984).
111
See Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., General Explanation of the
Revenue Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1984, at 296 (Comm. Print 1985) [hereinafter
General Explanation).
11
" See Weinstein v. United States, 420 F.2d 700 (Ct. Cl. 1970).
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erally they would be incurred prior to the Blitzer identification of
the business starting point for trade or business status.
Under a deep structure analysis, Blitzer's rejection of the "functioning as a going concern" gloss on section 162 is correct. Following this analysis, the "carrying on a trade or business" requirement
should be limited to distinguishing between section 162 activities
and non-profit-motivated activities or investments. 217 A trade or
business should be viewed as commencing as soon as the activity
can be determined to be profit-motivated and not merely an investment, i.e., usually when the business character of the activity
can be identified. An expenditure incurred prior to such point, e.g.,
investigatory costs incurred prior to a firm decision to enter the
activity, should be set up under the model as a separate asset and
currently deducted in the tax year in which the business commences, but only if the expenditure produces sufficiently shortterm, variable-term, or insubstantial benefits. Otherwise, the period benefited by such a capitalized cost should be estimated, even
if in a rough guess, and the expenditure then amortized over that
useful life. Under the model, most, if not all, pre-opening expenses
would be currently deductible in the year incurred unless otherwise prohibited under the distortion of income doctrine. However,
as a practical matter probably only investigatory costs would be set
up as a separate asset and then expensed or amortized once the
business commences, because only they would be likely to be
nonrecurring. 218
Even if the taxpayer's trade or business were determined not to
commence until the business begins to function as a going concern,
substantial distortion of income could be avoided by treating limited-life investigatory and pre-opening costs as creating free-standing assets, amortizable in full in the first tax year of operation. 219

Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 879; see Buell, supra note 2, at 280.
••• See Note, supra note 87, at 453.
••• The Tax Court has obliquely indicated its receptiveness to such an approach. Goodwin
v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424, 433-34 n.9 (1980), afrd mem., 691 F.2d 490 (3d Cir. 1982).
The Goodwin Court indicated approval of the result, but not the reasoning, in United States
v. Manor Care, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980). The Manor Care court allowed a
current deduction in the tax year the business began to function as a going concern for
expenditures paid earlier in the same year, but prior to the taxpayer's both obtaining a
license to operate and operating the business. Id. at 362. In Goodwin, the Tax Court disagreed with the reasoning in Manor Care that the expenditures were deductible under
§ 162, on the ground they "were clearly pre-operating in nature." 75 T.C. at 433-34 n.8.
117
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In the case of the investigatory expenses and rare pre-opening expenses that benefit an extended period, amortization would begin
when the business commences and would be available through the
benefited period. In the case of pre-opening expenses which are
sufficiently recurring so that if they are incurred after the business
commences they will be currently deductible, a reasonable allowance under this approach for amortization in the year the business
commences of such expenditures would be equal to the entire
amount of the expense.
The suggested approach would bring symmetry and less distortion of income to the start-up and business expansion costs area.
Unfortunately, its conflict with contrary definitional precedents
and the necessity of case-by-case determination of useful life or
distortion of income would pose substantial problems in tax adminstration. Moreover, at least since the 1984 amendments in response to Blitzer, 220 courts arguably are not free to develop caselaw solutions as to start-up costs under provisions other than section 195. 221

B. Antithesis: Definitional Separate, Saleable Asset Doctrine
The distortion of income caused by capitalization without amortization under the classic preparatory doctrine generated a host of
definitional refinements to the doctrine. Examples of such refinements are: the preparatory doctrine does not apply to recurringtype expenditures incurred in the same tax year that the business
later commences, 222 and conceptually unsound attribution of business status 223 and deductions 224 across corporate lines. The major
Instead, the Goodwin court indicated the identical result of a current deduction could be
reached by capitalizing the expenditures and then providing-once the business began-amortization deductions over the period benefited. Id. Further, the Tax Court reasoned, implicitly, that the period benefited by such recurring pre-operating costs was a year
or less; therefore, the "reasonable allowance" in the year the business commenced for depreciation of such capitalized pre-operating costs was the entire cost. See Schuster, Pre-Opening Costs-Recent Legislative and Judicial Attention, Tax. Mgmt. Mem. No. 81-8 (BNA) 3,
5-6 (1981).
110
See infra note 446 and accompanying text.
.., See infra note 441 and accompanying text.
111
United States v. Manor Care, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980). See generally
Schuster, supra note 219.
••• Duffy v. United States, 690 F.2d 889 (Ct. Cl. 1982). Notwithstanding the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963) (relying on a long
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development in response to the inequities of the preparatory doctrine is the "separate, saleable asset" doctrine, fashioned to allow
current deduction of start-up-like expenditures with present and
future benefits incurred in expanding an existing business.
Briarcliff Candy Corp. v. Commissioner22 rs and most of its bank
credit card case progeny, establishing the "separate, saleable property right" bright-line test for current deductibility of certain business expansion costs, 228 contained common elements. The expenses
line of its earlier decisions that a shareholder was not engaged in the business of the corporation in which he owned stock), in Duffy the Court of Claims, in the context of whether
sales of property by a shareholder to his controlled corporation were made in the ordinary
course of the shareholder's business, imputed the corporation's trade or business activities
to the shareholder under an agency theory. 690 F.2d at 895-96; see also Tibbals v. United
States, 362 F.2d 266, 272 (Ct. Cl. 1966).
••• Baltimore Aircoil Co. v. United States, 333 F. Supp. 705 (D. Md. 1971) (although parent and subsidiary were separate entities, they filed consolidated returns and the subsidiary
was merely a branch or division of parent); see also Playboy Clubs Int'l, Inc., v. United
States, 76-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9560 (N.D. Ill. 1976), aff'd in part, vacated in part, and
remanded in part, in unpublished order, (7th Cir. May 16, 1977). The Tax Court refused to
take this approach, at least where the parent and subsidiary were not in the same business.
Bennett Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 458, 464-65 (1982), aff'd per curiam, 699 F.2d
450 (8th Cir. 1983); accord Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,423,005 (Feb. 8, 1984) .
... 475 F.2d 775 (2d Cir. 1973); Case Note, supra note 90.
... Briarcliff Candy, and its progeny, have been described as involving new ways of, not
new geographic branches for, operating an existing business. See Central Tex. Sav. & Loan
Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984). In fact, however, Briarcliff
Candy promoted sales through new retail, franchise outlets in drug stores in areas of geographic expansion (the suburbs).
In Briarcliff Candy, recurring (and generally increasing) expenditures were involved,
which was also true in the first bank credit card decision. See Colorado Springs Nat'! Bank
v. United States, 505 F.2d 1185 (lOth Cir. 1974). In First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 592
F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979) (permitting a current deduction under the separate, saleable asset
test for the cost of a computer program having a five-year useful period), however, the
Ninth Circuit majority was unable to distinguish the computer costs in Colorado Springs
National Bank. See id. at 1053 (Duniway, J., dissenting). This inability stemmed from misfocusing on the separate, saleable asset test. In Colorado Springs National Bank, the deductible computer costs consisted almost entirely of data entry charges, clearly recurring
costs probably with short-term benefits, and hence were currently deductible without distortion of income. See 505 F.2d at 1187-88. In contrast, in First Security Bank the computer
costs largely consisted of the cost of a computer program, used for five years, which under a
distortion of income analysis should have been capitalized and amortized, probably over
that period. 592 F.2d at 1053 n.1 (Duniway, J., dissenting in part).
Indeed, the best-reasoned bank credit card opinion did not even consider the lack of
transferability, the focal point of Colorado Springs National Bank and Briarcliff Candy.
See Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433 (8th Cir. 1979). The court
in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank rested on the facts that: (I) the acquired credit information was short-lived and subject to sudden change; (2) the information obtained could only
have been used to issue credit cards and did not create goodwill; and (3) equivalent credit
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were recurring (and in Briarcliff Candy increased annually in
amount over a long period), 227 and thus were similar to many preopening expenses. Moreover, " [t] he distinction between recurring
and nonrecurring business expenses provides a very crude but perhaps serviceable demarcation between those capital expenditures
that can be feasibly capitalized and those that cannot be." 228 These
cases universally viewed the expansion costs as new ways of carrying on an existing business, rather than starting a new business in
a new location. 229
The most important common factor, however, was the view that
a current deduction of a recurring expense with some future benefits was preferable to its capitalization without amortization-"rough justice. " 230 The Second Circuit in Briarcliff Candy
merely charged the government "to furnish clear standards and
guidelines as to what intangible assets are deductible under § 162
and what are not. " 231 The leading bank credit card decision, Colorado Springs National Bank u. United States, however, sharpened
the thrust:
The start-up expenditures here challenged did not create a property interest. They produced nothing corporeal or salable. They
are recurring. At the most they introduced a more efficient method
of conducting an old business. The government suggests no way in
which they could be amortized. The government's theoretical ap-

screening, clearly an ordinary and necessary part of banking, could have been internally
performed and currently deducted. Id. at 436. Therefore, in an interesting twist on Idaho
Power's tax parity mandate, the court in Iowa-Des Moines National Bank held that purchased credit screening was currently deductible. Id. The model works the same way; thus,
in practical effect a distortion of income analysis (although not expressly so articulated)
would not change the result in most of the bank credit card cases, but would produce capitalization and amortization in First Security Bank.
107
Over an eight-year period (1963-70) the franchise division's expenses annually ranged
from $580,702 to $808,965. 475 F.2d at 780.
••• Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. Commisioner, 685 F.2d 212, 217 (7th Cir. 1982); see
supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
••• Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d at 1190. The court held that "[t]he credit card
system enables a bank to carry on an old business in a new way. A new method is distinguishable from a new business." Id.; accord First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 558 F.2d 721
(4th Cir. 1977) (per curiam); First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 644, 649 (1975), affd,
592 F.2d 1050 (9th Cir. 1979); see Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 781, 787.
••• See Warner, supra note 87, at 8; Note, supra note 4, at 332-33.
131
475 F.2d at 783. The recurring costs in question consisted of compensation paid to
added salepersons, extensive advertising, and costs of soliciting drug stores and others to act
as sales agents. See id.
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proach ignores the practicalities of the situation, and permits a
distortion of taxpayer's financial situation. If an expenditure, concededly of temporal value, may be neither expensed nor amortized,
the adoption of technological advances is discouraged. 232

Briarcliff Candy and its progeny read the Supreme Court in
Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association as having
shifted the emphasis radically: ensuing future benefit was thought
no longer controlling. Rather, the court in Briarcliff Candy held
that the inquiry should be whether the expenditure created or enhanced essentially a separate and distinct asset. 233 "Asset" was de••• 505 F.2d at 1192 (emphasis added).
131
475 F. 2d at 786. In Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 403 U.S. 345 (1971),
the taxpayer currently deducted compulsory payments to the Federal Savings and Loan
Insurance Corporation's ("FSLIC") Secondary Reserve, in which Lincoln Savings & Loan
had a transferable pro rata share that could also be refunded or applied to FSLIC's conced·
edly deductible primary reserve. The Commissioner argued that because the Secondary Reserve provided future benefits it should be capitalized. Id. at 354. In response, the Court
stated that
the presence of an ensuing benefit that may have some future aspect is not controlling; many expenses concededly deductible have prospective effect beyond the taxable year.
What is important and controlling, we feel is that the ... payment serves to create
or enhance for Lincoln what is essentially a separate and distinct additional asset and
that, as an inevitable consequence, the payment is capital in nature and not an expense, let alone an ordinary expense, deductible under § 162(a) in the absence of
other factors not established here.
Id. This passage illustrates well one of the dangers of dictum. Although the passage showed
that the Court in Lincoln Savings & Loan focused on the presence of a separate asset,
several decisions and commentators have read it as merely indicating that the presence of a
separate asset is a "condition sufficient" for capitalization. See, e.g., Florida Publishing Co.
v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 269, 272, (1975), arrd in unpublished opinion, (5th Cir. April 26,
1977); see also NCNB Corp v. United States, 651 F.2d 942, 957-58 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated
en bane, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7
Cl. Ct. 220, 225 (1985); 1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 20.4.4, at 20-80 n.54; Gunn, supra note
5, at 444; Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 476; Warner, supra note 87, at 5, 8 (stating that a
separate property interest rule was hard to justify); Note, supra note 5, at 622; Note, supra
note 4, at 332 (stating that the separate asset standard was not sound tax policy, and therefore should be interpreted merely as a condition sufficent for capitalization). Implicit support for this reading can be found in the Court's subsequent capital expenditure cases,
which adopted other capitalization tests. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418
U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Mississippi Chern. Corp., 405 U.S. 298 (1972); see also Note,
s•Jpra note 4, at 320 & n.56.
Other cases and many student commentators have read Lincoln Savings & Loan as requiring creation or enhancement of a separate transferable asset as a condition precedent
for capitalization. See cases and sources cited infra note 234. The author would reconcile
Lincoln Savings & Loan with the clear reflection of income doctrine by treating the deferred charge, required where current deduction of the cost would produce a distortion of
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fined in its business sense as "items of ownership of a permanent
or fixed nature which are convertible into cash. " 234 Briarcliff
Candy's unarticulated premise may have been that such "assets"
(apart from increase in value of the business) usually would be depreciable or amortizable; hence, no distortion of income would result from capitalization. 280 While Briarcliff Candy, with its pronouncements on the one-year rule, called into question the
production of future benefits rationale for capitalizing pre-opening
expenses, 236 its progeny tended to explain the preparatory doctrine
in relation to the "carrying on a trade or business" leg of Rich-

income, as a separate, free-standing, and usually amortizable asset, thus satisfying the Lincoln Savings & Loan test. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text; cf. Central Texas
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United·States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984).
••• Briarcliff Candy, 475 F.2d at 786. Briarcliff Candy and its bank credit card progeny
read Lincoln Savings & Loan as requiring a separate, saleable asset and the standard set
forth in NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 289, as preconditions for capitalization. See supra note 227.
Specifically, Briarcliff Candy and its progeny held that the "ensuing benefit" language in
Lincoln Savings & Loan overruled the one-year standard for distinguishing between capital
and current costs. Most student commentators have erroneously favored the separate, saleable property rule. E.g., Note, supra note 87, at 463, 465; Note, supra note 115, at 1138, 1142;
Note, Deductibility of Bank Branching Expenditures: Central Texas Savings & Loan Association v. United States, A Weak Rebuttal to NCNB Corp. v. United States, 19 U. Richmond L. Rev. 147 (1984). But see Note, supra note 4, at 330, 332. Unfortunately, congressional staff also seem to have read Lincoln Savings & Loan as establishing such a separate
and distinct asset precondition to capitalization. See S. Rep. No. 313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess.
141 (1986); Staff of Joint Comm. on Tax'n, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., Tax Reform Accounting
Issues 50 (Sept. 13, 1985).
••• As one commentator noted
the property interest test drawn from Lincoln Savings & Loan is difficult to justify in
theory. However, it may serve as a means of imposing rough justice by requiring capitalization only with respect to those assets and benefits-tangible assets and intangible property interests-most likely to have ascertainable useful lives that will support
amortization deductions.
Warner, supra note 87, at 3. Colorado Springs National Bank appears to have been greatly
influenced by such considerations. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. On the other
hand, the Second Circuit historically has displayed a predeliction for importing property Jaw
concepts into this and related areas of taxation. See Commissioner v. Ferrer, 304 F.2d 125
(2d Cir. 1962); Van Iderstine Co. v. Commissioner, 261 F.2d 211, 213 (2d Cir. 1958) (a capital expenditure must result in the acquisition of "capital," i.e., an addition to the taxpayer's
taxable wealth).
••• If the future benefits/capitalization basis for the preparatory doctrine is removed, and
the definitional preparatory basis is undercut by Blitzer, then recurring pre-opening costs
should be currently deductible. See Erbacher, supra note 2, at 495; Lee, supra note 2, at 30
n.53; Note, supra note 5, at 624 n.34; see also supra notes 193-214 and accompanying text.
The business expansion decisions, however, were not so forthright. See infra notes 292-300
and accompanying text.
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mond Television. 237
The "separate, saleable asset" precondition for capitalization is
overinclusive, permitting a current deduction for (1) substantial
expenditures benefiting an extended period of time although creating no transferable asset, e.g., a computer program expected to last
five years, 238 and (2) acquisition costs of a license with an indefinite life. 239 A current deduction in such instances produces more
distortion of income than capitalization as a free-standing asset
amortizable over the benefited period. In addition to its functional
weaknesses, the separate, saleable asset test is conceptually weak,
based upon a limited, and oft-critized,240 reading of Lincoln Savings & Loan. As the Claims Court pointed out in Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. United States, 241 the "separate and distinct asset" referent in Lincoln Savings & Loan only meant that in
the particular case before the Court the taxpayer's acquisition of
such an asset was decisive. "It does not state ... that if the separate and distinct asset test is not met the payment is a necessary
and ordinary expense. " 242 A host of examples may be found where
capital treatment is required although no such separate and distinct asset is created or enhanced. 243
In summary, the first application of the separate, saleable asset
doctrine worked well (steady-state recurring expenditures). 244
See, e.g., Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank, 505 F.2d at 1190; see also First Nat'! Bank v.
United States, 41 F. Supp. 1107, 1111 (D.S.C. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 558 F.2d 721 (4th Cir.
1977); First Sec. Bank v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 644, 649 (1975), aff'd, 592 F.2d 1050 (9th
Cir. 1979). See generally Note, supra note 115, at 1134 & n.57. Central Texas Savings &
Loan (which applied the origin-of-the-claim doctrine to expansion costs) agreed that "if a
taxpayer were to start a new business, the pre-operational or start-up expenses would not be
deductible under section 162(a)." 731 F.2d at 1183.
All three definitional doctrines (preparatory doctrine, separate, saleable asset, and acquisition cost), however, fail the acid clear reflection of income test. Distinguishing (and hence,
approving in dictum) the preparatory doctrine was undoubtedly motivated by "the desire to
permit the taxpayer to deduct its expenses without directly challenging the well-entrenched
rule prohibiting the deduction of pre-operating costs." Note, supra note 5, at 627; see infra
notes 310-18 and accompanying text.
•aa First Sec. Bank, 592 F.2d at 1053 (Duniway, J., dissenting).
110
NCNB Corp. v. United States, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982) (en bane). Contra Central
Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
••• Gunn, supra note 5, at 452; Note, supra note 4, at 330.
••• 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985).
141
Id. at 225.
141
Id.; Gunn, supra note 5, at 446, 447 n.20; Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at 544-46.
••• See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
117
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When mechanically extended, however, as is the nature of a
bright-line test, the doctrine itself produced distortion of income
and, in time, countervailing authorities.
C.

Failed Synthesis: Amortization of Free-Standing Deferred
Charge

The majority panel decision in NCNB I (vacated on en bane review), paralleling an approach called for by some commentators 2 '«~
and the inspiration for the model, attempted to chart a middle
ground or "golden mean" 246 between the Richmond Television
"one-year rule" 247 and the Briarcliff Candy "separate, saleable interest" rule. The panel favored untying the "Gordian knot" of
these two talismanic rules by: (1) capitalizing business expansion
costs (and start-up costs as well) to the extent that their current
deduction would distort the taxpayer's income because future
years would be benefited (while recognizing exceptions for certain
nondistorting, currently deductible costs that would benefit future
years); 248 but then, (2) treating the expansion costs as separate,
... Erbacher, supra note 2, at 500; Seago, supra note 2, at 421; Note, supra note 5, at 619,
633; Case Note, supra note 90, at 916-17. These commentators, however, meant different
things by "clear reflection of income," usually adopting either the incorporation of financial
accounting rules or judicial policy. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text; infra notes
254-67 and accompanying text.
ua NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 294-95 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting). In his vacated majority
opinion in NCNB I, Judge Murnaghan saw his device of amortization as avoiding "the
Catch-22 from which the Tenth Circuit believed that it had to rescue Colorado Springs
National Bank." 651 F.2d at 959. For a discussion of the technical difficulties of the NCNB
I panel majority's view of amortization, see infra notes 254-67 and accompanying text.
147
The court in Richmond Television alternatively denied a current deduction for the
contested start-up costs (principally pre-opening broadcasting staff training) on the ground
that the costs benefited future tax years and, hence, were capital. See supra notes 156-57
and accompanying text. The court stated: "Our system of income taxation attempts to
match income and expenses so as to tax only net income. A taxpayer may, therefore, not
deduct as a current business expense the full cost of acquiring an asset, tangible or intangible, which benefits the taxpayer for more than one year." 345 F.2d at 907. Where an expenditure benefits future years, automatic capitalization can lead to distortion of income. See
supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text.
... The NCNB I majority read the reference to currently deductible future benefit expenditures in Lincoln Savings & Loan as speaking to "situations involving considerations of
pragmatism and uncertainty in which, with the blessing of the Commissioner, taxpayers
may deduct currently certain expenditures, notwithstanding the presence of probable future
benefit." NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 961. The panel pointed to the allowance of current deductions (1) for repair and educational expenditures benefiting a taxpayer during subsequent
tax years and (2) for expenditures that, as a practical matter, could not be associated with
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free-standing assets and allowing amortization in both the current
and future tax years in proportion to the extent the costs were
used in such years. 249

1.

NCNB I Panel: Amortization of Deferred Charge

The panel's treatment of the cost itself as a free-standing, amortizable, separate asset, rather than looking for a saleable asset produced or purchased by the expenditure, constituted one of the
opinion's two most significant holdings:
In order more accurately to reflect income, :both in the present period and in the future accounting periods, tpe carried-forward "assets" of an enterprise include, without regard to whether they are
tangible or intangible, certain expenditures for benefits whose cost
has already been incurred but the outlay for which is nevertheless
most properly matched against some future period's revenues
which the benefits will help produce. This matching is without regard to whether the benefits are tangible or intangible and also
without regard to their realizability, through sale or otherwise. The
critical factor is the accounting period in which the associated revenues are to be recognized, not the nature of the benefits which
help produce those revenues. Whether the deferred charge has
some separate identifiable worth is irrelevant to the accounting
process as it is applied. zao

either current or future tax years. Id. at 961-62. The panel also categorized other minor
current deductible expenditures, which conceptually were capital, as " 'more-trouble-thanit's-worth exceptions,' " e.g., expenditures with a useful life of no more than a year that in
fact overlapped two tax years. Id. at 953 & n.21; see Note, supra note 4, at 332-33. For
discussion of the proper future benefit exceptions to capitalization under the model, see
supra notes 53-78 and accompanying text.
••• NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 962-63. For discussion of the flaw in this view of amortization,
see infra notes 253-61 and accompanying text.
••• 651 F.2d at 949. For a hypothetical (strikingly prophetic of the Wolfsen Land & Cattle
approach) involving recurring landscaping costs, see Gunn, supra note 5, at 446 & n.19.
Professor Gunn advocated that the "cost" be treated as the amortizable asset itself, rather
than what was purchased with the cost. ld.
The taxpayer in Central Texas Savings & Loan argued in the alternative that the market
survey and permit application "expenditures should have been amortized over the life of the
'work product,' presumably the period of time prior to approval of the permit during which
the studies and applications were used." Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United States,
731 F.2d 1181, 1181 (5th Cir. 1984). The Fifth Circuit artlessly held that § 195 was not yet
applicable to the year in question, so that the court did not have to decide whether the
contested (survey and permit) costs could meet the § 195 proviso that amortizable start-up
costs "would be deductible if they were paid in connection with expansion of an existing
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This approach, which the panel would have applied to both business expansion and start-up costs, 2111 was fundamentally sound and
is close to the model suggested. 2112
However, through overreliance on Generally Accepted Accounting Principles ("GAAP"), 2113 the panel opinion in NCNB I was unclear on tax technicalities, and its distortion of income analysis
perhaps failed to account adequately for recurring investigatory
costs. The NCNB I panel majority thus fell into two major technical errors in its approach to amortization of the capitalized market
survey and branch permit application costs at issue in the case.
The first error was that amortization was determined year-by-year
on the basis of actual use of the intangible created by the contested expenditures in current operations in that year rather than
by estimating useful life. The second error was that amortization
of the capitalized acquisition costs of nonwasting assets, such as
branch permits, was permitted.
These technical errors resulted from the panel's opinion that the
determination of annual net income for a given tax year was an
accounting question, calling for the matching, in the appropriate
period, of the gross revenues for the year and the cost of producing

business." Id. at 1186. The Fifth Circuit, as a further non sequitur, concluded that "[i]n the
future, however, Section 195(a) should encourage formation of new businesses without the
attendant controversy and litigation to determine the proper tax classification of the startup expenditures." Id. at 1186. The judicial pattern of deliberating the backstopping of§ 195
while espousing a capitalization theory that logically would emasculate the provision has
become commonplace. See Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). See generally infra notes
309-17 and accompanying text.
101
651 F.2d at 956-57; accord Colorado Springs Nat'l Bank v. United States, 505 F.2d
1185, 1187 (lOth Cir. 1974).
••• The model also would set up many, if not most, expenditures benefiting future years
as a deferred charge, but would amortize the "asset" over a useful life determined by approximation. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text. Moreover, if the period benefited were short, say up to three years, the model would allow a current deduction. See
supra note 45 and accompanying text. Thus, under the model the market survey costs might
be currently deductible, while the permit costs would be amortizable.
••• 651 F.2d 954, 961-63. Some commentators have advocated identification of financial
accounting with clear reflection of income in the start-up cost area. See, e.g, Lee, supra note
5; Case Note, supra note 90. A thesis of this article, however, is that only broad financial
accounting concepts, e.g., amortization of start-up costs as a deferred charge, and not financial accounting principles themselves, should govern. See supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text. See generally, Comment, Tax Treatment of the Costs of Internally Developed Intangible Assets, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 767, 787 (1984).
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those revenues. 26" Therefore, the Fourth Circuit panel looked to
the GAAP "hierarchy" of expense recognition principles for the
proper "matching" 266 rules: (1) association of expense with revenue
"on the basis of cause and effect"; (2) if not possible, systematic
and rational allocation; and, (3) if neither possible, recognition of
costs as expenses in the period incurred or in which a loss is sustained. 266 Based on these rules the panel majority believed that
when there are discernible future benefits from an expenditure,
there very often will be a cause and effect relation between the
expenditure and revenues to be received during future periods. . . . Even when there is no direct means of associating the
expenditure and later revenues as cause and effect, there will almost always be a way systematically and rationally to allocate the
cost among the periods in which benefits are provided. 2117

Consequently, relying upon a melange of clear reflection of income, GAAP, and Cohan approximation, 268 the panel remanded
the case to the district court to determine the extent to which
("even if no better than a rough guess") 269 the internal and external business expansion costs (market surveys and permit costs)
were used in the production of current revenue during the years
before the trial court. The panel also held that the remaining
amount of the costs were similarly to be allocated in subsequent
tax years between use in production of future income and use, if
any, in the production of current revenue. 260 The panel viewed
such allocation (or amortization) according to use in the tax year
as constituting a "systematic and rational allocation" of the cost,
e.g., of the market survey, among the accounting periods during
which it was economically valuable to the taxpayer. Such allocation was appropriate even if it was not possible to associate, according to cause and effect, the use of such a survey and some sub-

204

651 F.2d at 948, 952, 961-962.
••• Id. at 952.
... ld. For the text of these principles, see supra note 84.
257
651 F.2d at 961.
... Cohan v. Commissioner, 39 F.2d 540, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1930). For a discusson of Cohan
approximations and their proper use in depreciation/amortization questions, see supra notes
166-74 and accompanying text.
••• 651 F.2d at 962.
••• ld. at 963.
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sequent revenues. 261
Seeking "rough justice," the NCNB I panel carried the financial
accounting principle of matching expenditures with associated revenues too far. It failed to appreciate that tax accounting, unlike
financial accounting, does not match costs and revenues on a
cause-and-effect basis year-by-year. Rather, under tax accounting
principles the period to be benefited, i.e., the useful life, generally
is estimated in the year the expenditure is made and its cost is
then deducted over that period, ratably in the case of intangibles.262 Thus, under tax amortization "rough justice" is obtained by estimating useful life through a "rough guess." 263
The NCNB I panel, taking matching of costs and revenue for
financial accounting to its logical extreme, called for amortization
of the direct and indirect permit application costs in the same
manner as the survey costs.264 The branch banking permit, however, had an indefinite life2611 and hence, under traditional doctrine,
could not be amortized. 266 In addition, traditionally, useful life
could not be estimated under Cohan, since the permit was not
wasting, i.e., had an indefinite life. 267 Betrayed by its desire to
clearly reflect income and the purported ease of systematically and
rationally allocating costs among the tax years of use, the NCNB I
panel failed to address both the acquisition cost doctrine (treatment of the application costs as a separate asset would be of no
avail) 268 and the inability to estimate with reasonable accuracy the

••• Id. at 962. These, of course, are the standaros of GAAP allocation. See supra note 84.
In effect the panel applied a "transactional approach," matching expenses and revenue
(through use rather than income generated) on year-by-year basis. Such a transactional or
"open" approach is contrary in this context to the annual accounting principle under which
the transaction is closed in year one, i.e., determine the useful life and then prorate the cost
over that period. See Warner, supra note 87, at 6. Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit took an
open-transaction approach (for lease-option transactions) once before and then reversed itself en bane, adopting a closed transaction approach. See Kitchin v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d
895 (4th Cir.), vacated en bane, 353 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1965).
••• Several narrow exceptions to ratable amortization of intangibles are permitted. See 1
B. Bittker, supra note 5, 11 23.5.6, at 23-70 to -72; see also supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
••• See supra notes 170-71 and accompanying text.
... 651 F.2d at 963.
••• See 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1982).
••• See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3.
••• See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
••• The capitalized cost would still have an indefinite life.
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useful life of the branch banking permits. As one commentator
noted:
Where a cost, such as that of a license, does not provide benefits
that decrease with time, Lincoln Savings & Loan clearly bars a
deduction, even though the result may be more or less (depending
on the actual duration of the business) unfortunate as a matter of
taxation of only net income. 1188

2.

NCNB I Panel: Capitalization and Distortion of Income

The second significant holding of the NCNB I majority was its
deep structure analysis of the basis for capitalization. The presence
of "future benefits" did not automatically require capitalization;
rather, wherever current deduction of expenditures providing future benefits would substantially distort the taxpayer's income,
capitalization and amortization were in order. Thus the panel's approach (whether the current deduction of expenditures benefiting
current and future years would distort the taxpayer's income) was
sound/no a long-needed application of basics. The non-income-distorting exceptions, however, were drawn too narrowly due to overreliance on the financial accounting rules implementing the matching of revenues and costs in the appropriate period. 271 Many of the
non-income-distorting exceptions noted by the NCNB I panel majority fell within the de minimis exception described by commentators, e.g., minor expenditures for books of a professional or tools of
a craftsman. 272 However, the NCNB I panel majority's understanding278 of the current tax treatment of certain advanced or practical
education costs, currently deductible by a taxpayer employed in
the same field but automatically capitalizable (without amortization) by a taxpayer not yet so employed, was contrary to a clear
reflection of income analysis and rested largely on a talismanic existing/new business dichotomy, strikingly similar to the definitional preparatory and separate, saleable asset tests. 27 •
"" Gunn, supra note 5, at 494 n.230.
170
See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
171
See 651 F.2d at 948 & n.ll. For discussion of the proper relationship of GAAP and tax
accounting, see supra notes 81-95 and accompanying text.
171
See supra note 62 and accompanying text; see also supra note 248.
171
See 651 F.2d at 961.
174
See Lee, Command Performance: The Tax Treatment of Employer Mandated Expenses, 7 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1, 33-36 (1972). Employee job-seeking costs also can be fit into an
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More significantly, the NCNB I panel overlooked perhaps the
major conceptual exception to the clear reflection of income principle permitting the current deduction of an expenditure benefiting
future, as well as current, tax years: regularly recurring expenditures. If a taxpayer annually makes similar expenditures in relatively uniform amounts benefiting both present and future years,
the taxpayer's income in any given year is not distorted by deducting the entire amount of the expenditure made in that year, so
long as expenditures made in other years benefiting that year are
not also amortized in that year. 2711 Similarly, distortion usually will
not arise when currently deducting, in their entirety, regularly increasing or steady-state expenditures. 278 Such a rationale supports
the current deduction of advertising expenditures and goes a long
way towards justifying the results, albeit not the rationale, of many
of the business expansion cases in this area.
As a practical matter, the choice between amortization and current deduction of recurring expenditures, without distortion of income, should turn more on whether the benefits created are so
short-term and whether useful life is so difficult to estimate that
amortization is more trouble than it is worth and unlikely to produce a clearer reflection of income than expensing. 277 This may be
the case with the market surveys in NCNB, which the NCNB I
panel sought to capitalize and then amortize.
In summary, the NCNB I panel majority correctly looked to one
of the deep structure principles of capitalization versus current expense, i.e., the clear reflection of income, in determining the proper
treatment of the business expansion co_sts. It correctly viewed the
use of the financial accounting concept of a deferred charge as the
resolution of the prior ali-or-nothing rules. However, it erroneously
treated the internal and external permit costs as a separate, amortizable asset apart from the branch banking privilege acquired with

old-business/new-business mold. See Halperin, Business Deduction for Personal Living Expenses: A Uniform Approach to an Unsolved Problem, 122 U. Pa. L. Rev. 859, 905-08
(1974). To the extent § 195 works at all, it should apply to new job-advancement educational and job-seeking expenses of employees, since such status constitutes a trade or business. See Lee, supra note 2, at 396; see infra note 468 and accompanying text.
"'" See supra notes 67-75 and accompanying text.
118
See id.
177
See Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436 (8th Cir. 1979);
Southland Royalty Co. v. United States, 582 F.2d 604, 618 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
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such permits. Such permit costs should be amortizable only if the
branch itself has a determinable life or if the absence of a wasting
asset is expressly acknowledged as not being a barrier to a Cohan
"rough guess" approach to achieving a clearer reflection of income.
Moreover, the NCNB I panel's method of amortizing the survey
costs presents difficulties: allocation year-by-year according to current revenue and future revenue use, determining or estimating
useful life, and difficulties of Cohan approximation.
The model approach of current deduction of a recurring expenditure appears preferable to capitalization and amortization because the model would not distort income where the expenditure
produces future benefits but has a short and very uncertain useful
life. However, the model, also based on avoiding distortion of income, is a far cry from the "separate, saleable asset" test of the
NCNB II en bane majority and would not, like it, allow current
deduction of the permit costs.

3. NCNB II En Bane: Adoption of Separate, Saleable Asset
Doctrine
On rehearing en bane, the majority in NCNB II vacated the
panel decision below and extended the Briarcliff Candy "separate,
saleable asset" reading of Lincoln Savings & Loan to investigatory
(market survey) costs and permit costs incurred in establishing
branch operations in new locations. The court stated that:
The money spent or obligated for metro studies, feasibility studies,
and applications to the Comptroller of the Currency, it seems to
us, adds nothing to the value of a bank's assets which can be so
definitely ascertained that it must be capitalized. Certainly no
"separate and distinct additional asset" is created. While the benefit of all these classes of expenses may or may not endure for more
than one year, that is but one factor to be considered. The branch
has no existence separate and apart from the parent bank; as a
branch bank, it is not readily saleable and has no market value
other than the real estate which it occupies and the tangible equipment therein. 178

The NCNB II en bane majority, however, failed to address the
clear reflection of income and amortization aspects of the panel
••• 684 F.2d at 293.
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opinion. Instead, it set up a "strawman," erroneously treating the
panel opinion as merely a "future benefits" decision resting on the
one-year rule articulated in Richmond Television, which the majority then knocked down by reading Lincoln Savings & Loan as
overturning the parts of Richmond Television "establishing a oneyear standard for distinguishing between capital and current
costs." 279 Just as in Briarcliff Candy and its progeny, upon which
it relied heavily, the NCNB II majority emphasized the recurring
nature of the contested expenses, both as to the frequency of the
taxpayer's evaluations of its market position and as to the regularity of actions based upon such evaluations, i.e., opening and closing
branches. 280 However, the opinion failed to discuss the frequency
of restudy of the same market or the rapidity of change in the environment; rather, the majority focused on the constant use of such
studies in the bank's decision-making process. Significantly, over
eighty percent of the contested expenditures were for internal
costs (salaries, supplies, and depreciation) regularly incurred in
preparing market studies (together with outside consultants) and
preparation of applications to open branch offices, 281 but neither

270

ld. at 289 & n.4.
••• ld. at 294; see NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 963, 970 (Widener, J., dissenting) (author of en
bane opinion).
18
' 684 F.2d at 286 n.l. The en bane majority's focus unfortunately appears solely to have
been on the recurring use of the market surveys, for which it made a good case for current
deduction along the lines of Iowa-Des Moines Nat'l Bank, 592 F.2d at 436, and Southland
Royalty, 582 F.2d at 618 (discussed supra at notes 67-72 and accompanying text). In his
NCNB I dissent, Judge Widener consistently ignored the direct and indirect permit costs:
We deal only with intangibles which in proper perspective are used as a part of the
decision making process of the bank. The taxpayer is in the regular day to day business of branch banking. This is nothing new. It must compete or die. To this end, it
employs consultants to prepare Metro Studies, and itself prepares feasibility and
other more precise studies of prospective locations to open or close branch banks.
The money spent on the Metro Studies and the money spent on the salaries, etc.,
involved in the decision making process of the bank, as well as carrying out that
process until the physical facility is obtained, is nothing more nor less than the expenses any merchant or manufacturer must bear if it is to stay in day to day competition with its competitors. The principal future benefit that such intangibles can be
said to produce is that the bank has become wiser after spending the money, and this
by its acquisition of additional knowledge. The additional knowledge is then used in
its decision making process. Whatever benefit the bank has gained from these studies
is not salable, and this is acknowledged by the government, and it has no intrinsic
ascertainable value.
651 F.2d at 970 (Widener, J., dissenting).
The NCNB I panel majority also focused primarily on amortization of the survey costs,
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the NCNB I nor the NCNB II opinion broke down costs between
direct and indirect market survey costs and direct and indirect
permit application costs.
The NCNB II opinion focused on the recurring use of the intangibles created by the expenditures in the decision-making process of the bank holding company, namely, "all of these expenses
were connected with NCNB's developing and operating a statewide
network of branch banking facilities." 282 The majority's separate,
saleable asset test may have reached the correct result (current deduction) as to the recurring market survey costs, but talismanic
application produced the wrong result as to the direct and indirect
permit costs because their value would continue undiminished as
long as the branch continued. 283 The mere fact that the permit
costs were recurring did not render them currently deductible. The
costs were not recurring in the sense of creating short-term benefits or replacement of similar prior assets; rather, they were recurring because the taxpayer acquired additional permits. However,
recurring acquisitions of long-lived or nonwasting assets are not
currently deductible. Otherwise, a taxpayer who constantly expands by building or buying new plants could currently deduct the
cost of each plant. 2" The answer to nonamortizable permit costs
lies in· remedial legislation or equitable approximation of useful
life.2sl!
Part of the result reached by the Fourth Circuit en bane in
NCNB II (deduction of the market survey fees) may be justifiable
if the survey costs were sufficiently recurring so that a current de-

apparently intending that the same principles would apply to the permit costs. 651 F.2d at
963. Conversely, the Fifth Circuit focused solely on the permit costs to the exclusion of
market survey costs. Central Tex. Sav. & Loan v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1184 (5th
Cir. 1984). These decisions appear to have been straining for universal rules rather than
resolutions of the particular facts-a failing shared by commentators, as well. See, e.g.,
sources cited supra note 234.
••• 684 F.2d at 290. See generally, Note, supra note 4, at 327 n.138.
••• As Professor Gunn has pointed out:
Briarcliff does not support the deductibility of the cost of licenses. Where a cost,
such as that of a license, does not provide benefits that decrease with time, Lincoln
Savings & Loan clearly bars a deduction, even though that result may be more or less
(depending on the actual duration of the business) unfortunate as a matter of taxation of only net income.
Gunn, supra note 5, at 494 n.230.
184
See Warner, supra note 87, at 5.
••• See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text.
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duction would not distort the taxpayer's income. Justification may
also be based on the ground that amortization was not feasible due
to inability to separate present and future benefits. Nevertheless,
allowing current deduction of permit fees with an indefinite life
would distort the taxpayer's income.

4.

Acquisition Cost Doctrine Response to NCNB II En Bane

In direct response to the Fourth Circuit's talismanic application
of the separate, saleable asset test to business expansion costs, two
other circuits subsequently applied the acquisition cost doctrine to
bank expansion costs. First, in Ellis Banking Corp. v. United
States 288 the Eleventh Circuit easily applied the doctrine to classic
acquisition costs (costs of determining through independent audit
the purchase price of target's stock acquired in geographic expansion through acquisition). 287 Second, in Central Texas Savings &
Loan Association v. United States 288 the Fifth Circuit broadly applied the acquisition cost doctrine to expenses seemingly indistinguishable from those incurred in NCNB. 289 The Fifth Circuit
viewed the state permits required for each bank branch as satisfying the separate and distinct asset test of Lincoln Savings &
Loan. 290
Tested against a distortion of income analysis, the result in Central Texas Savings & Loan was partly right and partly wrong. The
"" 688 F.2d 1376 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983).
••• ld. at 1380-81. The major function of examining the target's books was to determine
the appropriateness of the exchange ratio, or acquisition price-the quintessential acquisition cost under the origin-of-the-claim doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit apparently would
permit capitalization and amortization as a separate asset of the costs of market surveys
used in connection with a capital acquisition if the survey continued to be used in ongoing
operations. 688 F.2d at 1381-82 n.ll (citing the vacated NCNB I decision). The author also
would treat as a separate amortizable asset survey costs used solely in an acquisition if the
value of the survey is temporally limited and less than the life of the asset acquired, such as
a branch license. See supra notes 131-38 and accompanying text. Interestingly, the Eleventh
Circuit expressly acknowledged the conflict between its decision and the NCNB II majority.
688 F.2d at 1380 n.7.
••• 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984).
••• Id. at 1185. While not expressly acknowledging the conflict, the Central Texas Savings
& Loan court distinguished Briarcliff Candy and its credit card progeny (upon which the
NCNB II majority relied heavily). 731 F.2d at 1184-85. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit disagreed with the proposition that the compulsory accounting rule of bank regulators (also
relied upon in NCNB II) determined the tax consequences of the expenditures. Id. at 1185.
110
Id. at 1185.
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permit application costs were properly capitalized and added to
the cost of the nonamortizable permit or branch, but the survey
costs should then have been treated as a separate asset and currently deducted or amortized. Instead, the Fifth Circuit: (1) talismanically applied the acquisition cost doctrine derived from Richmond Television and its progeny to the (presumably recurring)
limited-life market survey costs; (2) mechanically associated them
with an indeterminable-life asset (the permits); and thereby, (3)
precluded amortization. 291 Thus, under this view recurring, shortterm benefit expenditures incurred in expansion to a new location
could neither be currently deducted nor amortized, thereby distorting the taxpayer's income-the same distortion that provoked
the separate, saleable asset test.
In Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co. v. United States 292 the
Claims Court completed the circle, reaffirming the start-up cost
doctrine of Richmond Television. The court reaffirmed the doctrine this time on its future benefits leg, the preparatory leg not
being available due to the binding precedent of Blitzer v. United
States. 293 Cleveland Electric Illuminating read Richmond Televi-.
sion and its Tax Court progeny as accepting or assuming the "not
fully articulated" rationale that
where a business requires substantial start-up expenditures before
it can begin operations, which are not directly for the purchase of
tangible assets and which will not ordinarily be recovered out of .
revenues for the same year, the capital investment is in the business as a whole rather than merely in the intangibles, and it includes the start-up costs. 294

The Claims Court accepted this rationale and thus rested on a
pure future benefits theory. Precisely this aspect of Richmond Tel111

The Fifth Circuit was led astray by the future benefits aspects of both the survey and
permit costs. "While the period of the benefits may not be controlling in all cases, it nonetheless remains a prominent, if not predominant, characteristic of a capital item." 731 F.2d
at 1183 (citing Judge Murnaghan's dissent in NCNB II).
••• 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). The Claims Court here followed the future benefits leg of Richmond Television; thus, start-up expenditures that will not ordinarily be recovered out of
revenues for the year constitute a capital investment in the business as a whole. ld. at 22829; accord Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986).
••• 684 F.2d 874 (Ct. Cl. 1982). In Blitzer, the Court of Claims held that Richmond Television expenditures constituted "capital expenditures under tax law standards even apart
from the 'trade or business' phrase in I.R.C. § 162." ld. at 880.
... 7 Cl. Ct. at 228.
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evision was overturned by the NCNB II en bane majority. 2911 Not
surprisingly, the Claims Court, like the Fifth Circuit before it in
Central Texas Savings & Loan, 296 also specifically rejected the
Fourth Circuit's separate, saleable asset test on the basis of the
clear reflection of income principle. The Claims Court noted that
"capital treatment of expenditures connected with the acquisition
of an asset having an extended life is an important facet of matching revenues and expenditures in determining net income. " 297
Yet the approach adopted by the Fifth Circuit and the Claims
Court itself produces distortion of income when recurring expenditures, e.g., market surveys or staff training, are added to a
nonamortizable asset, e.g., an indefinite-life operating permit.
Moreover, the courts' rejection of the separate, saleable asset test
creates a conceptual quandary-how to justify the current deduction of start-up-type costs. An example of this problem is allowing
current deduction of staff training costs for a new branch in expanding the same business, while requiring capitalization of startup costs for staff training for a new branch in a different or new
business. Cleveland Electric Illuminating attempted to do so on
the basis that the new business (nuclear power generating plant)
start-up costs for new employee training were substantial, provided
future benefits, and constituted a one-time expenditure. The court
distinguished this "new" business from a "same" business expansion because the same business (fossil fuel power generating plant)
expansion costs for new employee training were not so substantial,
replacement employees would receive similar training, and the employee turnover rate was projected as ten percent per year. In addition, the court found that no new operating permit was required
for the new plant in the same business, an immediate benefit was
present, and any division of the cost according to immediate and
future years was thought impractical. 298
Other litigation discloses that in fact start-up employee training
in a nuclear power plant is not a one-time expenditure, because the
employee turnover rate is quite high and extensive retraining is
••• 684 F.2d at 289 .
... 731 F.2d at 1184-85.
•.., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, 7 Cl. Ct. at 224 (stating the Claim Court's reading of the
Eleventh Circuit's holding in Ellis Banking).
••• ld. at 234-35.
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required on an ongoing basis. 299 Thus, all the Claims Court's purported differentiating factors, except "substantiality" and the requirement of an operating permit, would appear to apply equally
to the nuclear and coal-fired generating plants. Additionally, the
court's rationale in Cleveland Electric Illuminating for the "investment in the business as a whole" approach did not distinguish
the costs of the two plants. In the context of both start-up and
expansion costs the value created or acquired in excess of the cost
of the tangible assets is (increased) earnings power. 300 The Claims
Court should have set up the new business employee training costs
·(or perhaps only the excess over the amount of recurring costs) as
a free-standing asset amortizable over a period based upon projected employee turnover and retraining rates. The fossil fuel generating plant training costs similarly should have been set up as a
separate asset amortizable, probably, over ten years.
The basic question, therefore, is why did the Claims Court in
Cleveland Electric Illuminating and the Fifth Circuit in Central
Texas Savings & Loan ignore the NCNB I panel's "golden mean"
of amortization of substantial recurring expansion costs as a freestanding asset? A number of possible answers suggest themselves.
The NCNB I panel's approach was not articulated fully and was
confused by overreliance on GAAP as to the mechanics of amortization. Precedents 301 and commentary, 302 however, suggested the
proper analysis. Additionally, the taxpayers' counsels apparently
adopted an ali-or-nothing (current deduction or capitalization) litigating stance or artlessly presented any amortization arguments. 303
Nevertheless, the panel's discussion in NCNB I was there to be
read. The decisive factor for not using the "golden mean" of amor••• Madison Gas & Elec. Co. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 521, 543-44 (1979) (turnover was
high due to an extremely competitive job market and to physical and psychological
problems developing from stress; therefore, new operators had to be trained and current
ones retrained continuously), afrd, 633 F.2d 512 (7th Cir. 1980).
••• See supra note 233.
••• See supra notes 139-40 and accompanying text.
... See Erbacher, supra note 2, at 500 (start-up costs should be currently deductible and,
if not, amortized over a short period); Gunn, supra note 5, at 446 (capitalized costs should
be amortized as a free-standing asset); Seago, supra note 2, at 416 (recurring steady-state
start-up costs should be currently deductible).
••• See, e.g., Central Tex. Sau. & Loan, 731 F.2d at 1185-86 (court discussed taxpayer's
amortization claim only in the context of then-not-yet applicable § 195); Cleveland Elec.
Illuminating, 7 Cl. Ct. at 223-24 (taxpayer relied on separate and distinct asset as precondition to capitalization).
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tization approach in subsequent cases undoubtedly was the enactment of section 195 after counsel argued NCNB I but before issuance of the panel's decision. 304

D. Fatal Intersection of Section 195 and Case-Law
Development
Had some of the post-1980 case-law developments (Blitzer and
NCNB I) occurred earlier, section 195 would not be needed for
start-up, as contrasted with investigatory, costs. A functional approach to the "carrying on of a trade or business" proviso of section 162(a), coupled with both (1) capitalization as a free-standing
amortizable, "asset" of substantial not regularly recurring costs
and (2) current deduction of less substantial or regularly recurring
unequal amounts would have resolved the start-up cost controversy. Ironically, however, with the enactment of section 195 some
of these same developments (NCNB I and Central Texas Savings
& Loan) logically would render a large part of section 195 a nullity.
Section 195, as enacted in 1980, provided an elective sixtymonth amortization, commencing with the beginning of the taxpayer's trade or business, of the start-up costs of an active trade or
business, if identical expenses would have been currently deductible in the event paid or incurred in connection with the expansion
of an existing trade or business in the same field. soG This provision
rested on the following explicit assumptions, contained in the
Committee Reports, as to the then-existing case law: (1) start-up
and investigatory costs incurred prior to the commencement of
business were not currently deductible (under the preparatory doctrine) because they were not incurred in carrying on a trade or business;306 (2) often such start-up or pre-opening costs could not be
amortized because no ascertainable useful life could be established;307 and, (3) similar costs incurred in expanding an existing
... The panel decided NCNB I on June 18, 1981; arguments in the case took place on
Dec. 3, 1979. See 651 F.2d at 942. Section 195 was originally enacted on Dec. 28, 1980.
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-605, § 102, 94 Stat. 3521, 3522 (codified
at I.R.C. § 195 (1980)).
••• I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980). For the corresponding current provision, see I.R.C.
§ 195(c)(1)(B) (1984).
·
808
H.R. Rep. No. 1278, 96th Cong., 2d Seas. 9 (1980); S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at
10, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7300.
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 10. The 1980 Committee Reports stated that
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business were currently deductible 308 under the separate, saleable
asset test. 309 Thus, capitalization of substantial, but not frequently
recurring business expansion costs, under the NCNB I panel and
the Central Texas Savings & Loan decisions, logically would
render the sixty-month amortization pursuant to the original section 195 unavailable for comparable costs incurred before a new
business began. Under the NCNB I approach, but not Central
Texas Savings & Loan, "case-law" amortization would be available. This combination of the need to preserve the statutory reference point (deductible in expansion) and the legislative history's
definitional view of the (then) case law infected subsequent caselaw development.
This double impact of section 195 is probably the principal cause
of the Fourth Circuit's en bane decision to vacate the NCNB I
opinion. In NCNB II the court held that:
Congress is . . . under the impression that expenditures for market
studies and feasibility studies, as at issue here, are fully deductible
if incurred by an existing business undergoing expansion. An interpretation by us to the contrary would render § 195 meaningless for
it would obliterate the reference point in the statute-"the expansion of an existing trade or business."310

The Claims Court in Cleveland Electric Illuminating similarly
tried to maintain section 195, remaining true to Congress' view of
the prior law, 311 while at the same time rejecting the talismanic
separate, saleable asset test312 and the preparatory doctrine. 313
The next question is whether courts are compelled to follow the
"they [certain start-up costs) relate to a business with an indeterminate life." Id.; S. Rep.
No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7301.
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11. The 1980 Committee Reports provided that
"[i)n the case of an existing business, eligible start-up expenditures do not include deductible ordinary and necessary business expenses paid or incurred in connection with an expansion of the business. As under present law, these expenses will continue to be currently
deductible." Id.; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. &
Admin. News at 7302.
... See supra notes 226-35 and accompanying text.
310
684 F.2d at 291 (quoting I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980).
"' 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985); accord Johnsen v. United States, 794 F.2d 1157, 1163 (6th
.
Cir. 1986).
"" 7 Cl. Ct. 224-25.
.,. The Court of Claims (predecessor to the Federal Circuit, which reviews Claims Court
decisions) previously rejected the preparatory doctrine in Blitzer. See supra notes 196-204
and accompanying text.
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section 195 drafters' view of the deductibility of start-up and business expansion costs. The Claims Court accurately observed in
Cleveland Electric Illuminating that under traditional rules of
statutory construction "while the views of a later Congress are not
controlling as to the meaning and application of preexisting law,
they are entitled to consideration as a secondary authoritative expression of expert opinion as to such law. " 314 In fact, the expert
opinion of Congress, i.e., its statement of prior case law in the 1980
legislative history, has turned out to be erroneous. Congressional
opinion, apparently based upon commentary that described the
preparatory or pre-operating doctrine as applying to start-up
costs 3111 and the contradictory separate, saleable asset test as apply... 7 Cl. Ct. at 228; accord Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1163.
••• Neither the original nor amended statute adopted the definitions of "start-up" and
"investigatory" costs included in the 1980 Committee Reports. Compare I.R.C. § 195(b)
(1980) and I.R.C. § 195(c)(1) (1984) with H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 9-11 and S.
Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at
7300-02. The Committee Reports paraphrased the definitions of these costs suggested in
Lee, supra note 2, at 384-85. Thus, according to the Reports:
Investigatory expenses are costs of seeking and reviewing prospective businesses
prior to reaching a decision to acquire or enter any business . . ..
Startup or preopening expenses are costs which are incurred subsequent to a decision to acquire or establish a particular business and prior to its actual operation.
Generally, the term "startup costs" refers to expenses which would be deductible currently if they were incurred after the commencement of the particular business operation to which they relate . . . .
Startup costs may include expenses relating to advertising, employee training, lining-up distributors, suppliers, or potential customers, and professional services in setting up books and records . . . .
Under the provision, eligible expenses consist of investigatory costs incurred in reviewing a prospective business prior to reaching a final decision to acquire or to enter
that business. These costs include expenses incurred for the analysis or survey of
potential markets, products, labor supply, transportation facilities, etc. Eligible expenses also include startup costs which are incurred subsequent to a decision to establish a particular business and prior to the time when the business begins. For
example, startup costs include advertising, salaries and wages paid to employees who
are being trained and their instructors, travel and other expenses incurred in lining
up prospective distributors, suppliers or customers, and salaries or fees paid or incurred for executives, consultants, and for similar professional services.
H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 9-11; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7300-02. These definitions are similar to
those recommended in the author's earlier article:
Business investigation expenses consist of costs incurred in investigation of a prospective business prior to reaching a firm decision whether to acquire it. These expendi-

'
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ing to similar costs in business expansion, 316 did not consider a
deep structure distortion of income basis for capitalization and
amortization. 317 With both talismanic doctrines conceptually discredited,318 Congress' "view" of the law similarly erodes conceptually. Thus, the results reached by the Claims Court in Cleveland
Electric Illuminating and by the Fourth Circuit in NCNB II were
not mandated by the legislative history of section 195.
Under distortion of income principles, only recurring or insubstantial business expansion costs would be currently deductible;
less frequently recurring (say, more than every three years) or
'more substantial expenditures should be capitalized and then amortized as a free-standing deferred charge. Therefore, typical business expansion investigatory expenditures probably do not produce
benefits which diminish over the life of the business and, hence,
would not be treated as separate, amortizable assets. Most market
survey costs do produce benefits which diminish, but last longer
than a year and, hence, generally should be set up as separate,
amortizable assets unless repeated every two to three years. Advertising, salaries paid to employees overseeing the expansion, etc.,
should be currently deductible since they recur and produce shortterm benefits. Employee training as to the expanded facilities
should be either capitalized and amortized or currently deducted,
depending on the degree of regular retraining and employee turnover. The treatment of costs for obtaining distributors, customers,

0

tures are commonly distinguished from pre-operating expenses (also called start-up
or pre-opening costs), which are paid during the time between the decision to establish or acquire a new business and the beginning of actual business operations. The
term usually refers to expenses which would be currently deductible if they had been
incurred after business operations had begun in full flower. Typical examples of preoperating expenses are costs of advertising and promotion, training of employees, lining up suppliers and potential customers or distributors, and legal and accounting
services in setting up books and records. Expenditures for R & D, although capital,
are pre-operating and not investigatory expenditures. Distinctions analogous to investigatory, pre-operating, and operating expenses also exist in the areas of farming and
mining.
Lee, supra note 2, at 384-85 (footnotes omitted).
"" See Lee, supra note 2, at 391-95 (preparatory doctrine), 390 n.53, 411-13 (separate and
distinct asset doctrine).
117
The author's previous article mentioned the distortion of income. See Lee, supra note
2, at 412, 415. Nevertheless, setting up the start-up costs as a separate amortizable asset in
order to prevent distortion of income was not considered.
118
See supra notes 175-243 and accompanying text.
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and supplies in expansion should similarly depend on the degree to
which they are recurring and the turnover rate of such contracts.
Since substantial and less frequently incurred expenditures
would not be currently deductible under a distortion of income
analysis, whether expended in operation or expansion of an existing business, conceptual consistency would rule out section 195
amortization of similar substantial, but not frequently recurring,
expenditures in a new business. (Such non-covered start-up costs
in many instances should, however, be amortizable under section
167, at least once the business commenced.)819 Under this approach, longer-term, substantial expenditures would not be covered by section 195, while recurring lesser expenditures, which can
be currently deductible without distortion of income, would be
covered by the provision and thus, absurdly, only amortizable over
sixty months.
The ideal legislative solution to the business expansion and remaining start-up controversies would be expansion of section 195
to encompass business expansion costs and creation of a three-tier
system of deduction. First, recurring (in the sense of replacement,
not expansion) costs in creating a new business or expanding an
existing business that produce short- or highly variable-term benefits should be currently deductible. Second, expenditures so incurred producing longer- but not indefinite-lived benefits should
be amortized over sixty months. Third, expenditures producing indefinite-lived intangibles, e.g., permit costs, should be amortized
over a longer period, e.g., eighteen to twenty years.
If such an ideal legislative solution is not soon achieved, courts
will face three major options in dealing with business expansion
costs and start-up costs. The first option is for courts to "bow to
the will of Congress"320 in codifying past judicial error and to preserve section 195, denying current deduction of start-up costs

310

See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
••• Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 380 n.10 (1983) (holding that
courts must follow § 111, the codification of the judicially created tax benefit doctrine.)
Instead of correcting past judicial errors, the courts are yielding increasingly to the congressional codification or enactment of new provisions based upon such errors. The same holds
true regarding the judicial attitude toward administrative positions. An example of this
trend can be seen in the Supreme Court's recent revisit to the Crane doctrine. See Commissioner v. Tufts, 461 U.S. 300, 317 (1983) (O'Connor, J., concurring).

76

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 6:1

(under the preparatory or some similar doctrine) 321 while permitting a current deduction of all business expansion costs (to the extent they do not create a separate, saleable asset). 322 The second
option is to apply the "same business" standard broadly and at the
same time utilize the distortion of income concept (capitalization
and then amortization of substantial, long-term benefit expenditures) as to such business expansion costs, thus narrowing the category of start-up costs subject to section 195 while expanding the
start-up costs subject to capitalization and amortization outside
the statute. The final judicial option is to apply a distortion of income analysis to business expansion costs (regardless of whether
"same business" is construed narrowly), but apply section 195
broadly to all start-up costs other than those creating or enhancing
a separate, saleable asset.
The two options preserving section 195 (the first and third approaches) will possess the most surface appeaJ3 23 due to the potential ultimate lessening of controversy under the statutory regime
and to the quagmire of existing conflicting start-up and business
expansion precedents. These options, however, require eschewing a
distortion of income analysis, or at the least will produce conceptual inconsistency. Even such conceptual defects may not constitute the most serious problem with section 195. 32" Indeed, once the
full panoply of glitches in section 195, and particularly in the Committee Reports certain to be the model for future regulations, is
appreciated, the option of eviscerating section 195 through strict
adherence to distortion of income principles takes on an added
appeal.a211

au

See supra notes 175-87 and accompanying text.

••• See supra notes 225-35 and accompanying text .
... In Cleveland Elec. Illuminating, the Claims Court allowed a current deduction of employee training costs of the "same" business branch (fossil fueled electric generating plant),
but required capitalization of virtually the same expenditures associated with the "new"
business branch (nuclear fueled electric generating plant). Clearly the preservation of § 195
was a motivating factor. 7 Cl. Ct. at 229.
••• See infra notes 326-56 and accompanying text .
... Such strict adherence includes, e.g., capitalization and then amortization of substantial, long-term benefit business expansion and operation costs in an existing business, as
well as similar treatment by the courts of comparable new business start-up costs (excluded
from § 195 because not currently deductible in operation by an existing business).
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IV.

SECTION 195: PLUS ((A CHANGE, PLUS LA MtME CHOSE: THE
OTHER FAILED SYNTHESIS

A.

Introduction: "Those who cannot remember the past are
condemned to fulfill it. " 326

As the calls for federal tax simplification gained momentum in
the late 1970s, reform proponents studied start-up costs, among
many other areas. 327 To effectuate the goals of clarity and comprehensibility of the statutory requirements, ease of taxpayer compliance, and ease of administration, reformers suggested that the "entire area could be simplified and the controversy greatly reduced
by adopting a compromise akin to that adopted for corporate
organizational expenses. There, the law prescribes a 60-month
fixed amortization." 328 By eliminating the ali-or-nothing consequences created by adopting either the separate, saleable asset or
the preparatory rule doctrines, "the necessity for carrying the controversy to conclusion is greatly reduced and one would expect in
the long run that most of the controversies would be easily
settled. " 329
In 1979 Representative Barber Conable introduced a "simple,"
bare-bones bill, H.R. 5729, 330 which would have granted taxpayers
an election to amortize, over at least a sixty-month period commencing with the month the trade or business starts functioning as
a going concern, "ordinary and necessary" start-up expenditures.
Under the bill, such expenditures must have been incurred incident to the investigation, formation, and creation of a trade or business entered into, but prior to its functioning as a going concern.
Eligible expenditures must also have been "chargeable to capital
account," i.e., presumably not creating an asset with a useful life of
its own other than the business itself, 331 and been of a character
••• 1 G. Santayana, Life of Reason ch. xii (1905-06), reprinted in Oxford Dictionary of
Quotations 414 (3d ed. 1979).
317
See Krane, supra note 10, at 310; see also McDaniel, supra note 10; N.Y. Bar Report,
supra note 10.
••• Krane, supra note 10, at 310 (referring to what is now § 248(a)); see I.R.C. § 248(a).
••• Krane, supra note 10, at 311 n.25.
••• H.R. 5729, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 29,857 (1979), reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 181.
331
The Brief Summary of H.R. 5729 explained that:
The amortization election would apply only to [1) ordinary and necessary start-up
costs [2) which do not create an asset which has a useful life of its own and [3) which
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which, if the business had a determinable life, would be amortizable over that life. This proposal closely paralleled section 248,
which provides for sixty-month amortization of organizational expenditures. 332 Congress held hearings on this and other reform bills
in 1980. 333
The Department of the Treasury supported H.R. 5729 because it
would reduce "the disparity in tax treatment between ordinary and
necessary preopening expenses and similar expenses incurred by
an existing business." 334 Treasury's main concern, however, was to
"induce taxpayers with existing businesses to elect to amortize the
start-up costs of a marginally related business, thereby reducing
the number of controversies in this area." 335 Treasury wanted the
provision to require an unconditional election to amortize start-up
expenditures no later than the time for filing the return, including
extensions, for the year the expenses were paid or incurred.
At the Hearings on H.R. 5729 ("1980 Hearings"), witnesses
urged three principal points. First, the drafters should not adopt
as the commencement point for the sixty-month amortization period the Richmond Television test of functioning as a going concern, but instead should use the starting point employed in various
regulations interpreting other Code provisions (including section
248). These provisions deem a business to commence as soon as its
activities advance to the extent necessary to establish the nature of
the business. 336 Second, taxpayers incurring start-up or "expansion" costs in an existing business prior to the effective date of the

are of a character which would allow the taxpayer to amortize them if they were
expended incident to the investigation, formation, and creation of a trade or business
having a determinable useful life.
Brief Summary-H.R. 5729, reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, 181, 182. The original
proposed statutory definition (contained in § 193(b) as proposed by H.R. 5729) paralleled
[1) and [3) above, with "chargeable to capital account" corresponding to requirement [2).
See H.R. 5729, reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 181 (proposed § 193(b)).
••• I.R.C. § 248(a).
••• 1980 Hearings, supra note 2.
••• Id. at 14 (statement of Daniell. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for Tax Legislation).
••• Id.
••• Id. at 46, 102, 113, 114 (statements of Charles M. Walker, Chairman, Section of Taxation, A.B.A.; Samuel M. Chase, Jr., Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee of Real
Estate Securities, Nat'! Ass'n of Realtors; Paul Clevenger, Vice President, Taxes, UAL, Inc.;
supplemental statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate National Director, Tax Services,
Touche Ross & Co., respectively).
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proposed legislation should not be precluded from using the bank
credit card business expansion cost precedents 337 to obtain a current deduction under section 162. Third, the proposed statute
should be available "to an existing business investigating a new
product or service line, or preparing to open a new branch." 338 One
prophetic, but ignored, voice called for postponing consideration of
H.R. 5729 until the Court of Claims decided Blitzer, because it
might "clarify the definition of a beginning of business," 339 thereby
rendering section 195 unneeded as to start-up costs.
Congress held no further hearings, and the drafters of the provision enacted as section 195 responded to all of the above points
(save Blitzer) by minor changes in the still bare-bones statute, accompanied, however, by extensive additions to the explanatory
Committee Reports. 340 Additionally, the final statute required that
the trade or business be "active"341 in order to preclude amortization of start-up costs of investments. 342 To prevent amortization of
capital expenditures, the drafters in 1980 substituted for the "ordinary and necessary" requirement of the draft bill the language in
section 195 as enacted providing that amortizable start-up costs
must be (currently) deductible in the year paid if incurred instead
in expanding an existing business. 343
Thus section 195, as enacted in 1980, provided an "election in"
under which a taxpayer could elect to treat start-up expenditures
as deferred expenses amortizable ratably over a sixty-month or
longer period commencing with the month in which the business
began. 344 Eligible start-up expenditures included any amount paid

887

Id. at 110 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe). In general, the industry witnesses feared
that the Service would argue that, since proposed § 193 would permit amortization of certain types of expenditures prospectively, such expenditures should not be deductible or
amortizable prior to the effective date of the proposed new statute.
••• Id. at 115 (supplemental statement of Gerald W. Padwe).
••• Id. at 106 (statement of Samuel M. Chase, Jr.).
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 9-13; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10-14,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7300-04.
341
I.R.C. § 195(a) (1980); I.R.C. § 195(b)(1) (1984). See generally Shapiro & Shaw, StartUp Expenditures-Section 195: Clarification or More Confusion?, 34 Major Tax Plan. 11-1
(1982).
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12,
reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7302.
••• I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980); see H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11; S. Rep. No.
1036, supra note 9, at 12, reprinted .in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7302.
••• I.R.C. § 195(a) (1980); I.R.C. § 195(b) (1984).
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or incurred in connection with (1) investigating the creation or acquisition of an active trade or business or (2) creating an active
trade or business, which in either case would be currently deductible if paid or incurred in connection with the expansion of an existing trade or business in the same field. 3411 Predictably, the section 195 election had to be made by the due date (including
extensions) of the return for the year in which the business
began.346
The Tax Reform Act of 1984 (the "Act") 347 amended section 195
to make it exclusive as to targeted start-up costs; "start-up cost"
deductions under sections 162 or 212 were precluded, 348 and eligible start-up costs were expanded to cover Hoopengarner "pre-business" activities. 349 The Act also changed the 1980 statutory requirements for amortization under section 195 from a comparison
with expenses currently deductible in "expansion" of an active
trade or business to a comparison with expenses deductible in the
year of payment if the start-up costs had been paid in connection
with the operation of an active business. 3110 Even in 1984, however,
the drafters continued to ignore the deep structure conflict between the premise articulated in the 1984 legislative history to the
section 195 changes (that start-up expenditures "generally result in
the creation of an asset which has a useful life that extends substantially beyond the year in which incurred,"3111 presumably the
business itself) 3112 and the statutory requirement that the expendi-

... I.R.C. § 195(b) (1980). The bare-bones statute left to the Committee Reports the task
of defining start-up and investigatory costs. See supra note 315.
••• I.R.C. § 195(c)(1) (1980); I.R.C. § 195(d)(1) (1984).
347
Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 614-15 (codified at I.R.C. § 195).
••• I.R.C. § 195(a) (1984); Senate Comm. on Finance, Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Explanation of Provisions Approved by the Committee on March 21, 1984, 1 S. Print No. 169,
98th Cong., 2d Sess. 283 (1984), reprinted as 71 Stand. Fed. Tax Rep. (CCH) No. 16.
... S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283 (stating the Finance Committee's intent that §
195 reach expenses of the sort involved in Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538
(1983)); see supra note 175.
••• Compare I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980) with I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B) (1984). See infra notes
391-96 and accompanying text.
301
S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282. Increasingly, the courts also have begun to
adopt such future benefits capitalization as the basis for the start-up cost doctrine. See
Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1162 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating
Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985). But see Aboussie v. Unted States, 779 F.2d
424, 428 (8th Cir. 1985).
••• See supra note 112.
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ture be (entirely) deductible in the year paid in an existing business under general expense-capitalization rules. 3113 For an expenditure to be deducted entirely in the year paid, either in expansion
or operation, it must not distort the taxpayer's income. Yet the
current deduction of an expenditure with a useful life extending
substantially beyond the year in which paid will distort the taxpayer's income (unless it is de minimis or steady-state recurring),3a. whether expended in operation or expansion.
The legislative history shows that Congress believed that section
195 would "encourage formation of new businesses and decrease
controversy and litigation arising under . . . [prior] law with respect to the proper income tax classification of startup expenditures."31111 Attempts at simplicity through the adoption of legislation by Committee Reports flawed by both the adoption of caselaw reference points, where there is a splintering of authorities,
and the utter failure of the drafters to consider the deep structure
of capital expenditures, set the stage for complete confusion and
uncertainty as to the current rules-clearly a "disgrace"3116 given
the goal of simplification. Additionally, this tacked-on legislation
does not work in many instances, especially if the more recent business expansion cases and deep structure concepts are taken seriously. The 1984 remedial legislation still missed the mark.

••• I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B) (1984); I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980) .
... See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
••• H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 9; S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7301; see 1980 Hearings, supra note 2,
at 14 (statement of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax
Legislation). Halperin suggested that:
In the unclear cases, of which there are many, taxpayers should elect to amortize; if
they fail to elect and the Internal Revenue Service successfully maintains that the
costs must be capitalized, the election would not be available and the costs would not
be recoverable through amortization. Electing to amortize these expenses over five
years would appear for most taxpayers to be a more prudent decision.
ld. (footnote omitted); see Krane, supra note 10, at 311 n. 25.
••• Cf. NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 296 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting) Judge Murnaghan concluded: "The benefit heaped upon them [taxpayers, preeminently banks, by the separate,
saleable asset rule] further contributes to the deserved description of our income tax system
as a disgrace." ld.
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B. Efficacy of Section 195: The "Shot in the Foot"-The
Deductible Expansion/Operation Costs Reference Point
1. Introduction
H.R. 5729, closely paralleling the section 248(b) definition of
"organizational expenditures," 3117 defined start-up costs as any expenditure that is
(1) an ordinary and necessary expense incident to the investiga-

tion, formation, and creation of the trade or business;
(2) chargeable to capital account; and
(3) of a character which, if expended incident to the investigation, formation, and creation of the trade or business having a determinable life, would be amortizable over such life.m

Due to the absence of any deep structure analysis, the irreconcilable conflict between the "ordinary" requirement and the capital
expenditure aspects apparently was not perceived. Seemingly,
"chargeable to capital account" only referred to expenses which
would qualify but for the fact they are incurred prior to going concern status. 3119 However, the third requirement for amortization,
i.e., that the business has a determinable life, clearly rested on the
assumption that start-up expenditures are capitalizable as an acquisition cost, which would absolutely preclude "ordinary" status. 360 This conceptual schizophrenia has continued through every
subsequent version of the provision: the "shot in the foot."
Section 195, as enacted in 1980, defined start-up expenditures as
any amount
(1) paid or incurred in connection with(A) investigating the creation or acquisition of an active trade
or business, or
Section 248(b) defines 60-month amortizable "organizational expenditures" as "any
expenditure which-(1) is incident to the creation of the corporation; (2) is chargeable to
capital account; and (3) is of a character which, if expended incident to the creation of a
corporation having a limited life, would be amortizable over such life." l.R.C. § 248(b).
••• H.R. 5729, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979), reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at
181.
••• See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 109 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate
National Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.). According to Padwe: "Expenses which
would qualify but for the fact they are incurred prior to going concern status, become-in
tax terms-'chargeable to capital account' and not currently deductible; or, in accounting
terms, a deferred charge in the nature of an intangible asset." I d.
••• See supra note 19.
307
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(B) creating an active trade or business, and
(2) which, if paid or incurred in connection with the expansion of
an existing trade or business (in the same field as the trade or business referred to in paragraph (1)), would be allowable as a deduction for the taxable year in which paid or incurred. 861

Congress left to the unpromulgated regulations the role of defining
eligible start-up expenditures. However, the 1980 Committee Reports provided extensive definitions and illustrations of investigatory and start-up costs. Thus, investigatory costs were said to consist of the cost of seeking and reviewing a prospective business
prior to reaching a final decision to acquire or enter that business. 362 The Reports illustrated investigatory costs as "expenses incurred for the analysis or survey of potential markets, products,
labor supply, transportation facilities, etc." 363 The requirement
that the taxpayer actually enter into the active business was intended to prevent abuses, 364 such as in the reported cases where
taxpayers deducted travel costs for a prospective business that
manifested a strong personal component. 3611 While such an approach was easier to administer, a substantiation requirement
would have been more precise and equitable.
The drafters of the 1980 Committee Reports defined the second
category of targeted costs-start-up or pre-opening expenses-as
costs incurred subsequent to a decision to establish a particular
business, but prior to the time when the business began, and which
would have been deductible currently if they were incurred after
commencement of the particular business operation to which they
relate. 366 These Reports also illustrated start-up costs with "adver••• I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1981). The drafters explained that the second paragraph was intended to bar amortization of syndication costs, the acquisition cost of the business, and the
cost of investing in depreciable property. H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11; S. Rep.
No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12, reprinted in 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 7302.
[The texts of the House and Senate 1980 Committee Reports regarding the intent of § 195
are virtually identical. For the sole significant difference between the two, see infra notes
510-11 and accompanying text. Hereinafter, only the Senate Finance Committee Report will
be cited. In addition, since the 1980 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin News reprint includes the
orginal Senate Report's pagination, parallel citations will be omitted.]
... S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10, 11.
••• ld. at 11 .
... See infra notes 410-12 and accompanying text.
... See supra note 179 and accompanying text.
••• S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11; see supra note 315.
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tising, salaries and wages paid to employees who are being trained
and their instructors, travel and other expenses incurred in lining
up prospective distributors, suppliers or customers, and salaries or
fees paid or incurred for executives, consultants, and for similar
professional services. " 367
The drafters of the Reports pointed out that costs may be incurred during the start-up stage which would be nondeductible
and nonamortizable even if incurred subsequent to commencement
of busine~s operations, either because the expenses were of a
purely capital nature or related to a business with an indeterminable life. 368 The "ordinary and necessary" deductible expense of an
existing business in expansion (or now operation) standard of original section 195 was intended to deny amortization to such nonordinary and necessary business expenses. 389 The 1980 Committee Reports provided the following examples of such nonamortizable
expenses:
[A]mounts paid or incurred in connection with the sale of stock,
securities, or partnership interests are not within the definition of
startup expenditures, e.g., securities registration expenses, underwriters' commissions, etc., are not startup expenditures. In addition, the amortization election for startup expenditures does not
apply to amounts paid or incurred as part of the acquisition cost of
a trade or business. Also, startup expenditures do not include
amounts paid or incurred for the acquisition of property to be held
for sale or property which may be depreciated or amortized based
on its useful life, including expenses incident to a lease and leasehold improvements. 870

Although syndication costs cannot fit into the capital expenditure mold as easily as the acquisition cost of a trade or business, of
depreciable or amortizable property, or of leasehold improvements,
all three categories are not currently deductible under a distortion
of income analysis. To provide a deduction for syndication or registration costs, where the monies raised in the undertaking are excluded from income371 by the business raising the funds, would dis-

87
•
S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11-12.
,... Id. at 11.
,... Id. at 12.
870
Id.
371
See I.R.C. §§ 721, 1032.
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tort the taxpayer's income. 372 Additionally, current deduction of
the other listed capital expenditures would produce a distortion of
income since benefits are produced over a number of years and
none of the exceptions discussed in the model apply. 373

2.

Source of the Problem

The cause of the potential "shot in the foot" was the absence of
any deep structure or distortion of income analysis by the drafters,
courts, or commentators, prior to 1980, as to why start-up costs of
a new business should or should not be deductible currently. 374
Rather, the drafters of the Committee Reports and the statute accepted the new business preparatory doctrine and the existing business separate, saleable asset test as their conceptual framework. 3711
The 1980 Committee Reports explained that "business investigatory expenses of a general nature normally are viewed as being either nondeductible personal expenses, or as not being ordinary and
necessary trade or business expenses, viz., because no business exists, within the meaning of section 162 of the Code."378 The drafters believed that the latter definitional rationale applied to startup or pre-opening expenses as well, since they are incurred prior to
the actual operation of the business, 377 although some pre-opening
expenses would not be deductible even if incurred after business
operations commence because they "either may be of a purely cap171

See Missouri Pac. Corp. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 296, 309 (1984) (since year-one
stock issuance transaction gave rise to no taxable income to recipient corporation, year-two
adjustment gives rise to no deduction under the doctrine adopted in Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952)); Gunn, supra note 5, at 447 n.20; Lee & Murphy, supra note 5, at
524-25.
171
See supra notes 37-38 & 53-78 and accompanying texts.
174
See cases and sources cited supra notes 2, 168 & 171.
.,. S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12. Quoting the Senate Report's definition of investigatory costs, the NCNB II court concluded that: "Congress is thus under the impression
that expenditures for market studies and feasibility studies, as at issue here, are fully deductible if incurred by an existing business undergoing expansion." 684 F.2d at 291. In
Johnsen, the Tax Court similarly quoted the House Report's definition of start-up costs as
manifesting that "Congress has recognized that section 162 precludes deduction of preopening expenses." Johnsen v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 103, 116-17 (1984), rev'd on other grounds,
794 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1986); see also Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7
Cl. Ct. 220 (1985). Thus, courts have relied upon the drafters' mechanical reading of§ 162
to apply definitional rules that distort the taxpayer's income. See supra notes 305-17 and
accompanying text.
••• S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 10.
177
Id. at 11.
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ital nature, or may be capitalizable simply because they relate to a
business with an indeterminate life. " 378 The drafters correctly read
then-current law (Briarcliff Candy and its bank credit card progeny) as allowing, under the definitional "separate property interest
test," current deduction of the "ordinary and necessary" costs of
an existing business expanding in the same field, 379 at least as to
new ways of conducting an existing business. To preclude amortization of start-up costs that would be nondeductible and nonamortizable, even if they were incurred subsequent to commencement,380 the drafters of section 195 provided that amortizable
start-up costs did not include any amount that would not be currently deductible "if paid or incurred in connection with the expansion of an existing trade or business (in the same field ... )."381
By tying amortization of new business start-up costs to whether
identical expenditures would be deductible by an existing business
in expanding, however, the drafters left the door open for subsequent business expansion cases to rule that expenditures identical
to the start-up costs, intended to be covered by section 195, were
not currently deductible under section 162, and hence, identical
targeted start-up costs would not be amortizable under section 195.
The NCNB I panel did just that in treating recurring market survey costs incurred in expanding to new branches as constituting
separate, but amortizable assets. 382 Similarly, the Central Texas
Savings & Loan Association v. United States 888 treatment of
.,. ld.
170

ld. at 12.
""" Id. The Committee Reports explained:
Thus, amounts paid or incurred in connection with the sale of stock, securities, or
partnership interests are not within the definition of startup expenditures . . . . In
addition, the amortization election for startup expenditures does not apply to
amounts paid or incurred as part of the acquisition cost of a trade or business. Also,
startup expenditures do not include amounts paid or incurred for the acquisition of
property to be held for sale or property which may be depreciated or amortized based
on its useful life, including expenses incident to a lease and leasehold improvements.
ld.
""' I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980) (predecessor to I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B) (1984)).
""' 651 F.2d at 956-57, 962. The court held that the test is not whether the business is old
or new, but instead is whether the nature of the matching income represents current or
future income; expansion costs are usually related to anticipated future income, and hence
must be capitalized where a current deduction would distort income. See generally supra
notes 245-69 and accompanying text.
""" 731 F.2d 1181, 1185 (5th Cir. 1984).
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branch expansion costs, including investigatory costs, as constituting part of the acquisition cost of the branch itself under the "origin-of-the-claim" doctrine denied a current deduction for such
costs, although traditionally no case-law amortization of such cost
would be available since the branch would have no determinable
life.
The Claims Court attempted in Cleveland Electric Illuminating
Co. v. United States 384 to preserve a playing field for section 195
by permitting a current deduction for employee training costs as to
a new branch of the same business while requiring capitalization of
more substantial employee training costs as to a purportedly new
business. Denied the support of the preparatory doctrine by
Blitzer, 386 and itself functionally rejecting the separate, saleable asset avenue, 388 however, the Claims Court could not fashion a convincing rationale for its disparate treatment of substantially identical costs. 387
In summary, believing that expenditures identical to the
targeted investigatory and start-up costs .of a new business were
currently deductible if made by an existing business expanding in
the same field, 388 the drafters of section 195 chose the standard of
deductibility in expansion in the same field as the barrier to preclude the amortization of the cost of syndication, purchase of a
business, or assets when either held for sale or depreciable. Shortly
after the enactment of section 195, however, courts applying a distortion of income analysis or the origin-of-the-claim doctrine to
business expansion costs properly undercut the separate, saleable
asset doctrine. 389 Consequently, in some jurisdictions (e.g., the
Fifth Circuit and perhaps the Eleventh Circuit) expenditures identical to the targeted investigatory start-up costs could not be currently deducted in expansion, and hence, start-up costs of new
businesses arguably could not be amortized under section 195. This
would have eliminated the disparity between new and existing
businesses, albeit not in the direction intended by Congress .
... 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228-29, 234-35
••• See supra notes 193-213 and
.., 7 Cl. Ct. at 225.
887
See supra notes 298-300 and
888
See supra note 375.
••• See supra notes 287-304 and

(1985).
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
accompanying text.
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1984 Amendments

By 1984, Blitzer and Hoopengarner forced Congress to repair
section 195 by attempting to make it preemptive. The NCNB opinions also had exposed the defects in the statutory reference point
of deductibility of a comparable expenditure in expansion by an
existing business in the same field. Without explanation in either
the Senate Finance or Conference Committee Reports, the Tax Reform Act of 1984 amendments to section 195 changed "expansion"
to "operation" 390 in the section 195 requirement that identical expenses "if paid or incurred in connection with the operation of an
existing trade or business ... , would be allowable as a deduction
for the taxable year in which paid or incurred. " 391
Obviously, the change from "expansion" to "operation" was in
response to the NCNB opinions. Unfortunately, Central Texas
Savings & Loan was decided after the Senate Committee on Finance approved its version of the legislation but before preparation
of the Conference Bill and Report, 392 and thus, the impact of its
"origin-of-the-claim" analysis was not taken into account by the
1984 amendments. 393 The panel opinion in NCNB I viewed an "ordinary" expenditure as one that constituted part of the cost of producing the income for the current year and, conversely, a capital
expenditure as one that properly must be matched against some
future period's revenues that it would help produce. Therefore, the
panel remanded the decision to the district court to make a finding
concerning the amount of use of the market surveys in the taxpayer's current revenue-producing operations and the amount of
use of the surveys in the planning for, or implementation of, new
facilities for future use in the taxpayer's revenue-producing
••• Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 615 (codified at
I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B)).
••• I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B) (1984) (identical to I.R.C. § 195(b)(2) (1980) except "operation"
substituted for "expansion").
••• Central Texas Savings & Loan was decided on May 11, 1984. See 731 F.2d at 1181.
The Senate Committee on Finance approved its Report recommending amendments to
§ 195 on Mar. 21, 1984. See S. Print No. 169, supra note 348 (suggested amendments were
§ 73 of the Committee's proposed Deficit Reduction Tax Act). The Conference Report on
the Tax Reform Act of 1984, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., was ordered to
be printed on June 23, 1984.
••• In addition, the Claims Court's Cleveland Electric Illuminating and Sixth Circuit's
Johnsen decisions were not issued until 1985 and 1986, respectively. See 7 Cl. Ct. at 200;
794 F.2d at 1157.
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operations. 39"
Possibly, the drafters intended the 1984 change from "expansion" to "operation" to limit section 195 amortization to expenditures that are totally used up in current operations, while at the
same time to bolster the section 195 preemption of deductions for
start-up costs. Thus, Congress reasoned that such start-up costs
"generally result in the creation of an asset which has a useful life
which extends substantially beyond the year in which incurred." 3911
Such expenditures usually would not be deductible in operation of
an existing business in the year paid, under a distortion of income
analysis. 396 Consequently, the amendment does not remedy the
deep structure conflict between the conceptionalization of start-up
costs as creating a long-lived asset and a comparability requirement of current deductibility in operation largely to preclude
amortization of long-lived assets.

4.

Suggested Solution

The ideal solution would be application of the same statutory
rules to comparable expenditures by both existing and new businesses, i.e., a current deduction as to recurring and short- or variable-term benefits, a longer amortization for longer-term benefits
(say, sixty months), and a still longer amortization period for indefinite-life expenditures such as permit costs (say, eighteen to
twenty years). 397 If, however, as is more likely, Congress at most
merely tinkers with section 195 again, it should eliminate the reference to current deductibility if incurred in operation by an existing
business. The provision instead should articulate the criteria for
determining which shorter- and longer-term expenditures should
be amortized over sixty months by a new business and which
should not be amortizable, addressing both the degree of recurrence and the length of useful life necessary. One of the originally
proposed requirements for eligible start-up expenditures was
whether the expenditure would have been amortizible over the life
of the trade or business investigated or acquired if such trade or
... NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 962-63.
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282.
'" See supra note 354 and accompanying text.
••• See supra full paragraph in text following note 319; see also supra full paragraph in
text following note 172.
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business had a determinable life. 398 Adoption of this standard in
any minor amendment would satisfy Central Texas Savings &
Loan and its origin-of-the-claim test. However, it would not satisfy
the NCNB I panel's approach of treating a business expansion or
start-up cost as creating a separate, amortizable asset. Consequently, an alternative requirement under such an amendment
might be whether the expenditure, if not associated with the basis
of the business, would be amortizable as a separate, intangible
asset.
If Congress fails to reformulate section 195 along the above lines,
courts will have three options: (1) conceptually backstopping section 195 by adopting the definitional preparatory and separate,
saleable asset doctrines; 399 (2) adopting the functional distortion of
income doctrine as to start-up costs incurred in operation or expansion, thus rendering section 195 largely "meaningless";400 or, (3)
applying a functional test elsewhere, but strong-arming section 195
into a workable tool. 401 The keystone to current section !95's efficacy is the standard of deductible "if paid or incurred in connection with the operation of an existing trade or business."402 Those
seeking to maintain current section 195 must adopt either the first
or third alternative. The statute would be largely "meaningless" if
most substantial, less frequently recurring start-up-type costs
would not be currently deductible in operation, or expansion, of an
existing business under the functional distortion of income analysis
of the second choice. However, such a capitalized start-up cost
would be amortizable as a free-standing asset under the model.
The mechanism for undercutting the statute-the continuing shotin-the-foot statutory reference point of current deductibility-can
now be seen. Whether courts should yield instead to the adminis-

••• See supra text accompanying note 331.
... This is the approach taken by the Fourth Circuit in NCNB II, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir.
1982) (en bane) and the Tax Court in Johnsen v. Commissioner, 83 T.C. 103 (1984), rev'd on
other grounds, 794 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1986).
•oo This is the effect of NCNB I, 651 F.2d 942 (4th Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded en
bane, 684 F.2d 285 (4th Cir. 1982), notwithstanding Judge Murnaghan's protestations to the
contrary. See 684 F.2d at 294-95 (Murnaghan, J., dissenting).
••• See Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228-29, 234-35
(1985); see also Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1162-63 (adopting capitalization theory for start-up
costs, but seeking to preserve § 195); accord Central Tex. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. United
States, 731 F.2d 1181, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1984).
••• l.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(B).
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trative practicabilities of the third or first alternatives turns on the
other defects in section 195, also arising from loosely tacked-on tax
reform. Thus, the question to be asked as these further defects are
explored is whether section 195 is so seriously flawed that, absent
further amendment, courts should fashion a more equitable framework, along the lines of the model, outside of-and largely ignoring-the statutory provision.

C.
1.

Exclusivity of Section 195: When Does an Active Business
Begin and Confusion End?
Introduction

The commencement point of a trade or business, for purposes of
section 195 as enacted, had two intended consequences. First, if an
activity never reached that point, start-up costs incurred in the activity could not be amortized under section 195. Second, the sixtymonth or longer amortization could not commence until this point.
Additionally, perhaps as an unintended consequence, expenditures
incurred after this point presumably could not be amortized under
section 195. 403 Current section 195(b)(1) and (d)(1) continue this
requirement, adding, however, that amortization begins with the
month in which the active trade or business begins. Thus, both
original and amended section 195 narrowly limit the sixty-month
amortization to start-up expenditures that are paid or incurred in
connection with an (active) trade or business that the taxpayer actually begins. 404 The result of this provision is that "no deduction
is allowed . . . with respect to items incurred incident to a trade or
business which actually is not commenced or acquired by the
taxpayer. " 4011
While this prerequisite clearly rules out amortization of investigatory or pre-operating expenses of an enterprise that never actually commences business operations, it also might rule out amortization of unsuccessful investigations preceding an investigation of
a business ultimately commenced or acquired by the taxpayer.
Traditionally, the cost of unsuccessful general investigations is not
••• See Lathen & Lathen, The "Gap Period" Problem in Section 195, 62 Taxes 416, 41922 (1984).
404
See S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 13-14.
••• Id. at 13.
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added to the cost of a subsequent successful acquisition. 406 Consequently, the costs of the unsuccessful investigation in the same
field probably cannot be added to the cost, amortizable under section 195, incurred as to an active business entered into in that
field. 407
Congress intended that situations not covered by section 195
would be covered by section 165, if at al1. 408 However, only those
unsuccessful investigatory expenses going beyond a general search
to focus on the acquisition or creation of a specific business or investment that is not consummated are deductible under section
165, as a loss incurred in a transaction entered into for profit. 409
These rules are harsh ones; they were likely intended as barriers to
fictitious claims. 410 This rationale may also be one of the primary
reasons for the prior case law generally taking a harsh approach to

•oe See Rev. Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 C.B. 63, 64 (general investigatory costs incurred prior to
focusing on specific acquisition were personal, thus not deductible under § 165); Rev. Rul.
73-421, 1973-2 C.B. 34 (travel expenses in search of a business site were not incurred in
carrying on a trade or business). Contrary arguments have been made that unsuccessful
acquisition costs should be added to the cost of assets actually acquired. See Wabich, Expenses Relating to Abandoned Acquisitions and Business Expansion: Capital vs. Ordinary,
64 Taxes 377, 379-80 (1986) .
.., See Shapiro & Shaw, supra note 341, at 11-23 (raising issue whether general investigatory costs may be added to basis of subsequent related acquisitions); see also Solomon &
Weintraub, Business Start-Up Expenses and Section 195: Some Unresolved Problems, 60
Taxes 27, 31 (1982), reprinted in 7 Rev. Tax'n Individuals 123, 131 (1983).
•os S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 14, stated that start-up costs of a business with an
ascertainable useful life of less than 60 months may not be amortized under§ 195. However,
the start-up costs will remain subject to pre-§ 195 rules, which will apply to any remaining
unamortized amount upon termination of a business prior to the end of the 60-month or
longer amortization period. "Therefore, in an appropriate instance, a taxpayer may deduct
any unamortized amount as a loss (Code sec. 165) or an unamortized amount might be
carried over to the taxpayer's successor in interest . . . . " Id.; see also S. Print No. 169,
supra note 348, at 283.
09
•
Section 165 limits an individual's losses, other than trade or business or casualty, etc.,
losses, to "losses incurred in any transaction entered into for profit, though not connected
with a trade or business." I.R.C. § 165(c)(2). After considerable controversy, the Tax Court
and the Service agreed that the investigatory costs of a failed acquisition are deductible
under this provision once the taxpayer has gone beyond a general search and focused on the
acquisition of a specific business or investment, but then failed to consummate the attempted acquisition. Seed v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 880 (1969), acq., 1970-2 C.B. xxi; Rev.
Rul. 77-254, 1977-2 C.B. 63. See generally, Seago, supra note 2, at 413-14; Wilberding, supra
note 175, at 232-43; Comment, Transaction Test for Federal Income Tax Loss Deductions,
27 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 158 (1970).
••• See Sharp, Tax Relief for New Businesses: Equitable Treatment of Start-Up Costs, 57
Taxes 695, 699 (1979).
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investigatory expenses. 411 However, as commentators have pointed
out, "the appropriate remedy for abuse is a skeptical eye, not a
rigid rule of law. " 412

2. Source of the Problem
a.

Commencement Point of Amortization

H.R. 5729, as originally introduced, pegged commencement of
amortization to "the month the trade or business starts functioning as a going concern."413 This formulation clearly was modeled
on the Richmond Television, section 162 test, under which a taxpayer was not yet carrying on a trade or business "until such time
as the business has begun to function as a going concern and performed those activities for which it was organized."414 The Tax
Court also has followed this test. 416
However, by 1980 the answer to when a trade or business commences for purposes of section 162 was no longer unanimous. In
that year a district court in the Fourth Circuit ruled that recurring
payments made by the taxpayer for wages, employee training, utilities, promotion and consumable supplies, and advertising were
currently deductible under section 162 for the period from the first
of its tax year to the date in the same year that the taxpayer obtained a permit to conduct its business. 416 The district court functionally reasoned that the one-year rule417 (providing in part that
an expenditure producing a benefit that is exhausted completely
within the tax year is currently deductible) applied to a new business during the first tax year in which it began operations, thereNote, supra note 179, at 88.
1 B. Bittker, supra note 5, 'II 20.4.4, at 20-77 to 20-78; accord Shapiro & Shaw, supra
note 341, at 11-21 & n.20.
411
H.R. 5729, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1 (proposed § 193(a)), reprinted in 1980 Hearings,
supra note 2, at 181.
••• Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901, 907 (4th Cir.), vacated and
remanded on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965); see supra note 214 and accompanying text.
410
See, e.g., Bennett Paper Corp. v. Commissioner, 78 T.C. 458, 463 (1982), affd, 699
F.2d 450 (8th Cir. 1983); Todd v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 246, 249 (1981), affd, 682 F.2d 207
(9th Cir. 1982); Goodwin v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 424, 433 (1980), affd mem., 691 F.2d 490
(3d Cir. 1982); see also Aboussie v. United States, 779 F.2d 424, 428 (8th Cir. 1985) (court
held that "carrying on a business" starts when facts show that taxpayer almost certainly will
engage in a profit-seeking activity).
••• United States v. Manor Care, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 355 (D. Md. 1980); see supra note 219.
417
See supra note 247.
411

411
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fore producing no distortion of income. At the same time, the litigation leading to the Blitzer decision had commenced. 418 Blitzer
applied a functional profit-motivated noninvestment analysis to
the section 162 carrying on a trade or business proviso. This analysis in effect pegged practical commencement of a business to activities committing the taxpaying to an identifiable business activity,
and it rejected a requirement of carrying on revenue-producing operations as "an inflexible temporal prerequisite for the application
of I.R.C. § 162(a)."41 e
Moreover, the Service's audit activity in this area had increased
by the eve of enactment of section 195, with heavy reliance on
Richmond Teleuision;uo Viewing the "functioning as a going concern" criterion as erroneous, witnesses argued at the 1980 Hearings
on the proposed new section that such a test would leave "open for
controversy identification of the point at which a trade or business
begins to function as a going concern. Moreover, it [would] depart[] from the formulation already adopted in the Code in closely
analogous situations,"' 21 i.e., the regulations under section 248 and
1372(e)(5).422 The witnesses representing industry at the 1980
Hearings apparently feared that the Service would use section 195
and its proposed "functioning as a going concern" standard to
backstop the Service's audit and litigating posture that no deduction was allowable under section 162 until the business began to
function as a going concern,' 28 which in fact proved to be the
case. 42'
Section 195, as enacted, provided that the "not less than 60
months" amortization period commenced with the month in which
the business began. 420 Other than a reference to when an acquired
••• Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 880 (Ct. Cl. 1982). For a discussion of Blitzer,
see supra notes 193-213 and accompanying text.
••• 684 F.2d at 880.
••• See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 45, 101-02 (statements of Charles M. Walker,
Chairman, Section of Taxation, A.B.A., and of Samuel M. Chase, Jr., Chairman, Legislative
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, respectively).
411
ld. at 45 (statement of Charles M. Walker).
411
Treas. Reg. §§ 1.248-1(a)(3), 1.1372-4(b)(5)(ii)(b).
••• See 1980 Hearings supra note 2, at 102, 113 (statements of Samuel M. Chase, Jr.,
Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors, and of Paul W. Clevenger, Vice President, Taxes, UAL, Inc., respectively).
414
See, e.g., Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 1157, 1163 (6th Cir. 1986); Cleveland
Elec. IJJuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985).
••• I.R.C. § 195(a) (1980) (parenthetical language).
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business began (when acquired),'626 the 1980 statute was silent as to
when such event actually occurred. The 1980 Committee Reports,
however, stated that:
The month of acquisition is to be determined with regard to the
economic substance of each situation. Generally it is anticipated
that the definition of when a business begins is to be made in reference to the existing provisions for the amortization of organizational expenditures (Code sees. 248 and 709). Generally, if the activities of the corporation have advanced to the extent necessary to
establish the nature of its business operations, it will be deemed to
have begun business. For example, the acquisition of operating assets which are necessary to the type of business contemplated may
constitute the beginning of business. 427

Ironically, earlier in Richmond Television and in some of its progeny, taxpayers argued to no avail, based upon the section 248 regulations (the section 195 legislative history's reference point), that a
business commenced for purposes of section 162 as soon as its activities advanced to the extent necessary to establish the nature of
the business operations. 428
418
I.R.C. § 195(d) (1980). The month of acquisition was to be determined with regard to
the economic substance of each situation. S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 14.
417
S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 14.
••• In a previous article, the author noted that:
The district court in Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 66-2 U.S.T.C. 11
9589 (E.D. Va. 1963), clearly relied upon these regulations [Treas. Reg. § 1.2481(a)(3)) in giving the jury instructions as to when a business commences. Unfortunately, before the Fourth Circuit the taxpayer merely relied upon the section 248
regulations for the somewhat attenuated argument that since start-up costs were not
mentioned in such regulations as chargeable to capital account they were not required
to be capitalized. Brief for Appellee at 15, Richmond Television Corp. v. United
States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded per curiam on other grounds,
382 U.S. 68 (1965). Ironically, while many commentators have suggested that the [sic]
section 248 strongly supports the argument that trade or business status can attach
prior to full grown operations, its first explicit presentation to a court after Richmond
Television was an individual hobby loss case, rather than a preoperating expense
case. Justin A. McNamara, 32 T.C.M. 11, 16 (1973). Instead of pointing out that the
section 248 regulations speak only to when a business commences and not to whether
the requisite profit motive is present, the Tax Court broadly announced: "Our attention has not been called to, nor have we found any case which holds or even implies
that the test set forth in section 1.248-l(a)(3) has any applicability to determining
whether an enterprise in other than corporate form was [sic] actually entered into a
trade or business for purposes of section 162(a)."
Lee, supra note 122, at 460 n.481.
In Davis v. Commissioner, the taxpayer similarly relied to no avail upon the § 248 regula-
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Some commentators concluded that the above strands created a
"gap" under which a business might "begin" for purposes of commencement of amortization under section 195 (starting at the section 248 regulations' standard of when the nature of the business is
determined) at a point considerably earlier than under the Richmond Television test of when income-producing activities commence (before which time expenditures cannot be deducted under
section 162(a)). The commentators claimed that start-up expenses
incurred during this "gap" arguably could be neither currently deducted under traditional section 162 definitional authorities nor
amortized under section 195. Accordingly, they argued that to
achieve the legislative goal of reducing disparity between new and
existing businesses recurring "gap" expenses producing short-term
benefits should be currently deductible under Blitzer;m
The Service chose, probably wisely, to ignore the legislative history,430 as evidenced by Revenue Ruling 81-150. 431 In subtle reliance on Richmond Television, this Ruling held that a limited partnership, organized in 1980 to construct an offshore drilling rig and
to engage in contract drilling after its completion in July 1981, did
not begin a trade or business for purposes of section 195 until July
1981 and that section 162 amortization also could not begin until
that date. 432

tions in a pre-opening context. 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 1070, 1074 n.7 (1983). Moreover, the Tax
Court applied the Richmond Television actual business operations test to deny current deductibility of pre-opening expenses of a subchapter S corporation. Scott v. Commissioner, 46
T.C.M. (CCH) 1324 (1983). The Scott court did so despite the taxpayer's reliance on the
§ 1372 regulations, which provide, for purposes of the passive investment income test, that
"a corporation will be deemed to have commenced the active conduct of a trade or business
in the taxable year in which it first engages in activities (other than activities merely incidental to the organization of the corporation) designed or intended to enable it to engage in
any business operations." Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(ii)(b)), quoted in Scott, 46 T.C.M. at
1329. The more recently drafted "commencement of business" regulations attempt to push
commencement to a later date. See supra note 211.
••• E.g., Lathen & Lathen, supra note 403, at 419-22.
••• See id. at 422 (reporting that one author of unpublished draft § 195 regulations stated
that the draft provided that the beginning of business, for purposes of § 195, was when it
began for purposes of § 162, presumably under the Richmond Television test).
••• 1981-1 C.B. 119.
••• Id. at 120. The Revenue Ruling held that under Richmond Television the partnership
was not carrying on a trade or business until July 1981, when completion and operation of
the drilling rig took place; therefore, the management fee could not be deducted under
§ 162. As to § 195, the Ruling flatly stated that the amortization period began July 1981,
without mentioning any authority. ld. The Service thus ignored the statement in the 1980
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b. By-Passing Section 195
More serious problems, at least from the perspective of the Department of the Treasury's main objective of encouraging use of
section 195 and decreasing controversies, were the foreseeable 433
Blitzer and the unforeseeable Hoopengarner developments. After
the enactment of section 195, the Court of Claims concluded in
Blitzer,' 3 ' albeit in dictum, that for purposes of section 162 a partnership organized to construct and operate a low-income housing
project commenced carrying on its business no later than the date
by which it (1) acquired title to the land for the project, (2) executed its building loan agreement, and (3) received substantial
funds under the agreement, although construction of the partnership's income-producing asset had not begun. Thus, under Blitzer
any recurring noncapital expenditures incurred after such events
(amounting to a commitment to the identifiable business and the
acquisition of an asset to be used in the business, even though not
an operating asset) could be currently deducted under section
162(a). The decision by the Court of Claims in Blitzer thereby rendered section 195 superfluous as to recurring pre-opening costs
(but not as to investigatory costs), as the drafters of the statute
should have anticipated. To similar effect, the Tax Court in
Hoopengarner' 3 " subsequently permitted a current deduction of
noncapital expenditures under section 212 to commence upon the
acquisition of a property interest in a nonoperating asset, specifically a ground lease on which a building would be constructed to
be used in an anticipated active rental business. Not surprisingly, a
substantial number of affected taxpayers did not elect to amortize
start-up expenditures under section 195, but argued instead,
against Service opposition, that the costs were currently deductible

Committee Reports that when a business begins should be defined in light of the definition
provided by §§ 248 and 709, i.e., when the partnership's activities "have advanced to the
extent necessary to establish the nature of its business operations." S. Rep. No. 1036, supra
note 9, at 14.
••• See 1980 Hearings, supra. note 2, at 102, 106 (statement of Samuel M. Chase, Jr.,
Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of
Realtors).
••• Blitzer v. United States, 684 F.2d 874, 880 (Ct. Cl. 1982).
••• Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538 (1983), affd mem., -745 F.2d 66 (9th Cir.
1984); see supra note 175.
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under either section 162 or section 212. 438

3.

1984 Amendments

In 1984 Congress amended section 195 to deal with the problem
of taxpayers currently deducting pre-opening costs under section
162 or 212. As a "clarification"437 of the original definition of startup costs, Congress added a third category-costs paid or incurred
in connection with "any activity engaged in for profit and for the
production of income before the day on which the active trade or
business begins, in anticipation of such activity becoming an active
trade or business."438 This amendment was expressly intended439 to
cover the annual ground rent expenses permitted as a current deduction in Hoopengarner;" 0 At the same time that Congress
broadened the definition of start-up costs in 1984, it preempted
any further current deductions under section 162 or 212 as to
targeted start-up costs by denying any deduction for a start-up expenditure other than as an amortization deduction under section
195, with minor exceptions. •·n The 1984 amendments also provided, without any explanation in the legislative history, that "legislative" regulations would determine when an active trade or busi••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282 .
... The Senate Print stated that:
Present law is unclear whether a specific item should be capitalized[,] expensed, or
amortized as provided in section 195. For example, some taxpayers who do not elect
to amortize start-up expenditures under section 195 have argued that start-up expenditures are currently deductible as ordinary and necessary expenses under section
162, and, in any event, are deductible under section 212 as expenses paid or incurred .
in connection with property held for the production of income. The Internal Revenue
Service disagrees with both these positions.

Id.
•aa Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 615 (codified at
I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(A)(iii)).
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282-83.
••• See supra note 175.
... I.R.C. § 195(a) (1984); S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. The Conference Committee properly carved out, from the scope of § 195 capitalization, amounts deductible
under §§ 163(a), 164, or 174. I.R.C. § 195(c) (1984) (flush language); H.R. Conf. Rep. No.
861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 896-97, reprinted in 1984 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1445,
1584-85. The Senate Finance Committee believed that "start-up expenditures generally result in the creation of an asset which has a useful life which extends substantially beyond
the year in which incurred. Therefore, such expenditures should not be fully deductible
when paid or incurred but rather should be deducted over a longer term." S. Print No. 169,
supra note 348, at 282-83.
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ness begins. 442
The linchpin to the section 195 preemption of the current deduction of start-up costs is the determination of when an active
trade or business begins. If it begins as soon as the business can be
identified, both Hoopengarner and Blitzer can still come into play
as to expenses incurred from that point until revenue-producing
operations commence. Thus, as a practical matter, under this approach to determining the commencement of business section 195
"capitalization" and "amortization" would be limited to investigatory expenses. 443 Clearly, Congress did not intend this,""" and the
"legislative" regulations undoubtedly will peg the beginning of an
active business to some point close to, or identical with, the beginning of revenue-producing operations."411 Nevertheless, within the
four corners of the 1980 and 1984 legislative histories, the only
mention of when a business or active business begins appears in
the 1980 reference to the model of "identification of the business"
found in sections 248 and 709. To discern the intended scope of
the legislative regulations for determining when an active business
begins, namely, commencement of revenue-producing operations or
functioning as a going concern, (1) the 1984 legislative intent of
preempting Hoopengarner by section 195, (2) the reference to taxpayer arguments (implicitly based on Blitzer) that start-up costs
are currently deductible under section 162(a), which the Committees apparently also intended to preempt,""6 and (3) the rationales
... I.R.C. § 195(c)(2)(A) (1984).
••• Under the Blitzer approach, investigatory expenses are usually incurred before the
taxpayer acquires assets identifying the business. See 684 F.2d at 880. Moreover, such expenses more easily fall into an acquisition cost mold. See supra notes 216 & 218 and accompanying texts. Under a functional analysis, investigatory costs are more likely to be nonrecurring than start-up costs.
••• The Senate Finance Committee explicitly stated that it intended that the Hoopengarner expenses be covered by § 195, i.e., "capitalized" and electively amortized. S. Print
No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. The Joint Committee on Taxation Staff explicitly cited
Blitzer, to which the Finance Committee Report only alluded. General Explanation, supra
note 215, at 296; cf. S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283.
••• Thus, the circle will close, returning commencement of amortization closer to the original proposal of "the month the trade or business starts functioning as a going concern." See
supra note 330 and accompanying text. See generally Lathen & Lathen, supra note 403, at
422-23.
••• The Senate Finance Committee Report referred only to arguments under § 162 and
not to Blitzer specifically, unlike its references to § 212 and Hoopengarner. See S. Print No.
169, supra note 348, at 282. This omission may have been due to the Blitzer "preemption
gap." See supra note 429 and accompanying text. In the alternative, it may point out the
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of Blitzer and Hoopengarner must be read together.
Assuming that the regulations provide that an active business
begins no earlier than commencement of revenue-producing operations, Hoopengarner will have been legislatively overturned. The
situation as to Blitzer will be far less clear. The Court of Claims,
while speaking to the very types of expenditures described in the
1980 legislative history of section 195 as start-up costs when incu:tred prior to actual operation,'47 reasoned that normal recurring
expenses (utility bills, rent, stationery, and compensation) do not
provide benefits beyond the tax year in question and, hence, are
currently deductible under section 162(a) once the business commences."8 Under Blitzer, the new business begins for purposes of
section 162 as soon as it is committed to and assets (identifying the
business) are acquired. The key to the efficacy of the 1984 changes
in this regard is whether such normal recurring expenses incurred
after business commences under the Blitzer approach, but prior
both to completion of construction or acquisition of income-producing assets and to functioning as a going concern under the
Richmond Television approach, creates an asset with a useful life
extending substantially beyond the tax year in which incurred (i.e.,
the business itself of an increase in earning power). Only if the
recurring pre-opening costs can be said to "create" an active business are they covered by the mandatory "capitalization" of new
section 195(a). New section 195 applies only to "start-up costs"
and the "Congress believed that start-up expenditures generally
result in the creation of an asset which has a useful life which extends substantially beyond the year in which incurred";••e otherwise, such expenditures will be currently deductible under section
162 under both Blitzer and a distortion of income approach to capitalization. Paradoxically, if start-up expenditures do constitute
such an acquisition cost, they generally should not be currently de-

embarrassing fact that the drafters of original § 195 should have been on notice as to the
potential holding and impact of Blitzer. See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 102, 106 n.1
(statements of Samuel M. Chase, Jr., Chairman, Legislative Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Real
Estate Securities, Nat'l Ass'n of Realtors). In any event, the General Explanation explicitly
referred to Blitzer. See supra note 444.
••• See S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 11; see supra note 315.
448
Blitzer, 684 F.2d at 880; see Fowler, Continuing Saga of Start-Up Costs and Their
Identification, 17 Tax Adviser 244, 248 (1986).
••• General Explanation, supra note 215, at 296.
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ductible in "operation" under section 162(a) because a current deduction would produce distortion of income! 110
Blitzer assumes that such expenses do not result in the acquisition of such a long-lived benefit. 4111 To the contrary, the legislative
history of the 1984 amendments to section 195 (in a shift from the
rationale underlying the 1980 enactment of section 195, rather
than in a "clarification"),'~~ 2 as well as decisions such as Richmond
Television,' 113 Central Texas Savings & Loan,'~~' Cleveland Electric Illuminating,'~~ 11 and Johnsen,' 116 assume that they do. Thus,
the exclusivity of section 195 as to recurring expenditures producing short-term benefits incurred prior to commencement of revenue-producing operations likely will be established only through
additional litigation. A better solution would be to explicitly
amend section 162.

4. Suggested Solution
The lesser problem is when a business commences for purposes
of section 195. Symmetry undoubtedly mandates that a business
begin for purposes of section 195 at the same point that a business
is first being carried on for purposes of section 162. From a functional point of view this stage will be as soon as the activity is
identifiable as being profit motivated rather than an investment.
However, the regulations under section 195 most likely will peg
commencement of an active business to when the business begins
••• See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
••• 684 F.2d at 880 (recurring expenditures, e.g., utilities, rent, and office expenses, incurred prior to carrying on revenue-producing operations did not provide benefits extending
beyond the current tax year).
••• Compare supra notes 376-77 and accompanying text with supra note 395 and accompanying text.
••• Richmond Television capitalized pre-opening staff training costs and added them to
the basis of a nonamortizable operating permit. See supra note 112. In Francis v. Commissioner, however, the Tax Court treated recurring pre-operating expenses (insurance, professional fees, office supplies, auto and travel costs, etc.) as acquisition costs of the business
entered into. 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977). Blitzer dismissed Francis on the grounds that it
was devoid of "critical analysis." 684 F.2d at 880.
... Central Te:r.as Savings & Loan involved investigatory survey and permit costs. 731
F.2d at 1182. Such costs were more easily fit into the acquisition cost analysis the opinion
espoused than recurring pre-opening costs would be. See supra full paragraph in text following note 318; see also supra note 443.
••• 7 Cl. Ct. at 228.
... 794 F.2d at 1162.
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to function as a going concern in order to backstop section 195's
new anti-shelter preemption. The section 162 authorities, in time,
may also be expected to yield to this standard.
The actual root of the problem in preemption by section 195 is
the continued disparity between new businesses and existing businesses; the former are limited to sixty-month amortization of expenditures that the latter can deduct currently. Similar rules
should apply to similar expenses incurred by both new and existing
businesses. Therefore, the ideal solution is to cover both new business start-up and exisitng business expansion costs under the same
statutory provision, allowing a current deduction or five-year, eighteen-year, or twenty-year amortization, depending upon articulated functional factors. 4117 If such an equitable solution is not enacted, courts will best achieve equity by reading section 195 so as
to take substantial long-term benefit pre-operating and business
expansion costs out of its penumbra. This position can be based on
the ground that such costs, as capital expenditures, will not be currently deductible in operation but instead will be amortizable as
free-standing costs by estimating their useful life equitably under
Cohan. However, this case-by-case approach will generate continued controversy and may lead most courts "to bow to the will of
Congress" 4118 in codifying past judicial error, at least as to start-up
costs.

D. Exclusion of Business Expansion Costs: Don't Bank on
Pyrrhic Victories
1. Source of the Problem
The 1980 Hearings on H.R. 5729 aired two problems regarding
the then-proposed new section and expansion costs of existing
businesses: whether the new provision would overturn the prior
bank credit card "method of business" precedents and whether an
existing business expanding through new branches would be able
to use the proposed section if the new branch start-up costs had to
be capitalized. A witness suggested that the first problem should
••• See supra full paragraph in text following note 172; see also supra full paragraph in
text following note 319.
••• Hillsboro Nat'l Bank v. Commissioner, 460 U.S. 370, 380 n.10 (1983); see supra note
320.
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be resolved by committee reports providing that the section was
"not intended to create any presumptions about the state of the
law concerning start-up expenditures in prior taxable years." 4119
The second problem, the witness continued, should be solved by
. the statute or committee reports clarifying that the section was
"not intended to penalize existing businesses if they would otherwise meet the qualifications to amortize expenditures under section [195], and that the new section should be given reasonable
interpretation as applicable to existing organizations. " 460
Instead, the 1980 Committee Reports stated that amortizable
start-up expenditures did not include ordinary and necessary business expenses incurred in connection with the expansion of an existing trade or business; rather, "[a]s under present law [prior to
NCNB I and Central Texas Savings & Loan], such expenditures
will continue to be currently deductible." 461 The determination,
however, of whether there has been an expansion of an existing
business or an entering into a new trade or business "is to be based
on the facts and circumstances of each case as under present
law."462 In the context of the 1980 "present law" preparatory doctrine, the Tax Court regularly defined the taxpayer's existing business narrowly, particularly in the context of real estate, where it
believed that rental holdings in different geographic locations constituted different businesses463 and that development (construction
for sale or rental) of residential, commercial, and industrial real
estate constituted different businesses. 484 The Fourth Circuit flatly
••• 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 110 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate National Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.).
410
Id. at 115 (supplemental statement of Gerald W. Padwe).
481
S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12.
••• Id.
••• Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977); see Odom v Commissioner, 44
T.C.M. (CCH) 113 (1982) (also looked at substantiality of compared rental activities);
Shehan v. Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 727 (1970) (similarity of activities not shown);
cf. O'Donnell v. Commissioner, 62 T.C. 781, 785-86 (1974), (substantiality of activities in the
existing business constituting a material factor), arrd, 519 F.2d 1406 (7th Cir. 1975);
Preseault v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 685, 687 (1975). Contra Malmstedt v. Commissioner, 578 F.2d 520, 527 & n.13 (4th Cir. 1978). The Tax Court's position as to geographic separation conflicts with the current law concerning conduct of the same or of different active business under § 355(b)(2). See Lee, Proposed Regs. Under 355 Overhaul
Device Test and Single Business Divisions, 46 J. Tax'n 194, 198-99 (1977).
414
York .v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 520, 526-27 (1957) (residential and commercial development not the same as industrial development), rev'd, 261 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1958); accord
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disagreed on both points. 4811 The Tax Court, however, on occasion
took a broader approach similar to the new methods/new business
line drawn by some of the bank credit card cases," 88 where neither
real estate nor geographic expansion was involved. 467 It followed a
particularly expansive approach as to the business of being an
employee. 488
Subsequently, the Claims Court in Cleveland Electric Illuminating added to the confusion as to the "present law" line between
expansion of an existing business and entering a new trade or business.489 The court found that nuclear generation of electricity was
·a new and different business than generation of electricity by conventional fossil fuel plants. 470 Yet, under the bank credit card
cases, nuclear generation appears to be merely a new way of carrying on the existing business of generating electricity. 471 It was exceedingly poor drafting, even for congressional committee reports,
to specifically incorporate an area in which there was an existing
conflict between the Tax Court and other tribunals" 72 (with other
conflicts to develop) as to what the "present law" then was regard-

Malmstedt v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 199 (1976), rev'd, 578 F.2d 520 (4th Cir.
1978).
••• Malmstedt, 578 F.2d at 526-27; York, 261 F.2d at 422 .
... See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
••• See Brown v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 397 (1979) (development of computer
monitored learning program was part of existing business of tutoring learning disabled);
Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1184 (1977) (costs of registering
certain variable annuity contracts with the Securities and Exchange Commission by a company's subsidiary were currently deductible).
••• See Primuth v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 374, 377-78 (1970). For its progeny, see, e.g.,
Black v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 108, 113 (1973) (employment agency fee was deductible
although new job in same field obtained independently); Cremona v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.
219, 220-22 (1972) (employment agency fee was deductible although taxpayer remained employed at old job); Kenfield v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1197, 1199-1200 (1970) (employment
agency fee was deductible, although taxpayer accepted a new job obtained through an
agency, then stayed with his old job because he received a promotion resulting from the new
job offer); Motto v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 558, 559 (1970) (employment agency fee was
deductible, even when the new job obtained is in the same field). See generally Tucker, An
Individual's Employment-Seeking Expenses: Analyzing the New Judicial Climate, 34 J.
Tax'n 352 (1971); Note, Federal Income Tax Treatment of Business and Employment Investigatory Expenses, 56 Minn. L. Rev. 1157 (1972).
••• 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985).
470
Id. at 229.
471
See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
471
Compare supra note 464 and accompanying text with supra note 465 and accompanying text.
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ing expansion versus new business. This situation represents still
another case of tacked-on reform producing the antithesis of simplification, i.e., unpredictability.
Possibly the drafters of the 1980 Committee Reports left open
the question of "expansion" so that taxpayers in "marginal cases"
would choose amortization under section 195. However, had the
drafters drawn a bright line between start-up and expansion costs,
some taxpayers would have chosen current deductions under section 162 rather than amortization under section 195. The drafters
may have believed that the uncertainty of hanging definitions
would force more taxpayers to the certainty of section 195. 473 Experience with deductions claimed under Blitzer and Hoopengarner
suggest that this would not have been the case. 474
Once again, a more fundamental issue than the statutory mechanism for exempting expansion costs of existing businesses from
section 195 amortization is the question of why Congress intended
preferential treatment for an existing business (current deduction)
as contrasted with a new business (only sixty-month amortization).
Clearly the sixty-month or longer period for amortization under
new section 195(b)(1) was copied from sections 248 and 709,4711
which provide sixty-month amortization of organizational expenditures by corporations and partnerships, respectively. A major proponent pronounced the sixty-month amortization as more desirable than the immediate deduction for many businesses:
This is because the first few years of a business operation often
show low profits so that immediate deductibility might generate a
net operating loss. A net operating loss can be complicated for a
small businessman to handle. Thus, spreading the deductibility of
startup expenses over 5 years may correspond more closely to the
earnings growth of a new business. 478

471
See supra note 355 and accompanying text.
••• Congress estimated in 1980 that amortization under § 195 would reduce fiscal year
budget receipts by $22 million in 1981, $73 million in 1982, $121 million in 1983, $180 million in 1984, and $254 million in 1985. S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 14. The 1984
amendments, precluding a current § 162 (Blitzer) or § 212 (Hoopengarner) deduction, were
expected to increase fiscal year budget receipts by $23 million in 1985, $36 million in 1986,
$31 million in 1987, $26 million in 1988, and $19 million in 1989. S. Print No. 169, supra
note 348, at 283.
••• Compare the statements in the 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, with S. Rep. No. 1036,
supra note 9, at 14. See generally Krane, supra note 10, at 310-11.
••• 126 Cong. Rec. 24,813 (1980) (statement of Rep. Conable, introducer of H.R. 5729).
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More likely, however, sixty-month amortization was chosen as a
compromise to the aU-or-nothing stakes of pre-section 195 case
law:n 7
Tax reform, particularly tax simplification, has no substantial
natural lobby;ns at least prior to President Reagan's efforts in
1985-86. Therefore, simplification projects must tread a narrow
path to reach a "collegial" understanding among the tax profession
interest groups themselves-Joint Committee, Treasury, and Service staffs and tax section representatives from the professional associations of tax accountants and lawyers 479-without stirring up
·any opposed special interest groups along the way. During the deliberations over section 195, the banks obviously were concerned
that their judicial victories regarding credit card business expansion might be lost in the legislative arena. 480 Perhaps this led Congress to preclude section 195 from limiting existing businesses to
sixty-month amortization of start-up-like costs.
In any event, the compromise sixty-month amortization of new
business start-up costs continued the disparity between a new business and an ongoing business; consequently, the seeds of controversy continue to germinate. A more serious consequence to section
195's efficacy arising from the exemption of existing business
(through the 1980 "deductible in expansion" standard) was the
risk that business expansion costs would not "continue to be deductible" when the issue shifted from expansion by new methods
to expansion to new geographic locations. Indeed, the House Ways
and Means Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures was
warned that costs of such geographic expansion might prove deductible under neither section 195 nor 162. 481 With Central Texas
Savings & Loan this unheeded warning came true. Under the Fifth
Circuit's analysis, "establishment of a new branch office creates a

417

See Krane, supra note 10, at 310-11 & n. 25.
See McDaniel, supra note 10, at 35-36, 72-75.
470
See Hoffman, Role of the Bar in the Tax Legislative Process, 37 Tax L. Rev. 413, 499502 (1982).
••• See 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 110 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate
National Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.). Referring to the bank credit card
victories, Padwe urged the Subcommittee members to adopt reports that "include language
that enactment of new Code section 193 [ultimately § 195] is not intended to create any
presumptions about the state of the law concerning start-up expenditures in prior taxable
years." ld.
411
Id. at 114-15 (supplemental statement of Gerald W. Padwe).
471
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separate and distinct additional asset. " 482 The Fifth Circuit also
added the costs capitalized under the "origin-of-the-claim" doctrine to the nonamortizable basis of the indefinite-life permits, 488
just as the Claims Court in Cleveland Electric Illuminating added
the cost of pre-opening staff training to similar permits. 484 Thus,
under their view expansion costs of new branches could not be deducted currently under section 162 and could not be amortized
under either current case law (as they could under the separate
asset approach adopted by the NCNB I panel) or logically under
section 195 (due to the Committee Report approach). Here too, of
course, the incorporated case law as to expansion costs developed a
conflict: Central Texas Savings & Loan, Cleveland Electric Illuminating, and perhaps Ellis Banking versus NCNB II.•n

2.

Suggested Solutions

The Department of the Treasury may be expected to apply a
strict view to expansion of a business under current section 195,
defining the "same business" very narrowly and thus broadening
the scope of the preemptive capitalizaton of the 1984 version of the
statute. Treasury may determine, e.g., that a new branch is to be
treated as a new business. In essence, this is the consequence of
the Central Texas Savings & Loan approach. With the section 195
preemption as to targeted start-up costs, this will encourage taxpayers to elect section 195 more frequently as to expansion costs,
the original goal of the Treasury. This approach also will have the
benefit of providing some deductions to taxpayers expanding to
••• 731 F.2d at 1185.
••• The permit costs were recurring, but only as part of the acquisition process; they
would end when expansion ended. Market surveys apparently were regularly made independently of acquisitions, but even if made solely for acquisitions such surveys could be a benefit only so long as they were not supplanted by changing market conditions. See NCNB I,
651 F.2d at 946 n.5; cf. Iowa-Des Moines Nat'! Bank v. Commissioner, 592 F.2d 433, 436
(8th Cir. 1979). In Iowa-Des Moines National Bank, although the value of the permits continued undiminished as long as the branch continued-a classic capital expenditure-unfortunately no amortization was available due to the absence of a determinable life.
ld.; see Gunn, supra note 5, at 490-91 & n.219; see also Nachman v. Commissioner, 191 F.2d
934, 936 (5th Cir. 1951). Market survey costs and permit costs should, therefore, be treated
differently under a distortion of income analysis. The two NCNB decisions and Central
Texas Savings & Loan failed to do so.
... 7 Cl. Ct. at 229.
••• See supra notes 287-97 and accompanying text.
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new branches in the Fifth Circuit. If Treasury applies a broad
reading of the "same business" to encompass expansion to a
branch in a different location, then potentially a taxpayer, at least
in the Fifth Circuit, will not be entitled to elect section 195. Additionally, under the Fifth Circuit view, such taxpayer will be able
neither to deduct these costs currently under section 162 nor to
amortize them under section 167. This result should be avoided at
all costs.
The ideal solution is statutory "reform" treating identical startup and expansion costs identically, ranging from immediate deduction to various periods of amortizations depending upon the frequency of the expenditure and its useful life. If this does not occur,
then courts choosing the second activist option should apply the
exception to section 195 for the expansion of the same business
very broadly, carving out many cases from the statute's scope.
Each class of expansion costs should therefore be set up as a separate asset currently deductible or amortizable over its "estimated"
useful life, equitably determined under Cohan if necessary.

E. Active Business: "When I use a word, . . . it means just
what I choose it to mean-neither more nor less. "488
1. Source of the Problem
The drafters of the original section 195 did not want the costs of
starting-up or investigating an investment to be eligible for section
195's sixty-month amortization. 487 The statute was meant to "encourage formation of new businesses"; 488 therefore, section 195 requires that amortizable start-up costs relate to the investigation or
creation of an active business, or to a profit-motivated activity
which, it is anticipated, will become an active business. In adopting
the term "active business," however, the drafters of section 195
recklessly plunged into one of the true Serbonian Bogs of the tax
world. 489 The term "trade or business" is widely used in the Code,
... L. Carroll, Through the Looking Glass and What Alice Found There ch. vi (1871),
reprinted in The Annotated Alice 269 (M. Gardner ed. 1960) (statement of Humpty
Dumpty) .
.., S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12.
... ld. at 11.
••• See, e.g., Whitman, Draining the Serbonian Bog: A New Approach to Corporate Separations Under the 1954 Code, 81 Harv. L. Rev. 1194 (1968).
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purportedly interchangeably, and while "active conduct of a trade
or business" and closely related terms are used less commonly,
conflicts abound in connection with the usage of both terms in various regulations and the cases, as has been noted by commentators.490 The drafters of the 1980 Committee Reports badly compounded the confusion by referring to "an active trade or business
(within the meaning of Code sec. 162)." 491 Traditionally, section
162 is thought to impose only a "trade or business" requirement,
and a rather easy standard to meet at that, while other Code provisions (such as sections 355 and 954(c)(3)(A)) using "active trade or
business" or "active conduct of a trade or business" require something more than a mere trade or business, particularly in the context of rental real estate. 492 The 1984 amendments of section 195
only intensified this confusion. 493

2.

Conduct Versus Active Conduct: Overview

The term "trade or business" appears more frequently in the
Code than "active trade or business" and related terms. 494 Although the lines between investment and trade or business have
long been blurred (especially in the Tax Court), for largely historical reasons,' 96 the more recent view is that the distinction between
an investment and a trade or business lies in the intensity of the
••• See, e.g., Lee, "Active Conduct" Distinguished from "Conduct" of a Rental Real Estate Business, 25 Tax Law. 317 (1972).
••• S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12 (emphasis added).
••• Lee, supra note 490, at 325-26.
••• See S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283.
••• Lee, supra note 490, at 317.
••• Prior to 1942, only property used in a trade or business, unlike investment property,
could give rise to deductions for depreciation and operating expenses. 2 B. Bittker, supra
note 5, 11 51.3, at 51-31 n.10. Consequently, the predecessor to the Tax Court essentially
espoused the position that renting of real estate was automatically a trade or business. See,
e.g., Fackler v. Commissioner, 45 B.T.A. 708, 714 (1941), aff'd, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943).
This position was maintained even after the enactment of the predecessors to §§ 167(a)(2)
and 212. See Hazard v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 372, 375-76 (1946); accord Elliot v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 283, 289 (1959); see also Lee, supra note 490, at 318-19; Comment, The Single Rental as a Trade or Business Under the Internal Revenue Code, 23 U. Chi. L. Rev. 111,
113-17 (1955). Other tribunals looked instead for regular and continuous management of
rental activities. Fackler v. Commissioner, 133 F.2d 509 (6th Cir. 1943); Grier v. United
States, 120 F. Supp 395 (D. Conn. 1954), aff'd mem., 218 F.2d 603 (2d Cir. 1955); Bauer v.
United States, 168 F. Supp. 539 (Ct. Cl. 1958). See generally Rothman, Capital Assets-Sale
of a Business or Property Used in a Trade or Business, 447 Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-18, A-22
(1983).

110

Virginia Tax Review

[Vol. 6:1

taxpayer's activities. Thus, a taxpayer can transform almost any
section 212 investment activity into a section 162 trade or business
by intensifying his participation. 496 Consequently, rental of a single
piece of property, or even of an important project, can constitute
an investment activity or a trade or business, or shift back and
forth from one status to the other depending upon the intensity of
the taxpayer's management or rental activities. 497 Significantly,
under this analysis net leasing property does not qualify as a trade
or business. "98
Active conduct of a trade or business, on the other hand, generally requires a taxpayer to engage in "entrepreneurial endeavors of
such a nature and to such an extent as to qualitatively distinguish
its operations from mere investments."" 99 In the context of active
conduct of a rental real estate trade or business, the taxpayer generally must perform significant operational management services;~00 net leasing property alone obviously will not qualify under
this standard.~ 01 A well-known provision in the pre-Subchapter S
Revision Act regulations, which is followed in several other regulations, sought to distinguish between passive and active rental businesses based upon whether the taxpayer rendered significant services to the tenant, with maid servies qualifying, but not
furnishing utilities, cleaning public areas, or collecting trash. ~
02

406

Hoopengarner v. Commissioner, 80 T.C. 538, 543 n.8 (1983), afrd mem., 745 F.2d 166
(9th Cir. 1984) .
•.., Hoopengarner pinned these otherwise sound conclusions on several cases; unfortunately these cases did not address the issue surrounding the applicability of § 162 versus §
212. Thus, Hoopengarner, and not the "precedents" upon which it relied, constitutes the
best authority.
••• Union Nat'! Bank v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 382 (N.D.N.Y. 1961); Lee, supra note
490, at 320-21. See generally Lee, Functional Divisions and Other Corporate Separations
Under Section 355 After Rafferty, 27 Tax L. Rev. 453, 462-66 (1972).
400
Rafferty v. Commissioner, 452 F.2d 767, 772 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408 U.S. 922
(1972); see Rothenberg v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 369, 373 (1967); Treas. Reg. § 1.9542(d)(l)(ii)(a)(2); Rev. Rul. 79-394, 1979-2 C.B. 141; Lee, supra note 463, at 199.
••• Cohen & Conzelmann, Corporate Separations-Active Business Requirement, 224-3rd
Tax Mgmt. (BNA) A-4, A-8 (1981).
001
Rafferty, 452 F.2d at 772-73; see Gada v. United States, 460 F. Supp. 849 (D. Conn.
1978); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.355-3(c) (Ex. 5). See generally Cohen & Conzelmann, supra note
500, at A-6; Lee, supra note 498, at 463. Net leasing coupled, however, with extensive acquisition, financing, and construction activities may constitute active conduct of a rental business. King v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1972) .
... Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(vi). Similar distinctions are drawn in other regulations.
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. §§ 1.167(j)-3(b), 1.1402(aH(c)(2); see also City Markets, Inc. v. Com-
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Under this rule, payments for use or occupancy of private residences, apartments, offices, and shopping malls constitute "passive" rental income, while the regulations treated similar payments
for motel rooms as active income. 1103 Such degree of activity is not
required under most active conduct of a trade or business
provisions. 1104

3.

Initial Legislative History of Section 195 as Enacted

The 1980 Committee Reports explained that the active business
requirement was intended to preclude amortization of the investigatory and start-up costs attributable to an investment. "For this
purpose, an activity with respect to which expenses are deductible
only as itemized deductions for individuals (Code sec. 212) is not
considered to be a trade or business. "ClOG The Reports also warned
that use in a trade or business under section 1231 would not determine whether the activity was a section 195 trade or business. 1108
Significantly, the comparable trade or business status provision of
section 1221(2) 1107 is one of the areas where some courts, purporting
to use section 162 as their model, stretched the term "trade or business," especially as to rental property, finding such status in a single rental of residential property. 1108
missioner, 433 F.2d 1240, 1242 (6th Cir. 1970); Bramlette Building Corp. v. Commissioner,
424 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1970); Feingold v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 461 (1968) .
... Treas. Reg. § 1.1372-4(b)(5)(iv).
604
See Lee, supra note 490, at 326-28; Lee, supra note 498, at 464.
••• S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12.
... Id.
007
See I.R.C. § 1221(2) (relating to the definition of "capital asset"); 2 B. Bittker, supra
note 5, 11 54.1.3, at 54-8.
008
See, e.g., Crawford v. Commissioner, 16 T.C. 678 (1951), acq., 1951-2 C.B. 2. Some
earlier reported decisions made a distinction between improved and unimproved rental realty, with only the former automatically considered a trade or business. Compare Hazard v.
Commissioner, 7 T.C. 372 (1946) (improved realty), acq., 1946-2 C.B. 3 with Emery v. Commissioner, 17 T.C. 308 (1951) (sale of unimproved realty). But cf. Curphey v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 766 (1980) (relying on factual determination in lieu of dichotomy between improved
and unimproved real property). Other decisions, however, also indicated that the rental of
even improved real estate did not qualify where the taxpayer's activities were minimal. See,
e.g., Grier v. United States, 120 F. Supp. 395 (D. Conn. 1954), affd., 182 F.2d 603 (2d Cir.
1955). The Service reversed its earlier position by stating it would apply a facts and circumstances test to all rental real estate. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8,350,008 (Aug. 23, 1983). Moreover,
since the improved real estate in question was net leased, the taxpayer engaging in little or
no activity as to the property, the loss on the sale was a capital loss and not a § 1231 loss,
i.e., a loss as to real property used in the taxpayer's trade or business. Id.
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Finally, the 1980 Committee Reports required, in the case of
rental activities, "significant furnishing of services incident to the
rentals to constitute an active business (within the meaning of
Code sec. 162) rather than an investment."1109 The earlier House
Report stopped at this point, 1110 thus raising the question whether
the more intense level of activity test of the Subchapter S regulations was intended. The drafters of the 1980 legislative history, apparently belatedly realizing the potential impact of their choice of
words, added in the subsequent Senate Report that generally "the
operation of an apartment complex, an office building, or a shopping center would constitute an active trade or business,m thus
manifesting that the more rigorous Subchapter S test was not the
intention of the Reports.
In summary, the start-up cost bill as introduced used the term
"trade or business" 1112 and the drafters probably added "active"
just to deal with the historical blurring of the line between investment and trade or business rental property. Unfortunately the
drafters again chose the format of a bare-bones statutory reference
fleshed out by the Committee Reports, attempting to incorporate
existing reference points, and again generated confusion based on
pre-existing conflicts as to the meaning of the statutory referent.

4.

1984 Amendments

Prior to Hoopengarner, Congress' goal was a narrow construction of "active business" so that pre-operating investment costs
could not be amortized under section 195, nor deducted currently
under then section 212 precedents.1118 Hoopengarner changed the
ground rules suddenly, providing the potential for a section 212
deduction for start-up (but not investigatory) costs of a new investment activity. Equipment leasing tax shelters usually involve
net leased property, as is also often the case with single tenant real
estate and with commercial real estate, 1114 so that all of these activities standing alone failed to constitute an active trade or business
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S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12.
H.R. Rep. No. 1278, supra note 306, at 11 .
S. Rep. No. 1036, supra note 9, at 12.
H.R. 5729, reprinted in 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 181.
See supra note 176.
Staff of the Joint Comm. on Tax'n, Handbook on Tax Shelters 52-53 (1976).
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under traditional authorities. Hoopengarner could be used in these
situations to obtain current deductions for pre-opening costs under
section 212, but not for investigatory costs, as soon as an asset to
be used in the activity is acquired, and perhaps even earlier when
contractual obligations identifying the activity are assumed. So
long as such activities are never "anticipated" to rise to active business status, they would not be caught by the new anti-Hoopengarner additional definition of start-up costs. 5111 Therefore, such
activities would not be capitalized under post-1984 section 195(a).
Clearly, the drafters of the Committee Reports accompanying the
1984 version of section 195 wanted a broader definition of "active
business" to render the preemptive section 195516 applicable, denying the current deduction of pre-operating costs of such net leased
property under section 212. 517
In 1984 Congress amended section 195, "clarifying" the deduction of start-up expenditures, so "that the rent expenses permitted
as a deduction in Hoopengarner, and similar expenditures, will be
subject to this provison. " 518 The drafters added to the two existing
1980 categories of start-up costs (investigation of an active business and creation of an active business) a third category, i.e., "any
activity engaged in for profit and for the production of income
before the day on which the active trade or business begins, in anticipation of such activity becoming an active trade or business." 519
Congress did not change the wording of the 1980 categories. To
back up this definition, preempting any deduction of start-up costs
under section 212 or section 162, Congress provided in new section
195(a) that all start-up costs had to be "capitalized"520 by denying
any deduction except for the sixty-month or more amortization deductions under section 195.m Congress believed that "start-up ex-

"'" See infra notes 418-23 and accompanying text.
••• See supra note 348 and accompanying text.
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283.
••• ld.
••• Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 94(a), 98 Stat. 494, 615 (codified at
I.R.C. § 195(c)(1)(A)(iii)).
••• See I.R.C. § 195(a) (1984). The drafters of the legislative history stated that "the committee believes that it is appropriate to require such expenses to be capitalized unless the
taxpayer elects to amortize the start-up expenditures over a period of not less than 60
months." S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283. Actually, capitalization is not usually an
alternative to amortization, but rather a precondition.
11
"
Exceptions are provided for deductions under §§ 163, 164, and 174. See supra note
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penditures generally result in the creation of an asset which has a
useful life which extends substantially beyond the year in which
incurred." 1122 Thus, the Hoopengarner-type pre-opening ground
rent deductions will constitute start-up costs, and therefore cannot
be deducted under section 212, but only may be amortized under
section 195.
Regarding net leased property, if the net leasing activity never
rises to an active business status, the pre-opening stage expenditures of the activity do not constitute capitalizable start-up costs
under section 195, and can be deducted currently under the
Hoopengarner reading of section 212. Congress made no change in
section 195 itself regarding net lease property, other than the general anti-Hoopengarner amendment in new section
195(c)(1)(A)(iii). Rather, following the now familiar, and disastrous, 1980 model, the congressional staff attempted to change the
meaning of "active business" via the Committee Reports to the
1984 amendments:
Active trade or business means that the taxpayer is actively conducting a trade or business. This definition of active trade or business may include a trade or business that is in many respects passive. For example, a business where property is regularly [leased?]
based on a net lease basis is an active trade or business for this
purpose. 623

Thus, the 1984 legislative history shifted, in the context of rental
activities, from a "significant furnishing of services" standard to
regularly leasing. The latter, but surely not the former, test would
catch net leased property, including equipment leasing tax shelters
and leasing of commercial real estate.
Is the 1984 formulation of "active business" as to net leased
property consistent with the 1980 test for rental activities? Judged
on the basis of established precedent,1124 the answer must be no.
Active conduct of a rental business requires significant services
with respect to the management or operation of the property, or

441.
•••
1157
•••
•••

S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 282; accord Johnsen v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d
(6th Cir. 1986).
S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283.
See supra notes 494-504 and accompanying text.
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both. 525 Net leasing on a regular basis alone will satisfy neither active conduct aspect. Moreover, such a "regular basis" test comes
perilously close to the sections 1221(2) to 1231 precedents, 526 explicitly disavowed by the 1980 Committee Reports. 527 Additionally,
the Federal Circuit recently ruled that regular, extensive, and continuous activities do not in and of themselves establish trade or
business status. 528
To the extent that the 1980 and 1984 Committee Reports conflict as to the application of the "active business" concept to rental
activities, the 1984 version is technically ineffective in changing
the meaning of the term enacted in 1980. Should the 1984 version
prevail? During the 1984 rearrangement of section 195, the 1980
definition of start-up costs, i.e., costs incurred in investigation or
creation of an active business, remained unchanged 529 except for
the addition of the anti-Hoopengarner clause covering a section
212 activity that it is anticipated will become an active business.
Assuming that "active business" means the same for (1) investigating and creating an active business and (2) holding for profit and
the production of income in anticipation of becoming an active
business, the 1984 Committee Report in effect technically explained the meaning of the term as used in the 1980 Act. Indeed,
the 1984 legislative history explained that the Senate Finance
Committee "intends that the definition of start-up expenditures be
generally the same as under present law but clarifies the definition
to cover certain pre-opening costs. " 530
Judicial application of and reliance on statutory construction in
congressional committee reports, as well as more informal legislative history, has intensified in recent years. 531 In the process,
courts have often discarded old maxims of statutory construction.532 One of these traditional rules is that evidence of later congressional understanding of a previously enacted statute has no in-

••• See supra notes 496-504 and accompanying text.
••• See, e.g., Hazard v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 372 (1946), acq., 1946-2 C.B. 3.
017
S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283.
••• Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 814 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
••• Compare I.R.C. §§ 195(c)(1)(A)(i), (ii) (1985) with I.R.C. § 195(b)(l)(A), (B) (1981).
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283.
••• Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme
Court Term, 68 Iowa L. Rev. 195 (1983) .
••• ld.
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terpretive effect as to the intent of the earlier Congress. 1133 More
recently the prevalent approach with regard to tax law is that the
view of a later Congress will not establish definitively the meaning
of an earlier enactment, but it is entitled to consideration "as a
secondarily authoritative expression of expert opinion." 1134 However, the maxim is still used that views of a subsequent Congress
cannot override the unmistakable intent of the enacting one. 11311
The discussion in the 1980 Committee Reports of the "significant furnishing of services" test interpreted the active business requirement for start-up and investigatory expenses in the 1980 Act.
The 1984 amendments did not change the existing definition of
active business for start-up or investigatory expenses, but only
added a category of expenses incurred in an activity which is anticipated to become, although it is not yet, an active business. Thus,
the 1984 Committee Report's pronouncements on the meaning of
active trade or business technically interpreted the definition contained in the 1980 Act, since the definition itself remained unchanged by the 1984 Act. Indeed, the 1984 Report stated that the
Senate Finance Committee "intends that the definition of start-up·
expenditures be generally the same as under present law but clarifies the definition to cover certain pre-opening costs." 1136 However,
since the 1980 and 1984 definitions of "active trade or business" in
fact conflict, technically the 1984 Report is ineffective to change
the meaning of the term as enacted in 1980. Although the 1980
definition should therefore technically prevail, the reality is that in
both 1980 and 1984 Congress chose to "enact" definitions through
committee reports rather than through a more detailed statute. In
essence, the 1984 Committee Report definition is merely a "techni-

••• See, e.g., Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 381 U.S. 252, 268-69 (1965)
(House and Senate Reports accompanying a vetoed attempt to amend the Merchant Ship
Sales Act of 1946 had little significance); United States v. Wise,- 370 U.S. 405, 411 (1962)
(subsequent interpretation of the Sherman Act by several Congressmen, unsuccessful in
their attempt to amend the statute, had no persuasive significance).
••• Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220, 228 (1985); accord
Johnsen, 794 F.2d at 1163 (subsequent congressional views carried some weight and could
not be ignored where clearly relevant); cf. Bobsee Corp. v. United States, 411 F.2d 231, 237
n.18 (5th Cir. 1969) (subsequent committee reports were not part of legislative history, but
should not be disregarded altogether because they constituted secondary expert opinion).
••• International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 354 n.39 (1977) (views
of a subsequent Congress were entitled to little, if any, weight).
••• S. Print No. 169, supra note 348, at 283.
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cal corrections act" amending the 1980 legislation by committee
report. The proper question, therefore, is whether this "amendment" of the definition of "active trade or business" by the 1984
Committee Report is prospective only. It is clear, in any event,
that the 1984 Report is to be treated in fact as a command and not
as an interpretation of the earlier definition.
Regardless of whether the 1984 Committee Report's extension of
section 195 to net leased property is upheld by the courts (and it
probably will be, the standards of construing statutes notwithstanding, if the obvious trend in recent business expansion cases,
i.e., leaving it to Congress, 037 is any portent), this problem well illustrates the dangers in following the "simplification" approach of
bare-bones statutory language, fleshed out by regulations for which
the committee reports are to serve as a blueprint. Congress could
have defined "active trade or business" for purposes of section 195
as it desired in 1980 and 1984. The Committee Report approaches
of looking to section 162 for the content of "active trade or business" and then abandoning a "substantial services" test for a "regular conduct" test, however, pose the danger of widespread ramifications throughout the Code, since section 195 purports to use a
standard term and meaning.
The final question is whether the orignal function of the section
195 active trade or business test-to preclude amortization of expenditures attributable to an investment-can still be accomplished with the new formulation of "active trade or business,"
(e.g., regularly leasing on a net lease basis). The essential distinction between an investment and a business is that an investment
involves mere collection of income and/or possibly holding for
long-term appreciation, while a trade or business requires significant activity beyond collection of income, however regular. 038 Just
as with the ordinary deduction in the expansion/operation exclusion of capital expenditure costs morass, the drafters of the 1984
Senate Finance Committee Report lost sight of the forest-the exclusion of investment costs.

••• See supra notes 310-11 and accompanying text.
... See Moller v. United States, 721 F.2d 810, 814-15 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Rothman, supra
note 495, at A-22. Trade or business status may differ, however, as to securities (involved in
Moller) and real estate. See Lee, supra note 490, at 323-24.
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Suggested Solution

Ideally, a revised statute ending the disparity in treatment of
investigatory and start-up costs between old and new trades or
businesses would also end the disparity, if any, between start-up
and investigatory costs of old and new investment activities. If
Congress intends to continue to limit section 195 amortization to
trade or business activities, however, then the statute itself should
focus on the functional distinctions between investment activities
and trade or business activities. The pertinent factors should include the level of intensity of the taxpayer's activity, the effect of
the use of agents, the status of a single rental activity, and the type
of rental activities. Moreover, any congressional revision should
also expressly consider the applicability of the revised provision to
areas analogous to start-up costs where distinctions traditionally
have been drawn between identical expenditures incurred prior to
obtaining trade or business status as an employee and those incurred after obtaining such status, e.g., costs of seeking a job in a
new field versus seeking a new job in the same field and costs of
education, beyond the minimum requirements, incurred before and
after trade or business status is attained. 1139
If Congress does not make such changes, the effect of the 1984
definition of active trade or business will remain unsettled. Most
likely, courts will accept regulations based on the new definition,
at least prospectively. The more difficult task will be drafting the
Treasury Regulations, which should adopt functional criteria, as
well as fashion a test covering a taxpayer regularly leasing property
on a net lease basis but excluding other passive investments.

V. CoNcLusiON
The case-law treatment of start-up and business expansion costs
illustrates well the dangers of applying definitional approaches in
the attempt to distinguish ordinary expenses from capital expenditures and to determine the degree of reasonable accuracy required
for estimating the useful life of an intangible for purposes of amortization. A functional clear reflection of income approach would
have viewed current deduction, capitalization, amortization, and
estimation of useful life as interrelated. The denial of both a cur... See supra note 274 and accompanying text.
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rent deduction and any amortization of capitalized start-up costs
by these definitional rules created distortion of income or inequity.
To avoid inequity some courts, rather than functionally challenging these definitional rules, created their own definitional separate,
saleable property test. These courts, and some commentators,
thought that the "rough justice" of currently deducting an expenditure, regardless of whether its benefits were short- or long-lived,
produced less distortion of income than no deduction at all. The
cases, however, splintered as to when a business began . and
whether an expansion involved the same business. Some decisions
also disregarded the corporate entity to allow current deduction
and amortization. Section 195 senselessly perpetuates every one of
these conflicts.
Some decisions, however, applied a functional approach to startup and business expansion expenditures. To avoid the distortion of
income that arose from the ali-or-nothing approach of both the
separate, saleable asset test· and the preparatory doctrine, Judge
Murnaghan in NCNB I turned to an accounting concept. He
treated the expenditure benefiting future years as itself creating a
separate, amortizable asset. If the expenditure was short-term or
fell into other instances in which a current deduction of an expenditure benefiting future years would not distort income, Judge
Murnaghan would have permitted a current deduction of start-up
and business expansion costs. 640
The difficulty in this functional approach lies not in its conceptual foundation but rather in practical administration. Treasury
has provided no standard for classes of useful lives of intangibles.
Consequently, under a capitalization and amortization approach to
start-up and business expansion costs, the taxpayer-and the
courts-must determine useful life in each case on its own facts. It
is unlikely that courts can apply the Cohan doctrine to create class
lives or even accelerated rates as a reasonable allowance for amortization. Thus, controversies will continue. In order for capitalization and amortization to work in tandem to avoid distortion of income, a liberal approach to estimating useful life of intangibles
must be taken. Basically, the view of the Cohan rule-that a court
must approximate if there is some deduction-should be applied
to an intangible when it is shown that the intangible is a wasting
040

NCNB I, 651 F.2d at 956-57, 961-62.
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asset or that the present investment at some point can no longer
reasonably be matched with income. Unfortunately, the reality is
that many opinions, in particular Tax Court decisions, require a
reasonable basis for a Cohan approximation, including estimation
of useful life. Thus, controversy will likely result as to the proper
determination of useful life. Furthermore, the basic conflict between those tribunals following the definitional approaches and
those adopting the functional approach will continue. Indeed, in
NCNB II the Fourth Circuit reversed Judge Murnaghan's functional approach by applying the definitional separate, saleable test.
Therefore, most courts following the lead of NCNB II may be
expected to "bow to the will of Congress" gladly and cede start-up
costs to section 195. Unfortunately, section 195 is as deeply flawed
as the prior definitional approaches that constitute its conceptual
foundation. The lack of deep structure analysis in the statute has
resulted in self-contradiction, in light of which the drafters have
sought to impose an "ordinary" prerequisite for deducting expenditures they regard as creating benefits lasting substantially beyond
the tax year. Section 195 continues the disparity between new and
existing businesses, with the former required to amortize expenditures that are currently deductible by the latter. Thus, perversely,
tax policy grants a slower, and hence less valuable, deduction to
the entrepreneur who is least likely to have access to capital or
debt markets because he is in a new business, while giving an immediate, and hence more valuable, deduction to an existing business-"an excellent illustration of a cart-before-horse policy." 1141
Section 195 is further flawed by its method of drafting: a barebones statute with regulations to supply the details. Even if this
concept has merit, the realities are that Congress, through the
Joint Committee staff, has attempted to direct the course of the
regulations through detailed legislative history. Perhaps due to the
absence of the discipline required in drafting a detailed technical
statute, these Committee Reports were replete with errors, confusion, and contradicton. Hence, it can be said that the will of Congress was reasonably clear, but-sadly-technically deficient.
Treasury, however, probably will draft regulations that ultimately will work. Courts probably will approve them, by and large .
.. , 1980 Hearings, supra note 2, at 107 (statement of Gerald W. Padwe, Associate National Director, Tax Services, Touche Ross & Co.).
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Section 195 probably will preempt section 162, as well as section
212, in the start-up area. In the interim, until the regulations are
finalized, and depending upon the choices made in those regulations, total confusion will reign. In the end, section 195 has failed
utterly at simplification and does not achieve parity. One can only
agree with Judge Murnaghan that the failure of the prevalent case
law and repeated remedial statutes-ultimately traceable in both
instances to the same lack of deep structure analysis-to treat
start-up and business expansion costs equitably and similarly "further contributes to the deserved [pre-1986] description of our income tax system as a disgrace. " 1142
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NCNB II, 684 F.2d at 296 (Murnaghan, J. dissenting).

